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Abstract 
Private international law applies to cases governed by private law which involve factual 
connections with several countries. A major issue governed by private international law is 
the question of which country’s law should be applied to determine the merits of a 
dispute.  
This thesis focuses on choice of law in respect of transnational contracts. It compares the 
legal principles concerning choice of law adopted by way of European harmonization 
with those currently utilized in the United Arab Emirates. The purpose of this comparison 
is to find points which are not addressed in the United Arab Emirates law under its Civil 
Transactions Code, or on which its provisions are unsatisfactory. In particular, the 
absence of any special provisions on choice of law for contracts such as consumer, 
insurance, and employment contracts which involved disparity of bargaining power 
between the parties, is considered. The thesis proposes new provisions which could 
usefully be adopted in the UAE by way of amendment to its Civil Transactions Code in 
the light of the European solutions under the Rome I Regulation.  
Attention is also given to a recently established territorial enclave, the Dubai International 
Financial Centre (DIFC), which has its own legal system, based on an English model, and 
is designed to attract international businesses and investors. Thus the thesis examines 
choice of law under DIFC law, and (in view of the rapid development of the DIFC legal 
order, and the numerous issues therein which have not yet been fully resolved) also 
considers other areas of private international law in the DIFC (such as judicial 
jurisdiction, arbitration and the enforcements of judgments and awards).  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
General Introduction 
The area of law identified as private international law, or the conflict of laws, is 
concerned mainly with three types of issues which arise in connection with legal 
relationships governed by private law, where the factual circumstances of the case are 
connected to more than one country. Principles of private international law may be 
referred to as conflict rules. Such issues may arise from the relations of persons, of acts or 
events, or of property involved. Thus, relevant connections may consist of an individual’s 
domicile, residence, or nationality; the place of incorporation of a company, or the 
location of its headquarters or of a branch office; the place of conclusion or performance 
of a contract; the place where an accident giving rise to a tort claim occurred; or the 
location of property. 
Private international law deals mainly with three types of issues in relation to 
transnational disputes: judicial jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments. Provisions on jurisdiction serve to determine whether 
the courts of one country are competent to entertain proceedings involving disputes which 
have some connection with another country. Rules on direct jurisdiction are applicable by 
a court for the purpose of determining its own jurisdiction to consider proceedings before 
it. Provisions on foreign judgments serve to determine whether a judgment given by a 
court of one country is to be recognised or enforced in another country.  
Provisions on choice of law select from the connected countries the one whose law will 
govern substantive disputes arising from the contract or other matter. Choice of law with 
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respect to contracts is one of the most important issues in the sphere of private 
international law. In addition to the obvious importance of the issue to a court or arbitral 
tribunal that must resolve a dispute between contracting parties, it is also important for 
the parties themselves, in planning the transaction and performing the contract, to know 
the set of rules that governs their obligations.
1
 Choice of law is also important, because 
transnational contracts are the vehicle for international trade and give rise to numerous 
disputes and much litigation. By choosing the governing law of a contract, the parties can 
dictate the law that will govern their rights and obligations and can ascertain their rights 
by consulting the chosen law. In the absence of a governing law clause in the relevant 
contract, numerous issues can arise. In purely domestic cases, it is obvious that the courts 
of the country with which the contract is exclusively connected will have jurisdiction and 
that the internal law of that country will be applied to determine the substantive issues. 
But in transnational contracts, where the parties reside in different countries or the 
contract was wholly or partly negotiated or performed in a country other than that of their 
common residence, there may be great difficulty in ascertaining which courts have 
jurisdiction to determine disputes arising from or in connection with the contract and 
which law will be applied in resolving substantive issues that arise in such litigation. 
Since the parties to a transnational contract often fail to include a choice of law clause, 
the default rules, which are designed to provide a supplementary solution to the problem 
of what law governs the substance of a contract, are of great importance.  
The character and purpose of conflict rules have usefully been explained by Lord Nichols 
of Birkenhead:  
Conflict of laws jurisprudence is concerned essentially with the just disposal of 
proceedings having a foreign element. The jurisprudence is founded on the 
recognition that in proceedings having connections with more than one country an 
                                                          
1
 See the Introduction to the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, 
available online at www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=135 (accessed on 21 May 
2015). 
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issue brought before a court in one country may be more appropriately decided by 
reference to the laws of another country even though those laws are different from 
the law of the forum court.
2
  
In a conflicts scenario, the laws of two or more countries are invoked, and a significant 
difference in the outcome of the case may depend on which law is applied. Several 
factors are considered before selecting one country’s law in preference to another 
country’s law, and these will be outlined and explored below. 
Determination of the law applicable to a contract without taking into account the 
expressed will of the parties to the contract can lead to unhelpful uncertainty because of 
differences between solutions from State to State. For this reason, among others, the 
concept of “party autonomy” in the determination of the applicable law has become very 
widely accepted. 
Since the 19th century, the growth of international trade has led to increasing numbers of 
transnational commercial disputes and has also resulted in strong international 
movements towards harmonising the various systems of law.
3
 
In the light of this background, the aim of this thesis is to examine and compare the 
provisions concerning choice of law in contracts which currently exist in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) under the Civil Transactions Code (CTC) and those that exist in the 
European Union (EU) under the Rome I Regulation, with a view to reaching conclusions 
concerning the possible reform of the UAE provisions so as to reflect solutions adopted 
by the European Union provisions. Attention will also be given to the relevant legislation 
in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), which is a recently created legal and 
financial enclave within the UAE, and in which there is a rapidly developing legal regime 
                                                          
2
 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co [2002] UKHL 19. 
3 Ramazan Zorlu, How conflict of laws rules have developed, and may continue to develop, to 
accommodate the requirements of international commerce, available online at: 
www.akellawfirm.com/yayinlar/HOW_CONFLICT_OF_LAWS_RULES_HAVE_DEVELOPED_AND_
MAY_CONTINUE_TO_DEVELOP_TO_ACCOMMODATE_THE_REQUIREMENTS_OF_INTERNAT
IONAL_COMMERCE.pdf (accessed on 21 May 2015). 
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that differs substantially, as regards both internal and conflict rules, from that applicable 
in the rest of the territory of the UAE. 
These legal systems have been selected because of the author’s background as a UAE 
citizen, who has studied the CTC and discovered weaknesses in its provisions on choice 
of law, and because the Rome I Regulation is an important measure, both within the EU 
and beyond. The global influence of the EU legislation on private international law is 
illustrated by the fact that the Rome Convention 1980, which was the predecessor of the 
Rome I Regulation, has been the basis of recent legislation in Russia.   
After these initial remarks, this chapter will proceed to explain the scope of the thesis in 
more detail and the research methodology used. Finally, it will explain the structure of the 
thesis and the focus of each of the subsequent chapters. 
The Scope of the Study 
This study will focus on the choice of law rules for contracts. It will evaluate and 
compare the choice of law rules on this matter laid down for the UAE by its Civil 
Transactions Code; for the DIFC by its own legislation; and for the EU Member States by 
the Rome I Regulation.  
The major comparisons in this thesis will be between the choice of law provisions 
concerning contracts under UAE law (the CTC) and the choice of law provisions under 
European Union law (the Rome I Regulation). In addition, the thesis will discuss the 
choice of law rules applicable to this matter in the DIFC, an enclave within the UAE, 
where the legal order is based on a common-law model, and there is a set of courts and 
laws distinct from those of the rest of the territory of the UAE. The DIFC merits 
particular attention because of its important role in commercial litigation on both the 
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domestic and international levels, especially after the recent expansion in the jurisdiction 
of its courts. 
A major reason for choosing the UAE law as part of this study is that, in the CTC, the 
UAE legislator has failed to provide detailed solutions for many potential issues 
concerning choice of law rules. Consequently, such issues are subject only to broad rules, 
such as those specified for contracts by Article 19, which fail to deal unambiguously with 
some of the problems that may arise. In contrast, the European choice of law rules for 
contracts under the Rome I Regulation are much more detailed.  
Another reason for undertaking the comparison is that the Rome I Regulation is widely 
applicable internationally, since it has to be applied by the courts of 28 EU Member 
States, the exception being Denmark, which still applies (largely similar) provisions of 
the Rome Convention 1980. Thus, the rules concerning choice of law specified by the 
Rome I Regulation can be useful as an indication of general principles of private 
international law, to which any court within the UAE may have recourse under Article 23 
of the CTC in order to resolve ambiguities in the choice of law provisions laid down by 
the CTC and to supplement the CTC by filling gaps left by incomplete provisions therein. 
The research methodology 
The methodology used in this thesis will be to proceed by way of scholarly, critical and 
comparative analysis of publicly available texts. The sources will be legislative 
enactments, judicial decisions and legal commentaries, published by way of printed 
books or journals or available from websites. 
This research will conducted by way of critical examination on a comparative basis. The 
critical examination will focus primarily on the UAE choice of law rules, which are the 
main focus of this thesis. The examination of the EU rules concerning choice of law will 
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be undertaken to identify inadequacies in the UAE rules. Although some inadequacies in 
the EU rules themselves may become apparent, reform of the Rome I Regulation is not 
the purpose of this thesis, and solutions for such inadequacies will not be proposed. 
The choice of law provisions in contract under both the European law and the UAE law 
will be subjected to scholarly analysis. This involves endeavouring to explain the 
meaning of provisions, to compare them, to identify problems, and to propose practical 
solutions. 
A comparative method will be used in this thesis, with the aim of finding solutions to 
issues and of suggesting the adoption of reforming legislation designed to embody such 
solutions. Therefore, to discover weaknesses in the existing UAE choice of law rules, the 
study will compare these rules with the EU choice of law rules. Thus, the rules laid down 
by the Rome I Regulation and the CTC will examined and compared.  
As regards the DIFC, the research will be based on official websites as well as published 
judicial decisions and articles written by lawyers active within the DIFC area. Due regard 
will be paid to the character of the DIFC as a territorial enclave that has its own legal 
system, which has developed rapidly in the last few years.   
The structure of the thesis  
This first chapter provides a brief general introduction, dealing with the subject matter  
and the scope and character of the thesis. Further background explanation will be offered 
in the next chapter, which will address the overall legal order of the main UAE (apart 
from the DIFC) and that of the DIFC, and will also consider the recent development of 
private international law by means of EU legislation.  
It is in the third chapter that the core issue for the thesis, the determination of the proper  
law of a contract, will be examined. This will be addressed under both the EU and the 
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UAE law in terms of the role of choice of law clauses expressly agreed to by the 
contracting parties or implied from the terms and circumstances, and of the default rules 
applicable in the absence of any choice by the parties.  
In the fourth chapter, the exceptions to the operation of the proper law under both the EU 
and the UAE will be examined in terms of particular types of issues (such as formalities 
or capacity), and of public policy and overriding mandatory rules. Then, in chapter five, 
choice of law for contracts involving weaker parties (such as consumers) will be 
analysed.  
Private international law in the DIFC will be discussed separately in chapter six. In view 
of the special character and recent creation of the DIFC, this chapter will range beyond 
the choice of law for transnational contracts and address various other related issues of 
private international law involving the DIFC, which have so far received little attention 
from scholars and commentators, thus enabling the significance and usefulness of the 
DIFC as a reliable trading post to be better understood.  
Finally, in chapter 7, the results and findings will be gathered together, and a draft will be 
included of a legislative proposal for the amendment of Article 19 of the CTC designed to 
rectify the inadequacies discovered in the existing provision.    
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Chapter 2 – Some Background Matters 
 
The present chapter addresses various matters, which provide the context of the main 
issues examined in subsequent chapters. It is divided into two parts. The first part deals 
with the United Arab Emirates. The general character of the country will be described 
and then its judicial system and its Civil Transactions Code. After this, attention will be 
focused on the UAE free zones. Finally the DIFC will be introduced and its judicial and 
legal order will be described.  
The second part of this chapter will address the general character of the European Union, 
and will describe the progress of harmonization at the EU level of private international 
law rules. Then, the chapter will examine the development of EU law in relation to choice 
of law in respect of contracts.  
.
Part 1 – The UAE 
The general character of the UAE 
The UAE consists of seven countries: Abu-Dhabi (the capital), Dubai, Ajman, Sharjah, 
Ras-Alkaima, Al-Fujairah and Umm-Alquain.
1
 
The UAE constitutes a region of the Arabian Peninsula bordered by both the Arabian 
Gulf and the Gulf of Oman and shares international borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman. 
On 2
 
December 1971, six of those countries gathered to establish the UAE; Ras-Alkaima 
joined the Union later, on 11
 
February 1972.
2
  
In spite of the small geographical area of the UAE (approximately 82,880 square 
kilometres), it is located in a strategically and economically important place, which has 
                                                          
1
 See S. C. Smith, Britain's Revival and Fall in the Gulf, (Routledge Curzon, London, 2004), pp.78-108.  
2
 For more information about the history of the UAE, see the TEN Guide, at 
guide.theemiratesnetwork.com/basics/history_of_the_emirates.php (accessed on 5 May 2015).  
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enabled it to create one of the most successful economic models in the world. The 
population of the UAE in 2010 was more than 8.3 million people drawn from more than 
190 different nationalities.
3
 Local citizens represent just 10% of the population in the 
UAE; the rest of the population (90%) is made up of foreigners.
4
 This diversity in the 
population is due to its perfect location for trading and investment. 
From an economic viewpoint, the UAE is one of the largest economies in the Middle 
East. According to the Minister of the Economy, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
the UAE increased from Dhs. 6.5 billion in 1971 to 1,540 billion in 2014.
5
 Furthermore, 
with respect to the UAE’s economic activity, 70% of the UAE’s GDP represents non-oil-
sector businesses. These include business services, transport, real estate, communication, 
and storage. The UAE plays a key role in these industries as a result of giving major 
consideration to transportation. The UAE’s critical role in transportation is anchored by 
the existence of the Jebel Ali Free Zone, which hosts more than 6,400 international 
companies from more than 120 countries
6
 and by the opening of the Al Maktoum 
International Airport, which is capable of processing more than 120 million passengers 
and 12 million tons of cargo annually. The Al Maktoum International Airport is the 
largest passenger and cargo centre world-wide.
7
 In addition, the Minister stated that the 
percentage of the UAE economy comprising non-oil businesses, which is currently 70 
percent, should rise to 80 percent during the next 10 to 15 years.
8
 In addition, the UAE 
government plans to derive 5 per cent of the total GDP from innovation in technology 
                                                          
3
 See United Arab Emirates National Bureau of Statistics, available online at 
www.uaestatistics.gov.ae/ReportDetailsEnglish/tabid/121/Default.aspx?ItemId=1914&PTID=104&MenuId
=1  (accessed on 7 May 2015).       
4
 Ibid. 
5 The approximate equivalent amount in UK is £ 285 million and 274 billion in October 2015.  
6
 Jebel Ali Free Zone, available at www.jafza.ae/en/about-us/jafza-facts-at-a-glance.html (accessed on 7 
May 2015). 
7
 Dubai World Central, Al Maktoum International Airport, at www.dwc.ae/dwc.html (accessed on 7 May 
2015). 
8
 Ministry of Economy, available at www.economy.gov.ae/arabic/Pages/default.aspx (accessed on 7 May 
2015). 
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and businesses activities by 2021. According to the International Monetary Fund, the 
growth rate is expected to increase moderately in 2015–16, from 3.3 percent in 2014 to 
3.5 percent in 2015.
9
 
Most importantly, in November of 2013, the UAE won the right to host the World Expo 
in Dubai in 2020. World Expos are the oldest continuously running mega events, having 
started in 1851 with the Great Exhibition in London.
10
 This will be the first time that the 
World Expo is staged in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia (MEASA).
11
 Expo 
2020 Dubai is expected to attract 25 million visitors, 70 per cent of whom will be from 
overseas. The Expo 2020 is expected to bring substantial benefits to the economy given 
Dubai’s well-established status as a hub of regional tourism and well-developed relevant 
infrastructure.
12
 
With these developments, the UAE has established a profitable and sociable environment 
for transportation and trade, setting the stage for a variety of contractual relations 
involving consumer contracts, distribution contracts, transnational contracts for the sale 
of goods, and contracts for the provision of services. Especially in light of the 
international nature of the population of the UAE, contractual issues frequently arise from 
these relations which involve foreign elements, such as where the negotiation and 
conclusion of contracts involve cross-border communications, or where one or both of the 
parties are foreign nationals or residents, and it is important in such cases to determine the 
law that governs the contract. For example, a contractual dispute could arise with respect 
to a transnational contract, such as a sale of goods contract, concluded between a buyer in 
Scotland and a seller in Dubai, or a contractual claim based on an export contract 
                                                          
9 See International Monetary Fund Country Report No.15/219 available online at: 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15219.pdf (accessed on 7 May 2015). 
10 See Expo 2020 Dubai, available online at: expo2020dubai.ae/en/world_expos/did_you_know (accessed 
on 7 May 2015). 
11 Ibid. 
12
 See International Monetary Fund Country Report No.14/188 available online at: 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15219.pdf (accessed on 7 May 2015). 
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concluded over the telephone between a German exporter located in the UAE and a 
French importer.  
The judicial system in the UAE 
 
The judicial system in the UAE is based on Article 103 of its Permanent Constitution, 
which provides that “each territory in the UAE should be ruled in all cases that do not fall 
under the supervision of the Supreme Court by the rulings of each territory’s own courts. 
The judicial system in these territories consists of three courts: a first instance court, a 
court of appeal, and a court of cassation, and the ruler of each territory can order the 
formation of a private court or committees to resolve any lawsuits.”13 
In spite of this provision, only Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Ras-Alkaima have established a 
court of cassation located within their territories. The other four member territories have 
to refer judicial matters to the Supreme Court, which is located in Abu Dhabi, for appeals 
against judgments given by these courts of appeal, because there is no separate third court 
in these territories. However, this arrangement can sometimes lead to conflicts between 
the sources of legal authority; if, for example, a judgment from the Court of Cassation in 
Dubai differs from a judgment of the Supreme Court in a similar case.    
The Court of First Instance  
The First Instance Court deals with the first stage of litigation under the judicial system of 
the UAE. The First Instance Court has general jurisdiction over all legal disputes. Its 
broad and comprehensive jurisdiction includes ordinary cases, authentications, and urgent 
matters. Its role is to enable the people to seek vindication of their just rights with 
security and safety. 
                                                          
13This is the author’s translation. 
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The Court of Appeal  
The second degree of litigation is the Court of Appeal, which reconsiders the verdicts and 
judgments of the First Instance Court. Its appellate role extends to both criminal and civil 
judgments and to both minor and major cases decided by the First Instance Court.  
The Court of Cassation 
The third and highest degree of litigation in the judicial system in the Emirates of Dubai, 
Abu Dhabi and Ras-Al khaimah is the Court of Cassation of the emirate in question. The 
jurisdiction of this court is indicated by Articles 173-188 of the Civil Procedures Law 
11/1992.  
Article 173(1) specifies the cases which will be addressed by the court of cassation. 
These include cases in which the challenge to the judgment is based on a violation of the 
law or its misapplication or misinterpretation; the judgment is invalid for procedural 
reasons;
14
 the appealed judgment was rendered contrary to the rules of jurisdiction; where 
the dispute had been resolved contrary to another judgment which had been given on the 
same subject between the same litigants and which was res judicata; the judgment lacked 
reasoning or its grounds were inadequate or ambiguous; or the judgment included 
unrequested demands or more than what was requested. But judgments issued by courts 
of appeal in proceedings of execution are not appealable in cassation.  
 
 
                                                          
14
 This can occur, for example, when the judge who renders the decision was not validly appointed, or 
where the document commencing the proceedings was not validly served on the defendant. Another 
example can be found in inheritance cases, which must be decided by a single judge, so that if three judges 
decide such a case, the judgment will be invalid. 
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The Federal Supreme Court 
The Federal Supreme Court, which is located in Abu Dhabi, is the highest federal judicial 
authority in the country. The federal Supreme Court consists of no more than five judges, 
who are appointed by a decree issued by His Highness the Head of State after approval by 
the Supreme Council. The decisions of the federal Supreme Court are final and binding 
on all.  
It is necessary to emphasise that any judgment from a court of cassation or the Supreme 
Court counts as a general precedent, upon which judges and lawyers can rely in any case. 
The federal Supreme Court deals with disputes between different emirates which are 
members of the Union and between one or more emirates and the Union government. It 
rules on the constitutionality of federal and other laws, on conflicts of jurisdiction 
between the federal judiciary and local judicial bodies, and on conflicts of jurisdiction 
between the judicial authorities in different emirates. It also has jurisdiction over crimes 
directly affecting the interests of the Union, the interpretation of the provisions of the 
Constitution, and the accountability of ministers and senior union officials appointed by 
decree regarding their actions in the performance of their official responsibilities. 
The Civil Transactions Code 
The Civil Transactions Code (CTC) was introduced by federal Law 5/1985 on 15 
December 1985, and came into force in 1986. The CTC is the present UAE enactment 
that includes provisions concerning choice of law with respect to contracts and torts as 
well as most other matters.  
IN 1973, choice of law rules for torts and contracts were laid down by the Dubai Court of 
Cassation, which announced that: 
14 
 
…if the court does not find any laws which govern the claim in question, then it 
should apply Islamic law; and if it does not find any rules in Islamic law dealing with 
the subject in question, then it can rely on custom to find an answer to the claim in 
question.
15
 
 
As a result, since there were no overarching enactments concerning choice of law issues 
within the UAE territories, the next reliable source of provisions to be applied to such 
issues was Islamic law.
16
 Before the CTC came into effect in the UAE, Islamic rules were 
applied to choice of law matters. Under these Islamic rules on choice of law, the parties’ 
religion served as the main element for issues concerning a foreign party; their nationality 
did not play a role in such issues.
17
 Consequently, the application of Islamic principles in 
matters concerning choice of law were applicable simply in cases where both parties were 
Muslims. Another law would be applicable if the parties were non-Muslims.  
The Civil Transactions Act 1985 consists of five chapters which contain 1,528 Articles. 
Many provisions are derived from or designed to respect Islamic Shari'a principles. 
It must be emphasised that Articles 10- 28 of the CTC cover most of the choice of law 
issues under private international law, including public policy, contractual obligations, 
non-contractual obligations, and family matters. Article 27 of the CTA clearly declares 
the character of the Act, as it specifies that: "…it shall not be permissible to apply the 
provisions of a law specified by the preceding Articles if such provisions are contrary to 
Islamic Shari'a." This makes it clear that principles of Islam have a great influence under 
the CTC; other rules, especially ones dealing with family matters, also make this clear.  
It is also clear that existing Western law, and particularly the French legal principles, 
have influenced the CTC. In lieu of Islamic law, this approach has been generally 
                                                          
15
 Case No. 221/1973, 23 February 1973; cited in E. Al-Tamimi, The Civil Transactions Act of the UAE 
(Al-Bayan Press, Dubai, 2002), p.10.  
16
 Abdulla Said A. H. Alsuboosi, Choice of law in tort: a comparative study involving the laws of the 
United Arab Emirates and of other countries (PhD thesis, University of Essex, 2009), p.57. 
17
 R. Draz, Choice of Law Rules in the Islamic Law, (University Press, Alexandria, 2004), p.280. 
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accepted by Jordan and Egypt. Historically, most Egyptian rules have been derived from 
the French legal tradition, and on this basis many Arab countries have introduced the 
Egyptian provisions into their legal systems.
18
 The UAE Article 19 of the CTC provides 
the general rules concerning choice of law in contracts. Article 19 is designed to respect 
an express or implied choice of law by the parties and to provide default rules that are 
applicable in the absence of such a choice. Article 19 of the Civil Transaction Code 
(CTC) provides that:  
(1) Contractual obligations, as to the form and subject matter, shall be governed by 
the law of the state of the joint domicile of the two contractors, if they have one 
domicile. However, if they have a different place of residence, the law of the state in 
which the contract is made shall be applicable, unless the two parties to the contract 
agree or if it is evident from the circumstances that another law is intended to be 
applied.  
(2) However, the law of the location of a real property shall apply to the contracts 
made in respect thereof.  
It is clear that this Article respects the parties’ choice of law, and, in absence of such a 
choice, the court will apply either the law of a joint domicile or the law of the place of 
contracting. 
One of the most important UAE provisions concerning private international law is Article 
23 of the CTC, which provides that: 
Principles of the private international law shall be observed where no express 
provision appears to exist in the preceding Articles regarding cases of conflicts of 
law.    
UAE Free zones 
Article 121 of the UAE Constitution provides that: 
Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding Article, the Federation shall 
have exclusive legislative jurisdiction in the following matters:  
- labour relations and social security  
- real estate and expropriation in the public interest  
- extradition of criminals  
- banks  
                                                          
18
 See Alsuboosi, note 16 above, at 59-60. 
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- insurance of all kinds  
- protection of agricultural and animal wealth 
- major legislation relating to the penal law, civil and commercial transactions and 
company law, and procedures before the civil and criminal courts  
- protection of intellectual, technical and industrial property and copyright  
- printing and publishing  
- import of arms and ammunitions except for use by the armed forces or the security 
forces belonging to any Emirate  
- other aeronautic affairs that are not within the executive jurisdiction of the 
Federation  
- delimitation of territorial waters and regulation of navigation on the high seas  
– organizing the free zone areas, determining the method of creation of such zones 
and the scope of their exception from the implementation of the Federal laws.  
Based on an amendment what was made to Article 121, each Emirati government is now 
allowed to create its own free zones. This law allows each Emirate of the UAE to 
establish its own Financial Free Zone. This right is derived from Federal Law 8/2004 
concerning the Financial Free Zones in the United Arab Emirates (the Financial Free 
Zone Law).  
Each emirate has established its own free zones. Abu Dhabi and Dubai have more free 
zones in comparison to the other emirates.
19
    
There are many benefits that may be gained from establishing a company in a free zone, 
and these are designed to attract the investors to start businesses there. A company 
established in a free zones is permitted to have 100% foreign ownership; in contrast, 
companies located outside of the free zones are obliged to have a local (Emirati) sponsor, 
and the maximum permitted level of foreign ownership is 49%. Another benefit derived 
from establishing companies in the free zones is that no taxes will be imposed on each 
company’s income and profits, and this exemption is guaranteed for a period of 50 years. 
Each free zone has its own particular requirements concerning minimum office or 
warehouse space and permitted activities. The Dubai International Finance Centre (DIFC) 
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 Dubai has 21 free zones; Abu Dhabi has 6 free zones; Sharjah has 2 free zones; Ajman has 3 free zones; 
Umm Al Quwain has only one free zone; Fujairah has two free zones; and Ras Al Khaimah has 3 free 
zones. For more information about the zones, see www.uaefreezones.com (Accessed: August 10, 2015).  
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is the leading free zone at the moment in the UAE, especially after the establishment of 
the DIFC courts, which makes it attractive to investors who may have greater trust in this 
legal system, since it is based on a common law model.  
Free Zone companies 
A free zone company will usually take one of the following three forms: a branch or 
representative office of a foreign company, a free zone company, or a free zone 
establishment. There is no minimum capital requirement for a branch or representative 
office, but in most free zones a free zone establishment and a free zone company are 
typically required to have a minimum capital of approximately AED 500,000,
20
 though 
the precise requirements differ from one free zone to another. A free zone establishment 
may be owned by a single individual or company, whereas a free zone company typically 
requires two or more owners.
21
  
The activities of a free zone company are restricted in that it is usually allowed to conduct 
business only within the relevant free zone and only by way of performing the activities 
specified in its licence. The relevant licence will be issued by the free zone authority 
regulating the free zone in which the company is incorporated. In particular instances, a 
free zone company may be able to apply for an additional licence from a UAE authority 
that has jurisdiction outside of the free zone (for example, the Dubai Department of 
Economic Development), if the free zone company is conducting certain kinds of 
permissible business in a certain Emirate outside of the free zone of incorporation.
22
  
                                                          
20 The approximate equivalent amount in UK is £ 88,000 in October 2015.  
21
 Doing Business in the United Arab Emirates, available online:  
www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2783_1.PDF (Accessed: September 10, 2015). 
22
 There are various types of licences, such as a trading license, an industrial license, a service license, and a 
national industrial license. For more information about these licences, see Doing Business in UAE, 
available online: www.jurists.co.jp/en/publication/tractate/docs/110804_UAE_E.pdf (Accessed: September 
10, 2015). 
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In order for a free zone company to engage legally in sales within the UAE (and outside 
of the relevant free zone), the company will generally have to retain a commercial agent 
or distributor. Nevertheless, free zone entities with service licences have been known to 
provide services outside their free zone.  
The foreign company's application to form a branch office in a Free Zone must be 
supported by copies of its constitutive documentation, appropriately worded board 
resolutions and a statement regarding the amount of capital set aside for the 
promotion and support of the branch office operation. The foreign entity's 
application to form a Free Zone Establishment or Company must be supported by 
copies of its constitutive documents and appropriately worded board resolutions.
23
  
 
Since a Free Zone Establishment will be a separate corporate legal entity, further 
information is required concerning the proposed share capital, the number of shares, the 
identity of local bankers and licensed chartered accountants and the appointment of 
directors and secretaries. In the case of a Free Zone Company, the required 
documentation will depend upon the nature of the shareholders.  
As regards offshore companies, such as Jebel Ali Offshore Company, an agent for the 
process must be registered before the Free Zone Authority is appointed and authorized, 
and registered with the Authority. Local law firms and accounting firms provide a 
registered agent usually for a fixed fee. 
The Dubai International Finance Centre (DIFC) 
The DIFC was established as a Financial Free Zone in the Emirate of Dubai by Federal 
Law 35/2004. The DIFC territory is in the centre of Dubai, and it covers an area of about 
110 acres alongside Sheikh Zayed Road. Its headquarters in the “Gate” building are 
highly visible. 
Dubai Law No 9/2004, the Law establishing the Dubai International Financial Centre, is a 
Dubai Law that recognises the financial and administrative independence of the DIFC. 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
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According to Article 3, three bodies must be established in the DIFC: the Dubai 
International Financial Centre Authority (DIFCA); the Dubai Financial Services 
Authority (DFSA); and the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts.
24
  
The goals of establishing the DIFC were specified in Article 4: to be a financial centre in 
the Emirate based on principles of efficiency, transparency and integrity with a view to 
making an effective contribution to the international financial services industry; to 
promote the position of the Emirate as a leading international financial centre; and to 
expand the Emirate economy. 
The DIFC Courts 
The formation of the DIFC courts was established by Dubai Law 12/2004. There are two 
DIFC courts: the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal. The Chief Justice of the 
Courts may create any tribunals in accordance with the DIFC Laws.
25
  
 
The Court of First Instance  
From its creation, the Court of First Instance has had exclusive jurisdiction to hear and 
determine various matters. These include all civil and commercial claims and actions to 
which the DIFC or any DIFC body, DIFC establishment, or licensed DIFC establishment 
is a party. They also include civil or commercial claims and actions arising out of or 
relating to a contract or promised contract, whether partly or wholly concluded, finalised 
or performed within the DIFC or to be performed or intended to be performed within the 
DIFC pursuant to express or implied terms stipulated in the contract; and civil and 
commercial claims and claims actions arising out of or relating to any incident or 
transaction which has been wholly or partly performed within the DIFC and is related to 
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 This Article has been amended twice, by Dubai Law 7/2011 and then by Dubai Law 14/2011.  
25
 Article 2 of Dubai Law 12/2004. The last sentence of Article 2, which concerns the establishment of the 
tribunals, was added by Dubai Law 16/2011.  
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DIFC activities. Additional cases include appeals against decisions or procedures made 
by the DIFC bodies where DIFC Laws and DIFC Regulations permit such appeals; and 
every claim or action over which the DIFC Courts have jurisdiction in accordance with 
DIFC Laws and DIFC Regulations.   
As a result of an amendment made by Dubai Law 16/2011, the Court of First Instance 
may also hear and determine all civil or commercial claims or actions in which the parties 
agree in writing to file such claim or action with it, whether before or after the dispute 
arises, provided that such agreement is made pursuant to specific, clear and express 
provisions. The Court of First Instance may also hear and determine all civil and 
commercial claims and actions falling within its jurisdiction if the parties agree in writing 
to submit to the jurisdiction of another court over the claim or action, but such court 
dismisses such claim or action for lack of jurisdiction. But the Court of First Instance may 
not hear or determine any civil or commercial claim or action with respect to which a 
final judgment has been rendered by another court.  
It must be emphasised that the jurisdiction of the DIFC courts is largely confined to civil 
and commercial disputes. Family matters, for example, are still dealt with by the main 
Dubai courts, even if the parties reside in the DIFC. Also, criminal offences committed 
within the DIFC area do not fall under the DIFC jurisdiction and are dealt with by the 
main Dubai courts.   
The Court of Appeal  
The DIFC Court of Appeal has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals filed 
against judgments and decisions made by the Court of First Instance. The Court of 
Appeal also deals with all requests by the Chief Justice of the Courts for the interpretation 
of any article of the DIFC Laws and DIFC Regulations upon an application submitted to 
him by any DIFC body, DIFC establishment or licensed DIFC establishment. Such an 
21 
 
interpretation will have the same authority as the interpreted legislation. Judgments given 
by the Court of Appeal are final and conclusive and are not subject to any further appeal.  
 
The DIFC Legislation 
 
The DIFC has its own distinct law. This legal independence derives from the federal and 
Dubai laws, which allow the DIFC to establish its own civil and commercial laws 
modelled closely on international standards and principles of common law and 
customised to the region’s exceptional requirements.26 Accordingly, the DIFC legal order 
is modelled primarily on English commercial law. Moreover, many of the judges of the 
DIFC courts have formerly served as judges in England, Australia or Singapore. One 
might describe the DIFC as an attempt to transplant the City of London into a small area 
within the Arabian Peninsula.  
The DIFC Laws are managed by either the DFSA or the DIFCA. These laws operate only 
within the DIFC territory, though they are enacted by the Ruler of Dubai. 
The Laws established by the DFSA, which are the essential laws on financial services and 
are called Administered Laws, are the following: the Regulatory Law 2004; the Markets 
Law 2012; the Law Regulating Islamic Financial Business 2004; the Trust Law 2005; the 
Collective Investment Law 2010;  and the Investment Trust Law 2006.     
The DFSA has also been delegated by the Registrar of Companies to deal with the 
following DIFC laws: the Companies Law 2009; the Limited Partnership Law 2006; the 
Limited Liability Partnership Law 2004; the Insolvency Law 2009; and the General 
Partnership Law 2004.
27
 
                                                          
26
Available from: Dubai International Financial Centre, Web site: www.difc.ae/laws-regulations (Accessed: 
May 11, 2015)  
27  For more detail about these laws which are established by the DFSA, see 
www.dfsa.ae/Pages/LegalFramework/LegalFramework.aspx. regulations (Accessed: August 11, 2015).   
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Many DIFC laws have been adopted with respect to more general commercial matters. 
Thus, there are laws that lay down substantive rules with respect to contracts, 
employment, and insolvency. The Contracts Law is modelled partly on the Vienna 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods. A provision of last resort directs the 
DIFC courts, when no DIFC rule exists on the relevant matter, to import a rule from 
English law. This provision can be found in Article 8(2)(e) of DIFC Law 3/2004 on the 
Application of Civil and Commercial Laws in the DIFC, which allows the judge to refer 
to the laws of England and Wales to fill any gap existing in the DIFC law. Therefore, one 
could call this rule a supplementary rule that allows the judge to resolve gaps by referring 
to English law. 
With regard to the choice of law with respect to contracts, the DIFC legislation provides 
that an express choice of law agreed to by the contracting parties must be respected by the 
DIFC courts. But, in the absence of such an express choice, the DIFC courts must apply 
DIFC internal law to the contract.  
Part 2 – The European Union 
The general character of the European Union 
The fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome was marked on 25 March 
2007. The Treaties of Rome created the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). 
In economic terms, the EU economy is the largest worldwide; it is also the largest 
exporter and importer, representing 17.17% of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
globally.
28
 The combination of the current 28 Member States
29
 establishes an EU territory 
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 The Statistics Portal, www.statista.com/statistics/253512/share-of-the-eu-in-the-inflation-adjusted-global-
gross-domestic-product, (accessed on 15 May 2015). 
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that covers the majority of Western and Central Europe and contains an area of more than 
four million square kilometres. A large part of Eastern Europe is also included in its 
geographical area. The EU population in 2014 was approximately 502,577,700 people, 
the world’s third largest population. In contrast, the populations of the individual Member 
States correspond to considerably smaller proportions of the world’s population.30  
The harmonization of the European private international law rules 
The interests and traditions of each of the Member States differ from those of others 
when harmonisation of choice of law rules is under consideration. This makes the 
harmonization of conflict rules a complex problem, particularly with regard to choice of 
law.  
The harmonization of the European private international law has become an important 
aim of the European institutions. This goal originated from the necessity to coordinate the 
diverse substantive laws of the Member States. In order to accomplish this aim, European 
institutions have established uniform private international law rules for many matters. 
Although these leave the Member States’ inconsistent national substantive laws 
untouched, they do promote international uniformity of decisions in litigation of the same 
dispute in courts of different Member States. 
Thus, in order to create an area of freedom, security and justice in civil matters, the 
European Union has adopted a substantial number of legal instruments which deal with 
matters concerning private international law. These instruments deal with such issues as 
judicial jurisdiction, the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
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 The 28 Member States are: Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Austria, Greece, Slovenia, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and 
Croatia. 
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 Eurostat – Tables, Graphs and Maps Interface (TGM) table, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1
&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 (accessed on 15 May 2015). 
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commercial matters, and choice of law with respect to contractual and non-contractual 
obligations. This harmonization of private international law has been developed by means 
of EU legislation in the forms of conventions, regulations, directives and case law.  
Although the original treaties which ultimately gave rise to the European Union had the 
fundamental goals of creating a common market and harmonizing social policies,
31
 
private international law matters received little attention at that stage and had a low 
priority under the early treaties. In relation to private international law, Article 220 was 
the most important provision of the original the EEC Treaty.
32
 It gave rise to the 
negotiation of various agreements, such as the 1968 Convention on Companies and 
Bodies Corporate
33
 and the 1995 Convention on Insolvency.34 Nevertheless, the only 
measure based squarely on Article 220 to enter into force was the Brussels Convention 
1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters.
35
 The Brussels Convention had enormous effects. Nevertheless, two 
international conventions involving children were ratified by the EEC Member States (the 
Luxembourg and Hague Conventions of 1980) by harmonizing private international law 
rules.
36
 
                                                          
31 D. Lasok, Law and Institutions of the European Union, (Butterworths, London, 6th ed, 1994), p.19. 
32
 Article 220 of the original EEC Treaty (which was renumbered as Article 293 by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam and eliminated by the Treaty of Lisbon) provided that:  
"Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to securing 
for the benefit of their nationals: …  
- the mutual recognition of companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, 
the retention of legal personality in the event of transfer of their seat from one country to another, and the 
possibility of mergers between companies or firms governed by the laws of different countries,  
- the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of 
courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards." 
33 Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate of 29 February 1968; 
Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/1969, http://aei.pitt.edu/5610/01/002314_1.pdf 
(accessed on 20 May 2015). 
34 Convention on Insolvency Proceedings of 23 November 1995, (1996) 35 ILM, 1223. 
35 [1972] OJ L299/32. The Convention was replaced by the Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 
December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters (the Brussels I Regulation), [2001] OJ L12/1. The Regulation entered into force on 1 
March 2002.  
36 Both of these conventions are open to non-EU Member States. 
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Despite the limited direct impact of Article 220, an important measure was adopted 
harmonizing the choice of law rules with respect to contractual obligations: the Rome 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, which was signed in 1980 
and came into force on 1 April 1991.
37
 The Rome Convention 1980 was not based on any 
specific provision of the EEC Treaty but on a desire of the Member States to proceed 
further with the harmonisation of private international law.  
Before the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Brussels and Rome Conventions were the only EC 
legislative measures on major elements of private international law which had entered 
into force. Article K of the Treaty of Maastricht on the European Union (1992) made 
provision (in addition to the original Article 220 EEC) for the harmonisation of private 
international law by conventions. Under Article K, these would be negotiated by the 
Member States and recommended for adoption by the EC Council. Some conventions 
were established under Article K, but none entered into force. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam made relevant amendments to the European treaties. It was 
signed on 2 October 1997 and came into force on 1 May 1999.
38
 The Treaty of 
Amsterdam introduced significant adjustments to the treaties and completely transformed 
the status and classification of private international law.
39
 The modifications enabled the 
European institutions to adopt laws in the area of private international law that were 
essential for the operation of the internal market.
40
 The Treaty of Amsterdam gave great 
                                                          
37 See C.M.V. Clarkson and Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 
2006), p.172. However, the negotiations on harmonising the law applicable to non-contractual obligations 
were delayed. See the Explanatory Memorandum to the EC Commission Proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations of July 2003, 
COM (2003) 427 final, 22 July 2003.   
38 The Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts. 
39 See McEleavy, P., and Fiorini. A, The evolution of European private international law, (2008) Vol. 57, 
No. 4, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 969. 
40 Article 65 EC (subsequently renumbered as Article 81 TFEU by the Treaty of Lisbon) provides: 
"Measures in the field of Judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, to be taken 
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impetus to the harmonisation project. It led directly to the adoption in 2000 of the 
Brussels I Regulation on civil jurisdiction and judgments (replacing the Brussels 
Convention 1968), the Brussels II Regulation on matrimonial matters and parental 
responsibility, the Regulation on service of documents in Member States, and the 
Insolvency Regulation. 
However, under the Treaty of Amsterdam, unanimous agreement in the Council remained 
necessary for the adoption of measures in the sphere of private international law. Thus, 
every member state enjoyed a veto power, even if that member state did not wish to 
participate.
41
 The European Parliament had only a consultative role.
42
 Moreover, although 
the new Article 68 EC, which was introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, granted the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) jurisdiction with respect to measures in the sphere of 
private international law that had not existed under the earlier system, this competency of 
the ECJ was severely restricted. Only national courts of final appeal could refer matters to 
the ECJ for preliminary rulings in the sphere of private international law.
43
 
Relevant amendments were made by the Treaty of Nice,
44
 which eliminated the 
requirement of unanimity in the Council and permitted the adoption of a measure by a 
qualified majority voting in the Council along with approval by the Parliament. But this 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in accordance with Article 67 and in so far as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, 
shall include:  
(a) improving and simplifying: 
- the system for cross-border service of judicial and extrajudicial documents, 
- cooperation in the taking of evidence, 
- the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial cases, including decisions in 
extrajudicial cases; 
(b) promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Members States concerning the conflict of 
laws and of jurisdiction; 
(c) eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the 
compatibility of rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States".  
41 Kaczorowska, A, European Union Law, (New York, Routledge-Cavendish 2009), at 34. 
42 Fiorini. A, supra note (31), at 974. 
43 This derogated from the usual rule under Article 234, whereby any court of a Member State, whether 
sitting at first instance or on appeal or on final appeal, could refer a point of European law to the European 
Court. 
44 This Treaty was signed on the 26 February 2001, and entered into force on 1 February 2003. 
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amendment did not extend to measures dealing with family matters. There was a great 
increase in the number of measures concerning private international law adopted at the 
European level.
45
 
Further important developments in the field of private international law were introduced 
by the Treaty of Lisbon,
46
 among which was the deletion of Article 68 of the EC. 
Consequently, normal full competence was conferred on the European Court of Justice to 
rule on questions referred by any court of a Member State under Article 267 TFEU, 
which replaced Article 234 EC.  
The Treaty of Lisbon also established a special passerelle clause, contained in Article 
81(3) TFEU,
47
 by which the special legislative system concerning family matters, which 
has continued in operation for the time being, may be eliminated if all the national 
parliaments consent thereto.
48
 This special passerelle clause, which was added by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, obliges the Commission to inform the national parliaments of its 
proposal to eliminate the special procedure for certain family matters.
49
 The time limit for 
acceptance or refusal by the national parliaments of such a proposal from the 
Commission was limited to six months starting from the day of notification. 
Nevertheless, the Council can accept the proposal only if no objection is made.
50
 Despite 
the need for unanimity in family matters, the Brussels IIA Regulation,
51
 which deals 
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 Fiorini. A, supra fn ( 31), at 974. 
46 This Treaty was signed on 13 December 2007 and entered into operation on 1 December 2009. It was 
planned that the Treaty should have entered into force on 1 January 2009, but there was delay owing to 
rejection by the Irish initial referendum in 2008. The second Irish referendum in 2009 resulted in the 
acceptance of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
47 R.De Groot and J.-J. Kuipers, The New Provisions on Private International Law in The Treaty of Lisbon, 
(2008) 15/1 Maastricht Journal of International and Comparative Law 113. 
48
 For additional details of the new amendments of the Treaty of Lisbon to the European legislative 
procedures, see A. Kaczorowska, supra fn (33),at 42-63. 
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much more fully than its predecessor with parental responsibility for children, and the 
Maintenance Regulation, have been adopted and brought into force. In addition, the 
Rome III Regulation on choice of law with respect to the grounds for divorce has been 
adopted and brought into force under the enhanced co-operation procedure. The 
Succession Regulation, which entered into operation on 17 August 2015, was regarded as 
a non-family matter. 
The Rome I Regulation and its predecessor 
On 17
 
December 2009, EC Regulation 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (the Rome I Regulation) replaced the Rome Convention 1980, except in 
Denmark and the French overseas territories.
52
 The Convention remains applicable to 
contracts concluded before that date, but contracts concluded after that date fall within the 
scope of the Regulation.
53
 
The adoption of the Rome I Regulation followed six years of political discussion and 
negotiation, which began with the presentation of the Commission Green Paper on the 
Rome Convention in January 2003.
54
 The Regulation introduced various changes in EU 
private international law; but some of these were fundamentally derived from the prior 
law. Indeed, the Regulation as adopted is not very different from the Rome Convention 
1980. More radical changes were contained in the EC Commission's proposal, which 
initiated the legislative process. The main goal of these adjustments was to update the 
content of the relevant conflict rules and to harmonize them with other EU measures on 
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private international law,
55
 such as the Brussels I Regulation
56
 and the Rome II 
Regulation.
57
 However, the effect of the Regulation does not differ greatly from that of 
the Rome Convention.
58
 
The substantive scope of the Regulation is addressed by Article 1, which specifies that 
the Regulation applies to contractual obligations in commercial and civil matters in 
situations which involve a conflict of laws.
59
 Hence, non-contractual obligations, such as 
an obligation of restitution arising from unfair enrichment or an obligation arising from a 
tort, do not fall within the scope of the Regulation. Moreover, the Regulation does not 
apply to claims governed by public law,
60
 and various matters are excluded from its scope 
by Article 1(2). These exclusions include obligations arising out of family relationships 
(including maintenance obligations); issues governed by company law; trusts; and 
obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract. Pre-contractual 
obligations are governed instead by Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation. With regard to 
substantive scope, the Regulation differs little from the Convention. 
One of the main features of the Convention is its broad territorial scope, as specified by 
Article 2, which has been retained by the Regulation. Article 2 establishes the 
universality of application of the Convention and the Regulation. The law indicated by 
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the Convention or Regulation must be applied regardless of whether it is the law of a 
Member State or the law of a country outside the European Union.
61
  
Articles 3 and 4 of the Regulation lay down the main choice of law rules for contracts. 
They enable the contracting parties to choose by express or implied agreement the law to 
which their contract is subject, and specify default rules to be applied in the absence of 
such a choice. In most cases, these default rules provide for a rebuttable presumption in 
favour of the law of the habitual residence of the characteristic performer, and for an 
exception in favour of the law of the country with which it is clear that the contract is 
most closely connected. These provisions broadly resemble those of the Convention, but 
there are detailed differences. These main choice of law rules will be analysed in Chapter 
3 below. 
There are other general rules in the Regulation that deal with the burden of proof;
62
 the 
exclusion of renvoi;63 the public policy proviso;64 and the position of States with more 
than one legal system.
65
 These resemble the corresponding provisions of the Convention. 
In addition, the Regulation in Article 19 provides definitions of habitual residence for 
companies and individual traders.
66
 
The Rome I Regulation lays down special rules for certain contracts in Articles 5-8. 
These rules are designed mainly to offer protection to certain parties who are considered 
to lack adequate bargaining power, as compared to the bargaining power of the other 
party to the contract. The Convention had established special rules for only consumer 
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contracts by Article 5 and for the employees’ contracts by Article 6.67 In contrast, the 
Regulation deals with contracts for the carriage of goods or passengers in Article 5, 
consumer contracts in Article 6, insurance contracts in Article 7, and individual 
employment contracts in Article 8. The Regulation provides enhanced clarity in the case 
of contracts of the carriage of goods and introduced rules on the carriage of passengers 
that differ from those that pertain to the carriage of goods.
68
  
Furthermore, nearly all insurance or reinsurance contracts fall within the scope of the 
Regulation. In formal terms, this is a change from the Convention, which excluded 
insurance contracts concerning covering risks situated in Member States,
69
 but applied to 
insurance contracts where the risk was not located within the European Community and 
to all reinsurance contracts.
70
 But in substance, little change has taken place, since the 
insurance of European risks was formerly governed by rules contained in Directives, and 
the relevant provisions of the Directives have been replaced by slightly simplified 
provisions in the Regulation. Regardless of the location of the risk, both insurance and 
reinsurance contracts fall within the scope of the Regulation. Accordingly, Article 7 of 
the Regulation deals with insurance contracts covering mass risks situated within the 
territory of the European Union, and with insurance contracts that cover large risks 
regardless of where the risk is located. Insurance contracts regarding non-European mass 
risks are within the Regulation but not within Article 7. Such contracts are treated in the 
same way as non-insurance contracts. Thus, the Regulation has brought all insurance 
contracts within its scope with negligible exemptions.
71
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Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation is designed to harmonize the oversight of consumer 
contracts that are otherwise subject to multiple European instruments. It is also designed 
to introduce a definition of consumer contracts similar to that used in Article 15(1)(c) of 
the Brussels I Regulation and to set up easier rules than those provided by the Rome 
Convention.
72
 Both the substantive and territorial aspects of the definition of a protected 
consumer contract have been revised in the Rome I Regulation, as compared with the 
Rome Convention. The Rome I Regulation also added some exclusions. The new 
definition in the Rome I Regulation resembles that used in the Brussels I Regulation as 
opposed to the definition used in the Brussels Convention. The new definition is broader 
as the European Court has recognised.
73
 In addition to the exclusions formerly stated in 
the Convention, three new categories of contracts have been excluded from the scope of 
Article 6 of the Regulation. The new exclusions apply to “contracts relating to a right in 
rem in immovable property or a tenancy of such property other than a contract relating to 
the right to use immovable properties on a timeshare basis”;74 “rights and obligations 
which constitute a financial instrument”;75 and “contracts concluded within a multilateral 
system”.76  
Article 8 of the Regulation lays down special provisions for employment contracts, which 
are designed to protect the employee as the weaker party. Despite some changes in 
wording from Article 6 of the Convention, in substance the provisions have very similar 
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effects. The provisions designed to protect weaker parties will be analysed in Chapter 5 
below. 
The Regulation also lays down some exceptions to its main rules with respect to certain 
particular issues (such as formalities), as well as derogating from them by reference to the 
forum’s public policy and its overriding mandatory rules. These exceptions and 
derogations will be examined in Chapter 4 below. 
The relationship between the Rome I Regulation and Other EU Measures 
Article 23 is concerned with the relationship of the Rome I Regulation with the other 
European Union legislation. It states that, "with the exception of Article 7,
77
 this 
Regulation shall not prejudice the application of provisions of Community law which, in 
relation to particular matters, lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual 
obligations."
78
 
Recital 40 of the Rome I Regulation explains that the Regulation should not prejudice the 
application of other instruments laying down provisions designed to contribute to the 
proper functioning of the internal market in so far as they cannot be applied in 
conjunction with the law designated by the rules of this Regulation. Moreover, it explains 
that the application of provisions of the applicable law designated by the rules of the 
Regulation should not restrict the free movement of goods and services as regulated by 
Community instruments, such as Directive 2000/31 on electronic commerce.
79
   
Article 3(2) of Directive 2000/31 requires every Member State to ensure that the 
information society services provided by a service provider established on its territory 
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comply with the national provisions applicable in the Member State in question which 
fall within the coordinated field. The Member States are forbidden by Article 3(2), for 
reasons falling within the coordinated field, to restrict the freedom to provide information 
society services from another Member State. Article 1(4) specifies that the Directive does 
not introduce further rules on private international law. However, Recital 23 provides that 
provisions of the applicable law designated by rules of private international law should 
not restrict the freedom to provide information society services as established in the 
Directive.  
Despite the ruling of the European Court in eDate Advertising v X and Martinez v MGN
80
 
that the Directive on electronic commerce can affect the operation of choice of law rules, 
Article 3 seems to have no effect in relation to contractual obligations in view of the 
exclusions specified in Article 3(3) and the related Annex. Those exclusions concern the 
following matters: party autonomy to choose the governing law; various provisions 
concerning consumer contracts; choice of law contained in EC Directives on insurance; 
the formal validity of contracts establishing or transferring rights in real estate, when such 
contracts are subject to mandatory formal requirements of the law of the Member State 
where the real estate is located; and the permissibility of unsolicited commercial 
communications by electronic mail. 
Similarly, Directive 2006/123 on Services in the Internal Market
81
 does not affect choice 
of law in relation to contracts. Article 3(2) of the Directive provides that the Directive 
does not concern rules of private international law, in particular rules governing the law 
applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations, including those which 
guarantee that consumers benefit from the protection granted to them by the consumer 
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protection rules laid down in the consumer legislation in force in their Member State. 
Furthermore, on freedom to provide services, Article 17(15) provides that Article 16 does 
not apply provisions regarding contractual and non-contractual obligations, including the 
form of contracts, determined pursuant to the rules of private international law. Moreover 
Recital 90 explains that contractual relations between the provider and the client and 
between an employer and employee should not be subject to this Directive and that the 
applicable law regarding such obligations should be determined by the rules of private 
international law.     
The relationship between the Rome I Regulation and International Conventions 
Article 25 deals with the relationship of the Rome I Regulation with international 
conventions. Article 25(1) provides that the Regulation shall not prejudice the application 
of international conventions to which one or more Member States are parties at the time 
when this Regulation is adopted and which lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to 
contractual obligations. Nevertheless, Article 25(2) provides that this Regulation shall, as 
between Member States, take precedence over conventions concluded exclusively 
between two or more of them in so far as such conventions concern matters governed by 
the Regulation. 
In contrast, the Rome Convention 1980 applied this principle even in the case where the 
Member State subsequently became a party to another convention.
82
 But Article 25 of the 
Rome I Regulation is restricted to Conventions to which a Member State is already a 
party.  
Some Member States are parties to the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 on the Law 
Applicable to the International Sale of Goods, and/or the Hague Convention of 14 March 
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1978 on the Law Applicable to Agency.
83
 In both cases, the parties to the Convention 
include external countries, so that the exception specified by Article 25(2) of the 
Regulation does not apply. Thus, under Article 25(1) of the Rome I Regulation, these 
Conventions continue to operate and to derogate from the unifying force of the 
Regulation.     
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Chapter 3 - The Proper Law of a Contract 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The determination of the governing law (or “proper law”) of a contract is of great 
importance, as it is the substantive rules of the law in question which will usually be 
applied to the issues that arise with respect to the validity, interpretation or effect of the 
contract. The concept of such a proper law is common to the Rome I Regulation and to 
the CTC. If the parties choose the applicable law, there will usually be no problem, as the 
chosen law will apply. However, in the absence of such a choice, the court will have to 
follow default rules to determine the applicable law.  
This chapter will first focus on express choice of law under the Rome I Regulation and 
the CTC. Then, implied choice of law will be examined under the Rome I Regulation and 
the CTC. Finally, the last section of this chapter will deal with the default rules under the 
Rome I Regulation and the CTC.    
EXPRESS CHOICE OF LAW 
 
The Rome I Regulation 
 
The parties' freedom to choose the law governing their contract is ensured by Article 3(1) 
of the Rome I Regulation, which specifies that: "A contract shall be governed by the law 
chosen by the parties. The choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the 
terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can 
select the law applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract."
38 
 
This provision reflects the traditional practice in the majority of countries worldwide with 
respect to the freedom of parties to choose the law that governs their contract.
1
 An 
express choice of law clause is not subject to any formal requirement, such as writing. 
Therefore, if the parties involved in a contract orally agree on the law that is to govern the 
contract during their pre-contractual negotiations, their choice will be effective, even if it 
is not repeated in the subsequent written contract.
2
 
The last sentence of Article 3(1) of the Regulation explains that a choice of law by the 
parties may apply either to the whole of a contract or to a specific part.
3
 For example, if 
this power is construed widely, it will enable the parties to a contract of sale to agree that 
Spanish law will be applied to the seller’s obligations relating to delivery of the goods, 
but to agree that other aspects of the contract will be governed by English law. The 
Regulation allows the parties to choose different laws for different parts of a contract. It is 
important to point out that scission of the proper law must be distinguished from 
incorporation by express reference of terms of a law from one country into a contract 
governed by the law of another country. Thus, in case of such an incorporation by 
reference, any amendment of the law the provisions of which have been incorporated in 
its country of origin will be ignored, and the contract will be unchanged.
4
       
Accordingly, severance is possible where it appears to be coherent since the parts 
distinguished relate to different transactions.
5
 For example, if a document contains a 
contract for construction of a building and for maintenance of the building, severance 
could be possible between the construction and the maintenance provisions. However, 
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severance should not be allowed in relation to terms or issues; for instance, between the 
validity of the exclusion clauses and other issues related to the contract.
6
 Issues that can 
affect the whole contract, such as frustration, should be governed by the same law.
7
       
In Intercontainer Interfrigo v Balkenende Oosthuizen and MIC Operations,8 the 
European Court of Justice addressed the approach that should be adopted to severance in 
the absence of a choice of law by the parties under Article 4 of the Rome Convention. 
Now, under Article 4 of Rome I Regulation, severance is not allowed in the absence of a 
choice of law by the parties. However, the court accepted that, under Article 4 of the 
Convention, one law could govern a contract partly and the rest of the contract could be 
governed by another law. Nevertheless, it insisted that, for this to be possible, the part of 
the contract which is governed by a separate law must be independent with regard to the 
rest of the contract.      
The decision of the English court in Centrax Ltd v Citibank NA,9 which involved a 
contract for electronic services, shows how severance under a contract may be 
injudicious. The contract included the following choice of law clause:   
This Agreement and all documents, agreements and instruments related to this 
Agreement shall be governed by and interpreted according to the laws of the State of 
New York, United States of America, provided that any action or dispute between 
the parties regarding any Payment Instrument shall be governed by and interpreted 
according to the laws of the country or state in which the Drawee of such Payment 
Instrument is located. 
 
The customer sued the bank, asserting that cheques had been forged by an employee of 
the customer and therefore had wrongly been debited from the customer’s account. The 
bank was based in New York, but the cheques in question were drawn on its branch in 
London. The contract contained a term enabling the bank to debit the customer’s account 
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with respect to cheques forged by an employee of the customer, but the customer argued 
that this term was rendered invalid by the (English) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. The 
court applied English principles of construction to the interpretation of the choice of law 
clause and concluded by a majority that the issue was governed by the law of New York, 
since the dispute in question involved the terms of the contract and was not concerned 
exclusively with the payment instrument.  
The parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law is restricted to choosing the law of a 
country, in the sense of a territorial unit which has its own law, at least with regard to 
contractual rights and obligations. Article 22(1) provides:  
Where a State comprises several territorial units, each of which has its own 
rules of law with respect to contractual obligations, each territorial unit shall 
be considered as a country for the purposes of identifying the law applicable 
under this Regulation.
10
  
Therefore, the parties are not allowed to choose a non-state body of law, such as Shari'a 
law,
11
 Jewish law,
12
 or the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods. Recital 12 
to the Regulation explains that the Regulation does not prohibit parties from 
incorporating by reference into their contract a non-state body of law. However, while 
such incorporation is permitted to the parties, its effect is merely to introduce the 
specified provisions into the contract as terms; the chosen law, which must be the law of 
a country, will still govern the effect and validity of the contract.
13
  
If the parties choose Saudi law, which is based on Shari’a law, then the Shari’a law will 
be applied to the extent that it is applied by Saudi courts, along with any other rules 
applied by those courts. In such a case a definite judiciary (the Saudi judiciary) will exist 
whose interpretation of Shari’a law will be followed. The parties are not allowed to 
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choose the Shari’a law in general, independently of its operation in any particular 
territory, so as to leave to an English or French court the resolution of differences of 
opinion by Shari’a scholars as to the “correct” interpretation.  
Under Article 3(2) of the Regulation, the parties’ freedom to choose the law that governs 
a contract is not limited to the time of negotiation or conclusion of the contract, but it is 
extended so as to allow the parties to choose the governing law even after the contract has 
been concluded. It is important to emphasise that such a choice is allowed, whether the 
contract had previously been subject to an earlier choice by the parties or to the default 
rules specified by Article 4.  
According to Fawcett and Carruthers,
 
the default rules specified by Article 4 are initially 
applicable where no choice of law has been made by parties until after the contact has 
been concluded.
14
 Giving the parties the freedom to change the law that governs the 
contract after its conclusion might, in the absence of specific provisions, have an adverse 
effect on the formal validity of the contract, for example in cases where the subsequently 
chosen law includes formal requirements that did not exist under the previously 
applicable law.
15
 Therefore, in order to favour the formal validity of contracts, Article 
3(2) of the Regulation provides that “any variation by the parties of the law to be applied 
made after the conclusion of the contract shall not prejudice its formal validity under 
Article 11 or adversely affect the rights of third parties.” The last provision on the rights 
of third parties would, for example, prevent the obligations of a guarantor from being 
increased by applying a new law to an existing contract. On the other hand, subject to 
these savings, a subsequent choice of the applicable law by the parties should usually 
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have retrospective effect, because the parties usually so intend.
16
 For example, if the 
parties chose the Italian law when they concluded the contract and later changed the 
applicable law to French law, French law should be applied to earlier acts, such as earlier 
deliveries, as the parties presumably so intended.      
Exceptions under the Rome I Regulation 
Article 3(3) 
As a general rule, parties are permitted to choose the law that governs their contract under 
Article 3(1) of the Regulation. Their choice will be respected even if the contract is 
otherwise more closely connected with a different country, and even if they have made 
the choice for the purpose of avoiding inconvenient rules contained in the law most 
closely connected. However, an exception is provided by Article 3(3) to the general rule 
which to some extent restricts the parties’ freedom. Article 3(3) specifies that: "Where all 
other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in a country 
other than the country whose law has been chosen, the choice of the parties shall not 
prejudice the application of provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be 
derogated from by agreement."  
This rule could apply in a situation in which parties resident in the same country negotiate 
and conclude a contract there and in which contractual performances involved in the 
contract are also to be effected in that country, but the law of another country is chosen 
by the parties as the governing law. The purpose of this article is to give effect to the 
mandatory rules (rules that “cannot be derogated from by contract”) of the country in 
which all the other relevant connections are located. For example, if two French residents 
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make a contract in France that is to be carried out in France, but choose English law to 
govern the contract, French mandatory rules will still be applied to the contract, and even 
an English court before which proceedings are brought must respect the mandatory rules 
of French law.  
The application of Article 3(3) of the Regulation could be criticised, as its application 
may be problematic in cases in which the elements relevant to a contract are connected to 
a number of countries, and the laws of these countries in fact include the same mandatory 
rules. The application of Article 3(3) may also be narrow, as it is concerned only with 
mandatory rules, which means that the chosen law will still be applied in any cases not 
involving mandatory rules, but merely questions of interpretation, such as whether a 
reference in the contract to “dollars” as the currency of account is to be understood as 
referring to American dollars or to Canadian dollars.
17
 Moreover, the mandatory rules of 
the chosen law will still be applicable, along with those of the otherwise connected law, 
in cases where Article 3(3) applies.
18 
  
The narrow scope of Article 3(3) was confirmed by the English High Court in Caterpillar 
Financial Services v SNC Passion,19 which involved a contract of loan between an 
American lender and a French borrower, in which English law was chosen as the 
governing law of the contract. The court respected the choice of English law and ruled 
that French mandatory rules were inapplicable, as the contract had relevant connections 
with countries other than France. These included the United States, where the bank 
involved in the contract was located, and Singapore, where the transaction financed, a 
shipbuilding contract, was to be performed. A similar approach was adopted in 
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Emeraldian v Wellmix Shipping,20 where Teare J ruled that Article 3(3) did not make 
Chinese mandatory rules on exchange control applicable to a guarantee by a Chinese 
company of the obligations of a Hong Kong charterer to a Liberian ship-owner under a 
charterparty governed by English law.  
Article 3(4) 
Article 3(4) provides: “Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of 
the choice are located in one or more Member States, the parties' choice of applicable law 
other than that of a Member State shall not prejudice the application of provisions of 
Community law, where appropriate as implemented in the Member State of the forum, 
which cannot be derogated from by agreement.” It seems that Article 3(4) widens the 
scope of Article 3(3) so as to make applicable mandatory rules of European Union law in 
cases where all of the relevant connections are with Member States, even if they are 
divided between several Member States, such as, for example, where the parties are 
habitually resident in different Member States. No such provision is in the Rome 
Convention. 
The UAE Civil Transactions Code 
Article 19 of the CTC 
Article 19 of the Civil Transactions Code (CTC) provides: 
(1) Contractual obligations, as to the form and subject matter, shall be governed by 
the law of the state of the joint domicile of the two contractors, if they have one 
domicile. However, if they have a different place of residence, the law of the state in 
which the contract is made shall be applicable, unless the two parties to the contract 
agree or if it is evident from the circumstances that another law is intended to be 
applied. 
(2) However, the law of the location of a real property shall apply to the contracts 
made in respect thereof.  
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Thus, the freedom of parties in choosing the law that governs the contract is ensured 
under Article 19 of the CTC. The Article also indicates that an express choice of law 
clause is not subject to any formal requirement, such as being in writing. Therefore, if 
parties negotiate and conclude an agreement orally or via telephone, their choice of the 
applicable law will be effective. The court is obliged to apply the law that has been 
chosen by the parties. A breach of Article 19 occurs if the court does not apply the chosen 
law. 
Despite the wording of Article 19, it is generally accepted that the parties’ right to choose 
the governing law is possible even in the case of common domicile or residence.
21
 
It is important to point out that questions concerning choice of law in most areas, such as 
family matters and contractual and non-contractual obligations, are dealt with by Articles 
10 to 28 of the CTC. Thus, Article 19 must be interpreted in the context of these 
surrounding provisions. 
The problem of renvoi 
The problem of renvoi (reference back or on) is addressed by Article 26, which provides:  
(1) If it is decided that a foreign law is to be applied, domestic provisions thereof 
shall be applied only, rather than those related to the international private law.  
(2) However, the law of the UAE shall be applied if certain provisions of the 
international law which are related to the applicable law refer to its rules.  
Thus, if, for example, the parties have chosen French law to govern their contract, Article 
26(1) envisages the application of French internal law. However, if French private 
international law refers the matter to the law of the UAE (perhaps as the place of the 
                                                          
21 Dr. Ahmed Alhawry, يتاراملاا صاخلا يلودلا نوناقلا يف زيجولا)  ( Emirates private international law (Sharjah 
University, 2008), p. 458 (in Arabic). 
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characteristic performer’s residence), then Article 26(2) requires that UAE internal law be 
applied. 
In international practice, there are three basic solutions to the problem of renvoi: the 
internal law theory; partial renvoi; and total renvoi (or the foreign court theory). 
Under the first approach, known as the internal law theory, if the forum choice of law rule 
refers the issue to the law of a certain country, the internal law of that country will be 
applied by the forum, even if the choice of law rules of the country referred to by the 
forum conflict rules refer the issue to the law of a third country or refer it back to the law 
of the forum country. This approach is adopted as the general rule in the UAE by Article 
26(1) of the Civil Transactions Code. 
Under the second approach, which is known as the partial renvoi, where the conflict rules  
of the country (country X) referred to by the forum’s conflict rules refer back to the law 
of the forum country (country F), the forum will accept the reference back and apply its 
own internal law. To this extent, partial renvoi is adopted in the UAE by Article 26(2) of 
the Civil Transactions Code. 
Under partial renvoi, if the law of country X refers to the law of a third country (country 
Y), and the conflict law of country Y agrees that the internal law of county Y applies, the 
forum too will apply the internal law of country Y and accept the reference because it 
accept the single renvoi, then it will apply its internal law. More complicated situations 
can arise, such as, for example, when the law of country X refers to the law of country Y, 
and the law of country Y refers to the law of country Z, and the law of country Z refers to 
the law of country X or country Y. But, in all cases in which the law of country X 
provides for transmission to a third law, the UAE will apply the internal law of country X 
in accordance with Article 26(1). 
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Under the third approach, which is known as a total renvoi or the foreign court theory and 
which is applied by English courts to certain issues, such as intestate succession, the 
forum endeavours to apply whatever law the courts of the country to which the forum 
conflict rules refer would apply in the circumstances of the case. This involves taking 
account not only of that country’s primary conflict rules but also of its approach to the 
question of renvoi. Thus, this approach involves practical difficulties in ascertaining the 
approach adopted in country X to the problem of renvoi and logical difficulties when 
country X also utilises the total renvoi approach. It is clear that the UAE does not make 
any use of the total renvoi approach.  
In contrast to the UAE Civil Code, the Rome I Regulation, the Rome II Regulation, and 
corresponding provisions of various Hague Conventions, exclude the application of 
renvoi (whether in partial or total form) and adhere to an internal law approach. The 
operation of Article 26(2) of the CTC seems clear enough, but its application to contracts 
seems undesirable, especially in cases of express choice, since the parties must almost 
certainly intend to designate directly an internal law rather than a set of conflict rules. 
Therefore, one could suggest that the CTC should be construed or amended so as to 
exclude contractual obligations from Article 26(2) in order to follow the international 
practice of private international law and to respect the parties’ intentions.   
Public policy 
With regard to public policy (or ordre public), Article 27 of the CTA has clearly declared 
the present standing of the Act, as it specifies that: “Provisions of a law stated in the 
preceding clauses may not be applied, if such provisions are contrary to Islamic Shari'a 
law, public policy or morals observed in the UAE.” The operation of this provision in 
relation to contracts will be addressed in Chapter 4 below. 
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Various doubtful issues 
The brevity of Article 19 of the CTC indicates that the Emirati legislator failed to 
consider several important points concerning choice of law with respect to contracts. The 
first point is that the Article does not specify whether the parties’ freedom to choose the 
applicable law extends to enabling them to make changes to their choice of law at any 
time after contracting. Another point is that the Article does not clearly state whether the 
parties are allowed to choose different laws for different parts of the contract. The third 
point is whether the Article requires a connection between the law chosen by the 
contracting parties and the contract. The final point is that the Article does not clearly 
indicate whether the parties are obliged to choose the law of a country to govern the 
contract rather than a religious law. 
To clarify these important points that involve the parties’ freedom to choose the 
applicable law, the legislator has directed the Emirati court to follow general principles of 
private international law. Article 23 of the CTC specifies that: 
Principles of the private international law shall be observed where no express 
provision appears to exist in the preceding Articles, regarding cases of conflict of 
laws.  
 
The application of Article 23 of the CTA was confirmed and clarified by a Dubai court in 
Cassation Case 24/2005 on 26 June 2005. In that case, the court stated that, where the 
CTC has not offered an express principle on issues involving personal status, Article 23 
of the CTC should be applied.   
The reference to principles under Article 23 should be to principles of private 
international law, which are widely, but not necessarily universally, followed worldwide. 
For example, a principle which is applied throughout the United States but not applied 
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elsewhere cannot be regarded as a principle which is widely accepted. Whereas, a 
principle which is applied under EU laws in the EU Member States, or a principle which 
is applied under a Hague Convention which has a substantial number of parties, should be 
regarded as a widely accepted principle. Moreover, it should be recognised that, when 
international practice is divided, the UAE court has a choice and can select from among 
the rules widely followed one that the court considers most suitable to supplement the 
CTC provisions in light of the factual and legal circumstances of the UAE and of UAE 
public policy.  
It seems that the application of Article 23 of the CTC is available for use in two 
situations. The first situation is when the UAE legislation is silent on the relevant issue. 
The second situation is when the provision of the CTC that is relevant to the issue is 
ambiguous and capable of bearing more than one meaning. 
But it is difficult to disregard a clear and explicit provision of the CTC, merely because it 
does not accord with international practice and leads to unwelcomed results. For example, 
the default rules specified by Article 19(1) of the CTC make final reference to the place 
of contracting. This reference does not accord with principles widely applied 
internationally, and it gives rise to serious difficulties and troublesome results. This does 
not, however, appear to provide sufficient justification for the UAE courts to disregard 
the provision altogether and to invoke Article 23 so as to substitute a different rule (for 
example, in favour of the law most closely connected). The courts may, however, 
properly decide that this provision should be narrowly interpreted so as to confine it to 
cases in which all of the acts that have potentially brought about the conclusion of the 
contract have been carried out entirely in a single country, so that a completely 
unambiguous place of contracting exists; for example, when both the offer and the 
acceptance have been sent both from and to places in the same country. In contrast, when 
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the negotiations have been conducted by cross-border communications (whether by 
posted letter, telephone, email or fax), the place of contracting should be regarded as 
ambiguous, and as not-existent for the purpose of Article 19, so that a gap in the conflict 
rules exists which can be filled by the use of Article 23 to introduce a widely accepted 
principle of private international law in favour of the law which has the closest 
connection with the contract.  
Choices made after contracting 
The first point of contention is whether the parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law 
extends to allowing them to make changes to their choice of law at any time after 
contracting. On this point, Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation enables the parties to 
change the applicable law at any time after the agreement. However, the application of 
this right is appropriately restricted insofar as it must not adversely affect the formal 
validity of the contract or the rights of third parties. Thus, it seems appropriate to utilise 
Article 23 of the CTC to import a rule based on Article 3(1) as embodying a general 
principle of private international law and thereby fill the gap left by the silence of Article 
19 of the CTC on this issue.    
Two other minor questions in relation to express choice under Article 19 of the CTC can 
conveniently be mentioned at this point. The first is whether it is permissible for the 
parties to agree to enable one of them to designate the applicable law unilaterally. For 
example, a clause in a contract of sale might provide that the governing law shall be fixed 
by a notice to be sent, after the conclusion of the contract, by the seller to the buyer. It 
seems that such a clause should be not be respected, as Article 19 should be understood 
as requiring a bilateral decision. 
Secondly, there seems to be no reason why a choice of law clause that involves a 
contingent substitution should not be respected so long as the specified event is outside of 
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the control of the parties to the contract. For example, a clause in a contract of sale of 
goods might specify that the contract shall be governed by Russian law, but that, if (by 
constitutional amendment), Russia reverts to a Communist system, then the law of 
Finland shall apply instead.  
Choice of several laws for different parts of a contract 
The second point of contention is whether the parties are allowed to choose different laws 
for different parts of the contract. The Explanatory Memorandum of the CTC clarified 
this point by specifying that “contractual obligations shall be ruled by the law chosen by 
the parties either expressly or impliedly with consideration of the rules specified in the 
Article. This rule respects the autonomy of the parties and ensures the accordance of the 
applicable law to the contract. This accordance requires the applicable law to be applied 
to a contract as a whole, and this application does not include severance of contract 
components and the choice of an appropriate law that is in line with the nature of each of 
these components”.22  
Moreover, this Explanatory Memorandum of the CTC is close to the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the Egyptian Civil Code. Both explanatory memoranda suggest that the 
parties are not permitted to choose different laws to govern different parts of the contract. 
This approach may also be regarded as productive of certainty rather than confusion.  
However, these memoranda do not accord with recent developments in comparative 
private international law with regard to the freedom of parties to choose different laws to 
govern different parts of a contract.
23
 Further, an Explanatory Memorandum does not 
have the same binding effect as an enactment. In addition, the UAE Explanatory 
                                                          
22
 The Explanatory Memorandum for the Civil Transactions Code, cited in Professor Ukasha Mohammed 
Mustafa,  نيناوقلا عزانت يف طيسولا)   ( Conflict of laws (Dubai Police Academy, 2008), p. 721 (in Arabic). This is 
the author’s translation.  
23
 Ibid, p. 723.  
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Memorandum states that “the language used by the legislator seems to be flexible as it 
has not restricted the court and allows it to follow any new development in the private 
international law area”.24  
The possibility of scission by choice may perhaps gain further support from Article 11 of 
the CTC, which specifies that: 
(1) The civil status of persons and their competence shall be governed by the law of 
the State to which they belong by their nationality.  
(2) However, foreign corporate persons, including companies, associations and 
corporations etc. shall be governed by the law of the state where such persons have 
established their actual headquarters.  
This stipulation was applied by a Dubai court ruling in Cassation Case 117/2006 on 10 
September 2006. The court ruled with regard to Articles 11 and 16 of the CTA that the 
law of a foreigner’s nationality should govern his civil status. Since capacity to contract is 
referred to the law of the person’s nationality, or in the case of a company, that of its 
headquarters, rather than the law governing the contract, it may be argued that there is 
little reason for the UAE to insist that a single law should govern all other contractual 
issues.  
The majority of private international laws, such as the traditional English case law,
25
 and 
European Union law under Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation, allow parties to choose 
different laws to govern different parts of a contract. However, the application of this 
principle is governed by the requirement that the chosen laws for different parts of the 
contract must be logically consistent. Furthermore, the needs of international commerce 
require the permissibility of splitting the law to govern different parts of a contract. For 
                                                          
24
 The Explanatory Memorandum for the Civil Transactions Code, ibid, p. 723. This is the author’s 
translation.  
25 See Hamlyn v Talisker Distillery [1894] AC 202, 207; and British South Africa Company v De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd [1910] 1 Ch 354, 383. A similar provision can be found in Article 7(1) of the 
Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International Contracts 1994 (the Mexico 
Convention); and in Article 7(1) of the Hague Convention 1986 on the Law Applicable to Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods, which states: "Such a choice may be limited to a part of the contract. "  
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example, the parties can choose one law to govern the contract in general and another law 
to govern a particular transaction carried out in performance of the contract.
26
  
Therefore, no obstacles seem to prevent the Emirati courts from allowing parties to 
choose different laws to govern different parts of the contract. The judge could refer to 
Article 23 of the CTC, which allows the judge to rely on principles of private 
international law.          
Choice of an unconnected law 
The third point of contention is whether the law chosen by the contracting parties and the 
contract should be otherwise related. On the one hand, some argue that parties cannot 
choose a law that is not connected with the contract, because this freedom to choose the 
applicable law is restricted by the aim of the contract.
27
 On the other hand, others suggest 
that such a requirement is not necessary. Parties are free to choose any law even if it is 
not connected with the contract as long as the commercial needs of the parties can be met 
and their best interests are promoted. The use of Article 23 of the CTA to address this 
issue seemingly makes the second opinion more sensible and appropriate to be applied.  
The Emirati courts could refer to Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation, which enables 
parties to choose the law that should govern a contract, without requiring any connection 
between the law chosen by the contracting parties and the contract. Furthermore, Recital 
11 to the Regulation states: “The parties' freedom to choose the applicable law should be 
one of the cornerstones of the system of conflict-of-law rules in matters of contractual 
obligations”. Therefore, the Emirati judge could rely on this rule, which is consistent with 
the wording of Article 19.   
                                                          
26  See Centrax v Citibank [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 557 at 562.   
27
  Dr. Aoudallah Shaiba Alhamd,) ف يئاضقلا عزانتلا ماكحاو نيناوقلا عزانتيتاراملاا نوناقلا ي   ( Conflict of laws and 
the conflicts of international jurisdiction in the Emirati Law (Dubai Police Academy, 2001), p. 297 (in 
Arabic). 
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Choice of a non-territorial law 
The final point of contention is whether the parties are allowed to choose a religious law, 
rather than the territorial law of a country, as the law that governs the contract. Article 19 
of the CTC has not specified any principle with regard to this issue. However, the 
wording of Article 19 implies that the legislator can allow parties to choose a non-
territorial law, such as Shari'a law, as the main law that governs their contract. This 
suggestion derives its strength from Article 7 of the Permanent Constitution of the UAE, 
which provides that “Islam is the official religion of the Union. The Islamic Tiara's 
(Shari'a) shall be a main source of legislation in the Union ...”28 Moreover, restricting the 
parties to choose a particular territorial law would be contradictory to the application of 
Shari'a rules as ensured by Article 7 of the Permanent Constitution. Therefore, if the 
parties have chosen Shari'a law, the judge will deal with the case under Shari'a laws 
rather than ordinary UAE law.  
It important to point out that Shari'a law is divided into several schools. The 
determination of the Shari'a law school upon which the judge should rely on in his 
decision can be found under Article 1 of the CTC. Article 1 of the CTC provides: 
Legislative provisions shall be applicable to all matters dealt therein, in letter and 
context. In presence of an absolutely unambiguous text, there is no room for personal 
interpretation. In the absence of a text in this Law, the judge shall adjudicate 
according to the Islamic Shari'a taking into consideration the choice of the most 
appropriate solutions in the schools of Imam Malek and Imam Ahmad Ben Hanbal 
and, if not found there, then in the schools of Imam El Shafe'i and Imam Abou 
Hanifa, as the interest so requires. Where no such solution is found, the judge shall 
decide according to custom, provided it is not incompatible with public policy and 
morals. In case the custom is restricted to a specific Emirate, it shall be effective 
therein. 
                                                          
28 
The Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs Web site, available at 
www.mfnca.gov.ae/?lang=en&m=options&act=content_detail&content_id=440 (accessed on 30
th
 March 
2014). Notably, the application of Shari'a law can be found in many areas, such as marketing and banking, 
which have a major application of these rules.  
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Based on Article 1, the judge must follow the specified order of Islamic schools when he 
decides in relation to issues under Shari'a law. First, he must look to the school of Imam 
Malek. If he does not find a solution there, he must look to the school of Imam Ahmad 
Ben Hanbal. Finally, he should look to the schools of Imam El Shafe'i and Imam Abou 
Hanifa, respectively. However, where the Islamic schools do not provide an answer to the 
matter in question, the judge can rely on common practice to adopt a solution.   
In contrast, under the Rome I Regulation, the chosen law has to be the law of a country, 
rather than a non-state body of law, such as a religious law. Although the parties are not 
permitted to choose a non-territorial religious law under the Rome I Regulation, they can 
choose a law of a country that applies Shari'a law, for example. For instance, if the parties 
chose Saudi law, then Shari’a law will be applied to the extent that it is applied by Saudi 
courts along with all other rules applied by those courts. However, a definite judiciary 
(the Saudi judiciary) exists whose interpretation of Shari’a law will be followed.29  
Another of question that could arise is how the UAE court should deal with a case in 
which the parties have chosen substantive rules laid down in a treaty to which the UAE is 
not a party. For example, if the parties agree to choose the Vienna Convention 1980 on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as the governing law, such a choice should 
be interpreted sensibly and regarded as an indication of an implied choice of the law of a 
connected country that is a party to the Convention, since the provisions of the 
Convention are part of the internal law of the participating countries. A similar case could 
arise in an English court, since the United Kingdom is not a party to the Vienna 
Convention.   
 
                                                          
29 Supra note 2, at p. 294.  
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Establishing the content of the chosen law 
One of the issues that may arise in relation to a choice of law is what should happen when 
the content of the chosen law is unknown or unclear. This can occur if its substantive 
rules are unknown to the UAE courts or if their meaning is unclear. In such a case, the 
judge will apply the UAE law, as under Article 28 of the CTC the Emirati judge needs to 
consider two essential requirements before applying a foreign law. Otherwise, the law of 
the UAE will apply. Article 28 of the CTC specifies that:  
The law of the UAE shall be applied, if the proof of the existence of the applicable 
foreign law could not be established nor its significance could be determined.
30
  
This rule places the burden on the parties to provide the Emirati court with the necessary 
information as to the contents of the applicable foreign law, because failing to provide the 
court with sufficient information regarding the contents of the chosen law will result in 
the application of UAE law. However, the parties are permitted to choose the law of the 
UAE, if they think that it would difficult for them to provide the court with information 
as to the contents of the foreign law.  
It is important to point out that Emirati judges are obliged to give detailed reasons when 
they rule that the chosen law is not applicable because of the lack of information or 
difficulties in interpreting the chosen law.
31
 Moreover, the application and the 
interpretation of the applicable law are monitored by the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Cassation. This was confirmed by the Court of Cassation, which ruled that “the trial court 
in its interpretation of foreign laws in which it refers to foreign legal experts in such 
interpretation is monitored by the Court of Cassation.”32     
                                                          
30
 The importance of these two requirements in the sphere of contract is to ensure that the chosen law is 
accurately applied to the contract in accordance with the parties’ intention in choosing such a law.  
31  Supra note 15, at pp. 292-95. 
32
  Case no. 132/1995 on 18/2/1995 Dubai Court of Cassation. The author’s translation. 
57 
 
Another situation in which the UAE courts must have recourse to their own internal law 
is in the interpretation an ambiguous choice of law clause. For example, the court may 
have to interpret a choice of law clause that refers to “the seller’s residence” when the 
seller is a multilateral corporation. In such a case, it seems that the UAE court will have 
to interpret the reference to residence in accordance with UAE internal law. Moreover, 
the court may on occasion be driven to the conclusion that the choice of law clause is so 
ambiguous that it is not possible, under their rules of interpretation, to give it any 
intelligible meaning, with the result that the choice of law clause is void for uncertainty.   
 
IMPLIED CHOICE OF LAW 
The Rome I Regulation 
As previously noted, under the Rome I Regulation the parties involved in a contract have 
the right to choose the law that governs the contract and is used in the determination of 
disputes arising from the contract. However, in some situations, the parties do not 
expressly choose the law that governs their contract. In the absence of an express choice, 
the contract may be governed by a law impliedly chosen by the parties; or, if they have 
made no choice (express or implied), the governing law will be determined in accordance 
with the default rules specified in Article 4. The presence of the default rules specified in 
Article 4 makes it clear that in some cases it will not be possible for the court to discover 
an implied choice.  
Under Article 3 of the Rome I Regulation, an implied choice of law may be determined 
and applied to a contract in some cases where an express choice has not been made by the 
parties. Article 3(1) of the Regulation insists that such a choice must be “clearly 
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demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances of the case.” In contrast, 
Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention required that an implied choice should be 
“demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circumstances 
of the case.” The change of wording in the Regulation, as compared to the Convention, 
does not seem to indicate any actual difference in the requirements for the determination 
of an implied choice. This was confirmed by the English Court of Appeal in Lawlor v 
Sandvik Mining,33 in which Lord Toulson explained that the change of language was not 
designed to entail a change of meaning, but merely to bring the English and German texts 
into line with the French text of the Convention.  
Several special factors are considered with a view to determining an implied choice of 
law. Although these special factors may not exist in every case, they are regarded as 
potentially indicative of an implied choice. They may be contrasted with ordinary factors 
that exist in almost every case, such as the residence of each party and the places of 
negotiation and performance. It seems clear that such ordinary factors cannot alone 
provide the basis for determining an implied choice. 
The first of the special factors that may justify the discovery of an implied choice is the 
presence of a connected law, which, as compared with other connected laws, was at the 
time of contracting much more familiar with and had much more detailed rules on the 
interpretation of the particular type of contract in question. For example, in Amin Rasheed 
Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co,34 a marine policy issued in Kuwait by a 
Kuwaiti insurance company to a Liberian shipping company was written in English and 
employed a Lloyd’s standard form, but it did not contain an express choice of law. 
Claims under the policy were payable in Kuwait. After the vessel in question was 
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 [2013] EWCA Civ 365.  
34 [1984] AC 50. 
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detained by the Saudi authorities in connection with oil smuggling, the Liberian company 
brought a claim under the policy in the English court.  
The House of Lords ruled that the proper law of this contract was English law, explaining 
that the Lloyd’s standard form used for this policy originated in England and that, at the 
time of contracting, there was no ascertainable Kuwaiti law that concerned marine 
insurance contracts. In contrast, the English law was highly developed in matters relating 
to marine insurance. On the basis of these considerations, the Court inferred that the 
parties intended English law to govern the contract. It is clear that, if the insurer had been 
Australian or French, then the law of the insurer’s residence would have been applied, 
since Australian and French law had substantial familiarity with marine insurance and 
adequate rules for interpreting such contracts, so that recourse to the origin of the form 
used would not have been necessary in order to apply the law likely intended by the 
parties to resolve the dispute arising out of the contract. 
The validity of the contract under one connected law, but not under another connected 
law, may also indicate an implied choice of the validating law. A good example is Re 
Missouri Steamship Co,35 which involved an English ship registered at the port of 
Liverpool. The agent for the ship’s company in Boston, Massachusetts, signed contracts 
of carriage to transport goods from Boston to England using an English form. The 
contracts contained an exemption clause stating that the company would not be 
responsible for damages or losses caused by the negligence of a ship’s master or crew. 
This clause was invalid under Massachusetts law, because it infringed its public policy, 
but it was valid under English law. In the course of the voyage, the ship in question sank 
at Carnarvon, Wales, as a result of the negligence of its master and crew. A Mr. Munroe, 
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 (1889) 42 ChD 321. 
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who had shipped cattle on the ship, and was an American citizen residing in Boston, 
claimed against the Missouri steamship company for the loss of his cattle. The English 
Court of Appeal held the contract was governed by English law on the basis of an implied 
choice by the parties. The Court reasoned that the validity of the exemption clause under 
English law but not under Massachusetts law showed that the parties must have intended 
that the contract should be governed by English law.  
In such cases, difficulties may arise in discovering an implied choice where the parties 
were not aware of the difference with respect to the validity of the terms between various 
laws that were connected to the contract, especially where the contract had several strong 
connecting-factors, each with a different law, even if one law was more strongly 
connected to the contract.  
The form of a contract is one of the factors that can direct a court to the law governing the 
contract, as particular standard forms are drafted in the light of particular laws, and are 
sometimes used mainly in particular countries. This factor was recognised by the House 
of Lords in Miller v Whitworth,
36
 in which the Court held that English law governed a 
construction contract. An English owner of land located in Scotland used for the contract 
an English form suggested by his English architect rather than the separate Scottish form 
that was normally used in Scotland.   
Another factor mentioned in the Giuliano–Lagarde Report is that “a previous course of 
dealing” can be used to demonstrate an implied choice of law when the parties had 
chosen the law that applied to their earlier contracts. However, applying this factor in the 
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  [1970] AC 583.See also Amin Rasheed Shipping Corporation v Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] AC 50. 
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absence of an express choice is conditioned on the parties not having changed the 
practices which they had agreed on before.
37
  
An implied choice also comes into play in cases in which parties have chosen the court 
capable of hearing disputes linked to their contract. By Recital 12 of the Regulation, an 
agreement between the parties to confer on one or more courts or tribunals of a Member 
State exclusive jurisdiction to determine disputes under the contract should be one of the 
factors to be taken into account in determining whether a choice of law has been clearly 
demonstrated. The English traditional practice regards the inclusion of a jurisdiction 
clause in the contract as usually implying a choice of the law of the country whose court 
is chosen.
38
  
This factor can also be used in the case of an arbitration clause to determine an implied 
choice of law in the absence of an express choice. In Egon Oldendorff v Libera Corp,39 
for example, the parties chose an English form, written in English, and agreed that any 
arbitration would be carried out in London, which led the Court to decide that English 
law was the applicable law in the case. 
Links between related contracts are another factor that helps to determine an implied 
choice of law.
40
 However, in order for these to be used as indications of the law 
appropriate to a contract, there must be a commercial need for, and advantages related to, 
making several contracts subject to the same law. In the absence of such needs and 
advantages, this factor cannot be used to determine the applicable law.
41
 Similarly, all 
obligations arising from a banker’s letter of credit should be governed by a single law, 
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 [1980] OJ C282/17. 
38  See The Komninos S [1991] 1 Lloyds Rep 370, decided under the traditional English law; and Marubeni 
v Mongolian Government [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 873 (Aikens J), decided under the Rome Convention 
1980.  
39
 [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep 380. 
40
 Gard Marine and Energy Ltd v Glacier Reinsurance AG [2010] EWCA Civ 1052. 
41 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (3rd edn, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, 2014), at 
pp. 301-02. 
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that of the country in which the specified documents (such as a bill of lading) are to be 
presented for payment by the beneficiary at a bank office, which is expected to authorise 
payment.
42
 Therefore, this law will govern the obligations between the beneficiary and 
the issuing bank; the obligations between the beneficiary and the notifying or confirming 
bank; and the obligations between the two banks. However, the main contract of sale may 
be governed by another law, which may be chosen expressly or impliedly or determined 
under the default rules.   
In some cases, a combination of two or more special factors may indicate an implied 
choice of law. For example, using a standard form from a particular country can 
strengthen the argument for an implied choice that is based on other considerations. This 
can be seen in Gard Marine and Energy Ltd v Glacier Reinsurance AG,43 in which the 
English Court of Appeal took a broader view of an implied choice than it had taken in 
earlier cases. In this case, insurance with an English insurer had been partly reinsured by 
an English reinsurer and partly by a Swiss reinsurer with an office in London, and the two 
reinsurers were involved in the dispute. The underlying insurance was governed by 
English law, and the form of documentation for the reinsurance was a standard English 
form, which was used by both reinsurers. The Court relied on the form of the contract in 
determining the implied choice, but the Court also relied on the connection between the 
two reinsurance contracts and their connection with the main insurance contract. The 
Court also specifically indicated that, even if an implied choice could not be determined, 
English law would still have governed the Swiss reinsurer’s contract, because of the 
application of the closest connection analysis under Article 4 of the same factors. The 
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case also notably broadened the English perspective on closest connection under Article 
4, as both the form and the connection between the contracts were considered under that 
provision.  
This approach was confirmed in Golden Ocean v Salgaocar,44 in which the English Court 
of Appeal had to decide which law was applicable to a breach of an agent’s warranty of 
authority. In this case, the Court held that such a claim should be governed by “the same 
law as the proposed principal contract to which it is ancillary.” The Court also stated that 
the same result would be achieved under Article 4.  
The aforementioned special factors play an important role in determining which law is 
applicable to a contract, as they indicate the parties’ preference for a specific law. 
However, in some circumstances, one of these factors may conflict with others, or new 
special factors may arise. In such circumstances, the special factors should be considered 
as parts of a whole and evaluated in the light of the circumstances of each case in order to 
determine the parties’ choice regarding the proper law. In general, however, at least one 
special factor is necessary to enable the determination of an implied choice, and where 
only one special factor is present, or there are several such factors and they all point to the 
same law, it will usually be proper to conclude in favour of an implied choice of the law 
so indicated.  
The UAE 
The Emirati legislator did not overlook the case in which the parties involved have not 
chosen the applicable law or failed to reach an agreement on the law applicable to the 
contract. Therefore, Article 19 has directed the court to examine all of the circumstances 
of the contract with a view to discovering an implied choice of the applicable law.  
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Notably, Article 19 has given the court a wide discretion in determining the applicable 
law, since the Article has not restricted the court by requiring it to take into account any 
specific circumstances in determining an implied choice. However, there is a danger that 
this wide discretion, without any legislative guidance, may result in the application of a 
law that does not accord with the parties’ intention. Therefore, to avoid such a 
consequence, the court can rely on general principles of private international law as 
authorised by Article 23 of the CTC to ascertain and follow the proper principles in 
determining an implied choice of law. 
The court could thus rely on Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation in determining an 
implied choice of law. The Article requires that an implied choice should be clearly 
demonstrated by the terms of the contract or by the circumstances of the case. By 
applying such a requirement, the UAE court will have clear guidance that will assist it in 
reaching an outcome that complies with the parties’ intention as to the applicable law.    
On this basis, the Emirati court could consider several factors to determine the implied 
choice by referring to the rulings of English and other European courts. The form used in 
the contract is one of these factors that the court can use to determine the applicable 
law.
45
 For example, if two French nationals were residing in the UAE at the time of the 
contracting, and they used in the contract an English form that is generally used only in 
England, the applicable law would be English law by reason of the form used in the 
contract. 
Another factor is a jurisdiction clause, in which the parties have chosen the courts to 
which disputes arising from the contract should be brought. Similar significance arises in 
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the case of an arbitration clause which designates the seat of the arbitration.
46
 Another 
factor arises when the contract is connected with other contracts, and commercial needs 
make it desirable that it should be governed by the same law as those contracts.
47
 A 
previous course of dealing in which the parties have chosen the applicable law for the 
earlier contracts can also be used to determine the implied choice of law.
48
 
It seems, however, that, since the UAE legislation provides for implied choice but not for 
the closest connection, a wider view of implied choice should be adopted in the UAE than 
in the EU, where the default rules under Article 4 enable the rebuttal of the presumptions 
so as to apply a clearly more closely connected law. In contrast, the UAE default 
provision seems to lead to a rigid reference to the law of the common residence or (in the 
absence of a common residence) the place of contracting. While the default rule that 
favours the common residence is unlikely to lead to problematic results, the default rule 
in favour of the place of contracting lacks any reasonable justification and may frequently 
lead to arbitrary or unexpected results. Thus, a wide approach to the discovery of an 
implied choice offers the UAE courts a route by which they can rely on the explicit text 
of Article 19 and at the same time avoid the reference therein to the law of the place of 
contracting.  
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THE DEFAULT RULES 
The Rome I Regulation 
The default rules set out in Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation apply to situations in 
which the parties involved in a contract have failed to reach an explicit agreement on the 
law applicable to their contract, perhaps because each party insisted on the application of 
the law of his own country, and in which there is no sufficient indication from which an 
implied choice can be determined. Article 4 of the Regulation was derived from Article 4 
of the Rome Convention 1980, which was based on the principle that the law of the 
country most closely connected to a contract should be the law applied.  
This section of this chapter is focussed on the default rules under the Rome I Regulation 
(Article 4). It will first indicate the differences and the similarities between the Rome I 
Regulation and the Rome Convention 1980, after which it will examine the present 
provisions in detail. This will be followed by an examination of certain types of contract 
in relation to the Rome I Regulation. 
The most obvious difference between the Regulation and the Convention is the list of 
contracts established by Article 4(1) of the Regulation, to which no corresponding 
provision existed under the Convention. Despite this difference in structure, the outcomes 
of the two provisions are largely the same, since many of the entries in the list serve to 
indicate which party should be regarded as the characteristic performer with respect to the 
type of contract in question.  
Article 4(1) of the Regulation mentions several types of contract and the related factors 
that can be used to determine the applicable law in cases in which the law was not chosen 
under Article 3. These factors are the law of the country in which the seller has his or her 
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habitual residence (in a contract for the sale of goods);
49
 the law of the country in which 
the service provider has his or her habitual residence (in a contract for the provision of 
services);
50
 the law of the country in which immovable property is situated (in a contract 
concerning a right in rem or a tenancy of an immovable property);51 the law of the 
country in which the landlord has his or her habitual residence (in a short-term tenancy of 
an immovable property, provided that the tenant is a natural person and has his habitual 
residence in the same country as the landlord);
52
 the law of the country in which the 
franchisee has his or her habitual residence (in a franchise contract);
53
 the law of the 
country in which the distributor has his or her habitual residence (in a distribution 
contract);
54
 the law of the place where an auction was held (in a contract for the sale of 
goods by auction, if the place where the auction was held can be identified);
55
 and, 
finally, the law governing a financial market as defined by Article 4(1)(17) of EC 
Directive 2004/39 (in contracts concluded in a financial market).
56
 
Contracts relating to land 
Article 4(1)(c) of the Regulation deals with contracts involving a right in rem in 
immovable property or a tenancy of an immovable property and provides that the 
applicable law is the law of the country in which the property is situated. Despite the 
difference in wording of the Rome I Regulation and the Rome Convention 1980, the 
contents of both provisions are in substance the same. It has been suggested that the new 
word “tenancy”, which replaces “the right to use”, could be considered more restrictive.57 
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However, it seems that such changes are insignificant and that both provisions have the 
same outcome. 
An exception is made by Article 4(1)(d) in favour of the law of the landlord’s habitual 
residence in cases in which the tenancy of the land is for no longer than six consecutive 
months, and the parties habitually reside in the same country. 
Auction sales  
The sale of goods by auction is subject to Article 4(1)(g) of the Regulation.
58
 Under this 
provision, the applicable law for a contract for the sale of goods by auction is the law of 
the place where the auction is held, if that place can be identified.
59
 In some cases, 
difficulties may arise in identifying the location of an auction for instance, if the auction 
takes place on the Internet. It seems that the Regulation does not attempt to provide 
guidance in establishing the location of an auction in cases in which this is unclear. It can 
be argued that the location of the website to which bids are sent is the location of that 
auction. However, such a solution is unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, a website might 
be hosted on several servers located in different parts of the world in order to maintain 
availability; and second, applying such a solution could be unfair or arbitrary in some 
cases -- for example, where both the seller and the buyer were resident in France, and the 
website to which bids were sent was located in Australia. Applying Australian law would 
be inappropriate in this case, as French law would be more closely connected. Moreover , 
the location of the server might be unknown to the bidders, especially where the 
auctioneer’s website is on the multinational .com register rather than a national register 
(such as .co.uk or .de). 
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In cases such as the one mentioned above, Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation, which refers 
to the law of the country in which the seller has his habitual residence, could be applied, 
unless the circumstances of the case indicated a more closely connected law. But since, in 
the case of an auction sale, the seller’s identity may be unknown to the bidders, one can 
then look to the residence of the auctioneer, who is the seller’s agent.  
Contracts of loan 
It is clear that neither the Convention nor the Regulation have specifically addressed 
contracts for the loan of money, which are both common and important. In loan contracts, 
it is not clear who is the characteristic performer. In view of Recital 17 to the Rome I 
Regulation and the ruling of the European Court in Falco and Rabitsch v Weller-
Lindhorst60 on the Brussels I Regulation, a party who carries out an activity in return for a 
payment of money should be regarded as a service provider. However, contracts for the 
loan of money appear not to fall under the concept of services under Article 4(1)(b).    
Loan contracts are crucial for commercial interests, as the majority of individuals and 
companies require cash for business start-up. In contracts for which a loan is obtained to 
provide long-term finance for a company (as when finance is obtained by means of an 
issue of shares), it seems reasonable to regard the characteristic performance as the 
repayment of the loan (or the issuing of the shares).
61
 However, the characteristic 
performer in the case of other loans is unclear, as it could be either the lender or the 
borrower. The trend in the recent UK case law is to regard the lender as the characteristic 
performer.
62
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Securities Settlement Systems 
It is worth mentioning that Securities Settlement Systems (SSS) do not fall within Article 
4(1)(h) but instead under the general principles of Articles 3 and 4(2).
63
 In cases related to 
SSS, a particular presumption is not required, because the operation of the systems falls 
under EC Directive 1998/26. This Directive does not attempt to deal with the law 
governing the underlying contract. According to Article 2(a) of this Directive, 
participants must choose the applicable law of a member state to govern a “system” in 
order to enable the system to function and be counted as such. This system is based on 
putting each transaction into the netting system after it is concluded, so that it will be 
settled at a certain time thereafter.  
This provision is supported by Recital 31 of the Rome I Regulation, which provides that 
“Nothing in this Regulation should prejudice the operation of a formal arrangement 
designated as a system under Article 2(a) of Directive 98/26/EC”. If the transaction enters 
the netting system after it is concluded, the Directive will be applied even if one of the 
parties becomes insolvent, and the insolvency proceedings start after the transaction 
enters the system. Moreover, the Directive will be applied even if a dispute arises 
between the parties concerning the transaction after the transaction has entered the 
system. 
The characteristic performer’s residence 
If a contract does not fall under the scope of Article 4(1), or falls within more than one 
category of Article 4(1), one must endeavour to apply Article 4(2). The law applicable to 
the contract under Article 4(2) is the law of the country in “which the party required to 
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affect the characteristic performance of the contract is habitually resident”. Therefore, the 
application of Article 4(2) can be divided into two aspects, the first of which aims to 
identify the characteristic performance involved in a contract, and the second of which 
aims to locate the habitual residence of the party who is required to effect the 
performance characteristic of the contract.
64
 The main aim of most of the detailed rules 
specified in Article 4(1) of the Regulation is to identify the characteristic performer and 
thus pre-empt the operation of Article 4(2). 
The concept of characteristic performance has been taken from Swiss law,
65
 but its 
definition is set out neither by the Swiss legislation on private international law, by the 
Rome Convention, nor by the Rome I Regulation.
66
 For contracts that involve a single 
party’s performance, such as gift contracts or termination fee payment contracts, which 
are considered unilateral contracts,
67
 identifying the characteristic performance may at 
first sight seem not to involve any complications. In unilateral contracts, one party 
promises to pay in return for the other’s performance, but without any obligation from the 
second to perform. Under the Rome Convention, the English courts held that the only 
obligation which exists is to pay, and that is therefore the characteristic performance. 
However, it is arguable that there could be a characteristic performance which is not 
promised.
68
 In a unilateral contract, where one party has not promised to provide a 
service, but has provided a service as requested and now seeks the promised payment, it 
seems arguable that such a contract should be regarded as a contract for services and, 
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therefore, that the service provider should be regarded as the characteristic performer 
under Article 4(1)(b). 
Under most contracts, both parties have obligations to perform, and this makes it difficult 
to determine which party is the main performer under the contract.
69
 The Giuliano and 
Lagarde Report identifies a characteristic performance as “the performance for which 
payment is due”.70 While English and Scottish courts have applied this concept to goods 
and service contracts without much difficulty, its application can be complex in some 
cases, as in Print Concept GmbH v GEW(EC) Ltd,71 which involved an oral 
distributorship contract. In this case, the English Court of Appeal ruled that the 
characteristic performer was the manufacturer supplying products, because the products 
allowed the distributor to gain access to the German market. However, under the 
Regulation, this decision has been overruled by Article 4(1)(f), and the distributor is now 
regarded as the characteristic performer.  
The second part of the application of Article 4(2), as well as much of Article 4(1), 
involves determining the habitual residence of the characteristic performer. The 
definition of habitual residence is found in Article 19. Article 19(1) defines habitual 
residence as “the place of central administration” of a company or other body, as well as 
the “principal place of business” in the case of a natural person performing business 
activities on his own account. 
The notion of central administration, which is also used in Article 63(1)(b) (ex Article 
60(1)(b)) of the Brussels I Regulation, is comparable to the notion of the place of central 
management and control, which was used in Section 42 of the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act 1982 and refers to the place where the principal administrative and 
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managerial organ of the company (in English terms, the board of directors) holds its 
meetings and makes major decisions.
72
 For this purpose, the distinct legal personality of a 
subsidiary company is respected, save perhaps in special circumstances in which a parent 
company has successfully appropriated the roles of the subsidiary's board, which has 
stood aside.
73
 The English Court of Appeal in Young v Anglo American South Africa 
Ltd74 recently considered the concept of central administration under Article 63(1)(b) (ex 
Article 60(1)(b)) of the Brussels I Regulation). In that case, Aikens LJ explained that the 
reference to central administration refers to the place where the company involved makes 
important decisions in relation to its operation through its relevant organs. Moreover, he 
considered that the concept of central administration has the same meaning under Article 
63(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation as under Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, which deals with freedom of establishment. He concurred with 
the decision of Andrew Smith J in Vava v Anglo American South Africa Ltd (No 2). He 
rejected the approaches adopted in some earlier English decisions: King v Crown Energ 
was unhelpful in its reasoning;
75
 Iranian Ministry of Defence v Faz Aviation Ltd lacked 
analysis;
76
 and different legislative wording was addressed in Rewia.77 
For a period of time, the English courts confused the concept of the principal place of 
business, which is also used in Article 63(1)(c) (ex Article 60(1)(c)) of the Brussels I 
Regulation), with the concept of central administration, which is used in Article 63(1)(b) 
(ex Article 60(1)(b)), so that both referred to the place where the board of directors held 
their meetings.
78
 However, recent rulings have recognised that the concepts are different 
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and that the principal place of business is the location at or from which the most 
important and numerous of the company's dealings with outsiders are conducted, or the 
place in which the most essential of its economic, industrial or commercial activities are 
located and the majority of its employees and business resources are organised.
79
 In 
Young v Anglo American South Africa Ltd,80 Aikens LJ accepted that the concept of 
principal place of business diverges from the concept of central administration and that 
the concept of principal place of business refers to the place where the company in 
question does its essential business.       
Article 19(2) specifies that, “Where the contract is concluded in the course of the 
operations of a branch, agency or any other establishment, or if, under the contract, 
performance is the responsibility of such a branch, agency or establishment, the place 
where the branch, agency or establishment is located shall be treated as the place of 
habitual residence”. Article 19(3) states that the time when a contract is concluded is the 
relevant time in the determination of the place of habitual residence. The new provision 
in the Regulation provides that, if the conclusion of an agreement is carried out in the 
course of the operations of a secondary establishment, this establishment will count as 
the habitual residence. According to Stone, this “appears far more sensible, since it is on 
the establishment which negotiates the contract that the other party’s attention will 
normally be focused”.81 However, the position is obscure when, for example, the seller is 
a German company, but the sale is negotiated by its French branch and is to be performed 
by its English branch. 
With regard to the habitual residence of an individual who is not acting in the course of 
his business, the meaning of the habitual residence is not defined by the Rome I 
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Regulation nor by any other EU enactment in the field of private international law (such 
as the Rome II Regulation,
82
 the Brussels IIA Regulation,
83
 or the Insolvency 
Regulation).
84
 Nevertheless, it is likely that, in such cases, the approach adopted by the 
European Court in cases involving family matters under the Brussels IIA Regulation is 
likely to be followed for the purpose of other EU regulations in the sphere of private 
international law, such as the Rome I Regulation. This was confirmed by the English 
High Court in Winrow v Hemphill,85 in which Slade J held that a British army wife who 
had been living with her husband for a substantial period in the country in which he was 
stationed was habitually resident in that country for the purpose of the Rome II 
Regulation.  
The rulings of the European Court on the habitual residence of a spouse or parent in 
relation to jurisdiction in family matters under the Brussels IIA Regulation establish that, 
for this purpose, the concept of habitual residence must be uniformly defined under 
European Union law rather than be referred to the law of the forum State. The most 
helpful European Court ruling on this concept was given in Mercredi v Chaffe,86 which 
involved the habitual residence of a very young child, who had been removed by her 
mother to France from her previous habitual residence (England) and had resided in 
France for a few days before the crucial date. The mother was a French national and had 
resided in England for nearly nine years prior to her return to France with the baby. With 
regard to an adult, the European Court indicated that, for the habitual residence to be 
transferred to a State, it is essential that the individual in question have the intention to 
establish there the centre of his interests on a lasting basis. The actual duration of the stay 
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is merely a factor in determining the durability of the residence. Moreover, the person’s 
integration in a social and family environment must also be considered.          
A similar approach was suggested in the Borras Report,
87
 which relied on the definition 
provided by the European Court in another context,
88
 that habitual residence refers to the 
place where the person established, on a fixed basis, his permanent or habitual centre of 
interests, with all of the relevant facts being taken into account for the purpose of 
determining such residence. Moreover, this definition was applied by the English courts 
in Marinos v Marinos89 and Munro v Munro90 in relation to matrimonial jurisdiction 
under Brussels IIA Regulation.     
A question not yet settled concerns the minimum duration of the intended residence that 
can be regarded as a lasting or substantial period. It seems likely that an intention to stay 
for at least three years would be sufficient, but an intention to stay only for a shorter 
period (such as one year) would not.  
As regards the default rules for determining the law applicable to a contract, when the 
habitual residence of the relevant person cannot be ascertained to enable the proper law 
to be determined in accordance with Article 4(1) or (2) of the Rome I Regulation, as a 
last resort one can have recourse to Article 4(4) of the Regulation to refer to the law of 
the country with which the contract is most closely connected.  
Rebuttal 
 Under Article 4(3) of the Rome I Regulation, the law of a country other than that 
indicated by Article 4(1) and (2) should be applied if it is clear that the contract is 
manifestly more closely connected to that other country. This is referred to as the “escape 
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clause” by Recital 20, which suggests that “the court should take account, inter alia, of 
whether the contract in question has a very close relationship with another contract or 
contracts”.91 The words “clear” and “manifestly” are used to distinguish Article 4(3) of 
the Regulation from Article 4(5) of the Rome Convention, which required a contract only 
to be more closely connected to another country. Here, the Rome I Regulation seems, at 
least at first sight, to be more restrictive, as it requires a closer connection to be clear and 
manifest.
92
 But the difference may be minimal when the case law under the Convention is 
considered. 
An example of the application of Article 4(5) of the Convention can be found in 
Intercontainer Interfrigo v Balkenende Oosthuizen and MIC Operations,93 in which the 
European Court held that, if it appears clearly from the overall circumstances that a 
contract is more closely connected with a country other than that indicated by Articles 
4(2)-(4), the court can apply the law of the country that is most closely connected with 
the contract and not take the rules of Articles 4(2)-(4) into consideration.
 
This approach 
was confirmed in Gard Marine and Energy Ltd v Glacier Reinsurance AG,94 in which the 
English Court of Appeal, taking Article 3 into consideration, held that English law 
governed a contract, as it was the law impliedly chosen, and that the same factors led to 
the same conclusion under Article 4(5) of the Convention as showing the closest 
connection. The Court also emphasised the terminology used in the document and the 
connection between the various contracts, which indicated that English law was the 
applicable law. A similar case was British Arab Bank v Bank of Communications,95 which 
involved a performance bond issued by a Syrian bank with respect to the performance of 
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a Chinese contractor under a construction contract, as well as a counter-guarantee issued 
to the Syrian bank by an English bank. In that case, the English High Court applied 
Article 4(5) of the Convention in matters concerning the counter guarantee and ruled that 
Syrian law governed the counter guarantee between the English and Syrian banks based 
on its having the closest connection. 
The last resort 
In cases in which there is no express or implied choice and the law that governs a contract 
cannot be determined by applying Article 4(1) or (2) of the Regulation, Article 4(4) must 
be applied. This is known as the “last resort clause” and specifies that the law of the 
country most closely connected with a contract should be the applicable law for the 
contract.
96
 However, the operation of this provision can be very difficult in some cases. 
For instance, in a contract in which guns are exchanged for butter, both parties have an 
obligation to deliver goods, and it is difficult to determine which law is the most closely 
connected with the contract.
97
 The reference in Recital 19 to the centre of gravity does not 
appear to be of much help in resolving such difficulties. Another situation in which 
Article 4(4) can apply is when the habitual residence of the person referred to in Article 
4(1) or (2) cannot be ascertained.   
Contracts for the carriage of goods 
Article 5(1) of the Regulation deals with contracts for the carriage of goods and permits 
the parties to choose the law applicable to their contracts in accordance with Article 3. In 
the absence of such a choice, the law that governs the contract will be the law of the 
country of the habitual residence of the carrier, provided that the place of receipt, the 
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 Another example can be found in cases in which the parties exchange services for services. For example, 
hotel accommodations or theatre tickets are exchanged for advertising services. 
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place of delivery or the habitual residence of the consignor is also situated in that country. 
“If those requirements are not met, the law of the country where the place of delivery as 
agreed between the parties is situated shall apply”. The place of delivery refers to the 
place of discharge of the goods at the termination of the voyage.
98
 However, these rules 
are reduced to rebuttable presumptions by Article 5(3), which makes an exception in 
favour of the law of the closest connection. 
However, this may raise difficulties in cases in which there are several places of agreed 
delivery. For example, a Spanish consignor contracts with an Italian carrier to deliver 400 
containers by ship. The containers are to be loaded at a Spanish port, but out of the 400 
containers, 100 containers are to be delivered to Egypt, 100 to California, 100 to 
Denmark, and 100 to Australia. On one interpretation of Article 5(1), the applicable laws 
for the various goods would be the Egyptian, Californian, Danish and Australian laws, 
respectively, even though they are all subject to the same contract of carriage, since there 
is no single “place of delivery” for all of the goods. However, to avoid the application of 
two different laws in the case of disputes concerning two places of delivery, the parties 
would be well advised to choose the applicable law. Another possible approach would be 
to disregard Article 5(1) and look to the closest connection under Article 5(3). 
Presumably, in the above example this would be Spain as the consignor’s residence and 
the place of loading. 
Recital 22 explains that a single-voyage charter party and other contracts the main 
function of which is the carriage of goods should be considered contracts for the carriage 
of goods. It also defines the term “consignor” as referring to any person who enters into a 
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contract of carriage with a carrier and “the carrier” as referring to the party to the contract 
who undertakes to carry the goods, whether or not he performs the carriage himself. 
In Intercontainer Interfrigo v Balkenende Oosthuizen and MIC Operations,
99
 the 
European Court held that Article 5(1) of the Regulation is applicable not only for single-
voyage charter party contracts, but that it also applies to other contracts when the main 
function of the contract is the actual carriage of goods, not making available the transport 
resource. It seems that, in Interfrigo, the European Court regarded the actual contract 
before it as a contract for the hire of the railway wagons and thus as not falling within 
Article 5(1). 
Accordingly, a normal time charter of a ship, under which the shipowner retains control 
of the ship, employs the crew, and undertakes the carriage of goods, falls within the scope 
of Article 5(1).
100
 However, a bareboat charter, under which the shipowner provides the 
ship to the charterer, who employs the crew and undertakes the carriage of goods, is 
excluded from the application of Article 5(1). 
Despite the wording of Article 5(1), it is apparent that the second limb of this provision is 
not applicable, if the parties have not reached an agreement on the place of delivery, as it 
applies only if the parties reach an agreement on the place of delivery.
101
 
An exception to the operation of Article 5(1) has been provided by Article 5(3), which 
provides that, in the absence of a choice of law, and when it is clear from all of the 
circumstances of the case that the contract is manifestly more closely connected to a 
country other than that indicated in Article 5(1), then the law of that other country 
applies. 
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The UAE 
The default rules under the CTC can be found in Article 19(1), which directs the courts to 
follow two rules in determining the applicable law of a contract in the absence of an 
applicable law chosen by the parties. The first rule is that the applicable law should be the 
law of the country where both parties resided. However, this rule is restricted in that it 
envisages that the parties should have been resident in the same country. If the parties 
were resident in different countries, then the court will have to apply the second default 
rule of Article 19(1), which makes the law of the country in which the parties contracted 
the applicable law in the absence of an express or implied provision chosen by the parties. 
It seems that applying those rules in the absence of a law chosen by the parties could be 
difficult and could lead to unacceptable results. In most international contracts, the parties 
have different domiciles, so that the first rule is inapplicable. The second rule, which 
makes the law of the place of contracting the applicable law, is difficult to apply in some 
situations. For example, suppose that one party is resident in Dubai and the other party in 
Kuwait, and after some negotiations by correspondence between their offices they meet 
while attending a one-day conference in Bahrain, and there they sign the contract. 
Application of the second rule, which makes the place of contracting the applicable law 
in this situation, will lead to an unacceptable outcome, as Bahrain law does not have any 
substantial link to the contract. Moreover, it could be difficult to determine the place of 
contracting when the negotiations are conducted by correspondence across borders, such 
as, for example, by telephone or email. One could suggest that the rule in favour of the 
law of the place of contracting should be confined to cases in which all of the potentially 
relevant communications were both sent and received within a single country. Otherwise, 
one finds a gap and introduces a test of the closest connection under Article 23. However, 
if the place of contracting is clear, while leading to an undesirable result, the solution 
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could be to adopt a wide view of implied choice, wider than under the Rome I 
Regulation. 
Summary 
The parties have the freedom to choose expressly the law applicable to their contract 
under both the Rome I Regulation and the CTC choice of law provisions. However, the 
CTC is silent on several matters, such as whether the parties have the right to change the 
governing law at any time after contracting, whether the governing law must be a law of a 
country (a territorial unit), and whether the parties are allowed to spilt the governing law. 
In contrast, under the Rome I Regulation, these matters are clearly addressed. However, 
the key to solving these issues under the choice of law provisions of the CTC may be 
through Article 23, which permits the use of general principles of  private international 
law, as has been fully discussed in this chapter.  
With regard to the implied choice of law, it seems that such a choice is accepted under 
both the Rome I Regulation and the CTC provisions. However, it seems that, under the 
Rome I Regulation, an implied choice of law is required to be clearly demonstrated, 
while, under the CTC, there is no such requirement to determine an implied choice. 
Moreover, the CTC does not provide any examples or specify any factors indicative of an 
implied choice, whereas the Rome I Regulation provides several examples, and indicative 
factors are also identified in case law.  
With regard to the default rules that apply in the absence of an express or implied choice, 
those specified by the CTC seem inappropriate for the needs of commerce, as their 
application may lead to unpredictable results inconsistent with the parties’ expectations. 
However, those results could be avoided if the court were to take a narrow view of 
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Article 19 and could proceed to fill the gap by reference to general principle in 
accordance with Article 23.  
The default rules under the Rome I Regulation offer more sensible solutions by 
permitting the application of the law of the country that is most closely connected with 
the contract. Moreover, the default rules under the Regulation also subject different types 
of contract to different rules and thus endeavour to achieve a combination of reasonable 
certainty with respect for the distinct nature of certain types of contract. 
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Chapter 4 - Exceptions to the Operation of the Proper Law 
 
Introduction 
In general, the proper law of the contract, whether ascertained by reference to a choice by 
the parties or under the default rules, will govern all issues that may arise in relation to 
the contract.
1
 By way of exception, there are certain issues (such as a person’s capacity) 
the nature of which may lead to the application of a different law. By way of a further 
exception, there are cases in which the content of the substantive rules contained in the 
proper law may lead to seriously unacceptable results, so that the court will refuse to 
apply them as incompatible with the public policy of the forum country. A related 
exception may enable a court to give overriding effect to certain mandatory rules 
contained in its own law or possibly in the law of a third country.    
This chapter will first deal with issues the nature of which may lead to the application of 
a law other than the proper law. Consideration will be given to personal capacity, 
formalities, formation, minor details of performance, essential validity and formation, and 
the consequences of invalidity. These issues will be considered under the Rome I 
Regulation and the CTC. Then, the public policy provisos of the Rome I Regulation and 
the CTC will be discussed. Finally, the operation of overriding mandatory rules under the 
Rome I Regulation and the CTC will be considered.   
Personal Capacity  
Capacity under the Rome I Regulation 
By Article 1(2)(a) and (f) of the Rome I Regulation, the capacity of both individuals and 
companies to contract is excluded from the scope of the Regulation. Therefore, the 
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traditional conflict rules of the forum country will be applied to such matters. However, 
an exception is provided in Article 13, which provides:  
In a contract concluded between persons who are in the same country, a natural 
person who would have capacity under the law of that country may invoke his 
incapacity resulting from the law of another country, only if the other party to the 
contract was aware of that incapacity at the time of the conclusion of the contract or 
was not aware thereof as a result of negligence. 
The wording of Article 13 makes it clear that the exception is limited to the capacity of 
individuals and does not extend to that of companies. Historically, the exception is 
derived from French case law, which in the 19th century introduced a departure of this 
kind from a general rule referring a person’s capacity to the law of his nationality.2 
Subject to the exception provided by Article 13, the determination of a person's capacity 
by the English courts continues to be governed by the traditional English conflict rules. 
With regard to the capacity of an individual, the English conflict rules refer alternatively 
to the law that governs the contract and to the personal law of the relevant individual (that 
of his domicile and/or residence). Consequently, it is sufficient that he has capacity under 
either of these laws.
3
  
However, with regard to companies, the traditional English conflict rule requires that a 
company should have capacity both under the law of the country of incorporation and 
under the law governing the contract.
4
 A recent decision of the English Court of Appeal 
in Haugesund Kommune v Depfa ACS Bank5 involved a contract of loan, governed by 
English law, between a Norwegian local authority and an Irish subsidiary of a German 
bank. The Court ruled that the contract of loan was invalid, since, under Norwegian law, 
the local authority lacked power to obtain loans for speculative purposes. The Court 
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 See especially the ruling of the French Court of Cassation in De Lizardi v Chaise Sirey 61.1.305 (1861).  
3
 See Dicey, 15th edition, Rule 228; and Stone, 3rd edition, pp. 324-26. 
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 This was confirmed in Continental Enterprises Ltd. v Shandong Zhucheng Foreign Trade Group Co 
[2005] EWHC 92 (Comm), in which the court ruled invalid a contract governed by English law, as the 
buyer lacked capacity under the law of its incorporation, Chinese law, to enter into transnational trade.  See 
also Dicey, Rule 175.  
5
 [2010] EWCA Civ 579. 
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disregarded a further Norwegian rule that validated contracts despite incapacity when the 
other party acted in good faith on the ground that it is the law which governs the contract 
in question which governs the consequences of incapacity to contract. This application of 
part of Norwegian law to invalidate a contract which would be valid under Norwegian 
law as a whole seems very unsatisfactory.          
Capacity under the CTC 
Article 19 of the CTC does not apply to capacity, as this matter is specifically addressed 
by Article 11. With regard to the capacity of an individual, Article 11(1) lays down a 
general rule that the law of the state of which a person has the nationality applies to his 
civil status and competence. But it makes an exception with relation to financial dealings 
that are transacted in the United Arab Emirates and the results of which materialise 
therein. In such a case, if one of the parties is an alien of defective capacity under the law 
of his nationality, and the lack of capacity is attributable to a hidden cause which the 
other party could not easily discover, such a cause will have no effect on his capacity. 
The exception specified by Article 11(1) has some similarity to that adopted by Article 13 
of the Rome I Regulation. But under the CTC, the place of performance and the place of 
contracting are material, and there is no explicit requirement that the parties must be 
present in the UAE. Moreover, under the CTC, the incapacity in question will be wholly 
disregarded, so that the party who dealt with the incapable person will be precluded from 
invoking the person’s incapacity to escape from the contract.  
With regard to corporate capacity, Article 11(2) of the CTC deals with the legal 
regulation of foreign juridical persons, including companies, associations, and 
establishments, and this includes their capacity to contract. It lays down a general rule 
making applicable the law of the state in which such bodies have their actual main 
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administrative centre. It also provides for an exception when such a body carries on an 
activity in the United Arab Emirates and in that case makes UAE law applicable instead.  
The general rule laid down by Article 11(2) of the CTC referring corporate matters, 
including capacity, to the law of the company’s administrative centre accords with the 
approach traditionally adopted in many European countries, such as France and Germany. 
Thus, if a company has its administrative centre within the UAE, its capacity will be 
governed by UAE law.  
But the exception in Article 11(2), by which the capacity of a company the administrative 
centre of which is abroad and which merely carries on an activity within the UAE will be 
subject to UAE law, is less easy to justify. It is not even clear that the contract in question 
need have any connection to the UAE establishment. For example, a company might have 
its headquarters in Florida and have a branch in Dubai, and it might (through its Florida 
head office and not its Dubai branch) enter into a contract with a Japanese company to 
deliver goods in New York. The company might later become insolvent, and insolvency 
proceedings might be opened in both Florida and Dubai. The Japanese creditor might 
seek to prove its claim in the Dubai proceeding so as to obtain payment from assets there. 
On a wide reading of the exception, the creditor’s claim in the Dubai insolvency would be 
defeated if the company for some reason lacked capacity to enter the contract under UAE 
law, even though the transaction had no connection with the UAE.  
The best solution for capacity to contract is to refer the capacity of an individual to the 
law of his habitual residence and the capacity of a company to the law of its place of 
incorporation. If such a place is difficult to identify, one can refer instead to the law of the 
place where the company’s central administration is located.  
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Formal Validity 
Formal requirements deal with the form in which a contract must be concluded. They 
include such requirements as that a contract must be concluded in writing;
6
 that the 
writing should be signed by the parties and/or witnesses; and that there should be as many 
original copies of the contractual document as there are parties. Such requirements must 
be distinguished from substantive requirements, which deal with such matters as the need 
for consideration or a legitimate purpose, or the validity of the agreed terms. Here, we 
shall deal with formal requirements. Substantive requirements are governed by the proper 
law of the contract, subject to exceptions with respect to public policy and overriding 
mandatory rules (discussed later in this chapter). 
Formal Validity under the Rome I Regulation 
In the Rome I Regulation, Article 11(1) reflects a widespread international practice by 
specifying that a contract concluded between persons who are, or whose agents are in the 
same country at the time of its conclusion is formally valid if it satisfies either the formal 
requirements of the law that governs it in substance under the Regulation or those of the 
law of the country where it is concluded.  
Article 11(2) advances the policy of validation with regard to formalities when there is 
any reasonable basis for doing so by dealing with cases in which a contract is concluded 
between persons who are, or whose agents are in different countries at the time of its 
conclusion. In such a case, the formal validity of the contract will be governed by its 
proper law or by the law of a country, where one of the parties or agents is present at the 
time of conclusion, or by the law of a country in which one of the parties is habitually 
resident at that time. Among these laws, the one which is most favourable to the formal 
validity of the contract will apply. Thus, a contract between two parties or their agents 
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  Thus, an oral contract (for example, one concluded by means of a telephone conversation) is formally 
valid if the law applicable to formal validity does not require writing.  
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who were in different countries would be formally valid if it satisfied the formal 
requirements of any of the following laws: the law that governs the contract; the law of a 
country in which one of the parties or agents was present at the time of contracting; the 
law of a country in which the other party or agent was present at the time of contracting; 
the law of the country in which one party was habitually resident; and the law of the 
country in which the other party was habitually resident. 
Article 11(3), which again adopts a strong preference for a valid law, deals with the 
formal validity of a unilateral act intended to have legal effect relating to an existing or 
contemplated contract; for example, a release from liability under an existing contract. 
Such an act is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the law that governs 
or would govern the existing or contemplated contract in substance under the Regulation, 
or those of the law of a country in which the act was done, or those of the law of the 
country in which the person by whom it was done had his habitual residence at that time.   
An exception provided by Article 11(5) of the Regulation, which specifies that contracts 
the subject matter of which is a right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of 
immovable property are subject to the formal requirements of the law of the country in 
which the property is located, if by that law those requirements are imposed irrespective 
of the country of contracting and irrespective of the law governing the contract, and they 
cannot be derogated from by agreement. This probably applies, for example, to the 
English requirement that a contract for the sale of English land should be concluded in 
writing, imposed by Section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1989.  
Formal Validity under the CTC 
Under the CTC, no special rules concern the formal validity of a contract. Instead, the 
formal validity of a contract is subject to the same conflict rules that apply to other 
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contractual issues. Indeed, Article 19 of the CTC explicitly refers to both the form and the 
substance of contractual obligations. Thus, under Article 19 the formal validity of a 
contract will be governed by the law chosen by the parties. In the absence of such a 
choice, formal validity will be governed by the law of the country in which both parties 
reside, if they both reside in the same country; or if they reside in different countries, by 
the law of the place of contracting.   
It could be suggested that the reference by the CTC of formal validity to the law 
governing the contract is too restrictive and that it should alternatively be sufficient to 
comply with the formal requirements of the law of a place in which a party or agent was 
present at the time of the negotiations by which the contract was concluded.  
 Minor details of performance 
A minor exception to the operation of the proper law has been provided by Article 12(2) 
of the Regulation, which enables the place of performance to play a role in regulating the 
manner of performance and the steps to be taken in the event of defective performance. 
This may be seen as reflecting the approach adopted earlier by the English courts. Thus, 
in Mount Albert BC v Australian Assurance Soc,7 it was held that the minor details of 
performance may be governed by the law of the place of performance insofar as this does 
not affect the substance of the obligation.   
Article 12(2) applies to such issues as the determination under the contract of sale of the 
business hours within which the delivery should be affected. This principle could also 
apply in cases in which the parties have expressed a debt in a currency that differs from 
that of the place of payment to the question of whether, in the absence of a specific 
agreement, the debtor has the option to deliver local currency of equivalent value rather 
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than paying in the currency of the account itself.
8
 It also ensures that a sea-carrier is able 
to fulfil the obligation that a bill of lading should be returned to the customs agent after 
presentation, when this obligation is imposed by the law of the place of discharge, in 
order to show that the delivery has been made.
9
  
There is no provision in the CTC which corresponds to Article 12(2) of the Regulation.  
In addition, it has traditionally been recognised in England that a foreign proper law 
could be displaced by a stringent English public policy in cases when it would require a 
performance that it is prohibited under criminal penalty at the place of performance. Such 
cases are now specifically regulated by Article 9(3) of the Regulation. This role of the 
place of performance will be considered later in this chapter.  
Essential validity and formation 
By Article 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation, the existence and validity of a contract or of 
any term of a contract is subject to the proper law of the contract under the Regulation, 
which is determined on the assumption that the contract or term is valid. The essential 
validity and the formation of a contract fall within the scope of Article 10(1) of the 
Regulation. 
By Article 10(1) of the Regulation, matters concerning the essential validity of the 
contract as a whole will governed by the proper law of the contract. This includes the 
need for consideration and the effect of infringement of exchange restrictions.
10
  
With regard to formation, Article 10(1) of the Regulation subjects the formation of a 
contract to the proper law of the contract in question. This applies to such issues as the 
existence of a sufficient offer and acceptance. Therefore, if, for example, the letter of 
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 See Dicey, Morris and Collins, at para. 32-151. 
9
 See East West Corp v DKBS 1912 [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep 182 (Thomas J).     
10
 See Kahler v Midland Bank [1950] AC 24.  
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acceptance is lost in the post, it will be for the proper law of the contract to determine 
whether the contract was validly formed.
11
 The determination of whether a person has 
become a party to an existing contract between others will also be subject to the proper 
law of the contract, such as, for example, with regard to the holder of a bill of lading.
12
  
The determination of whether a party's consent is invalid by reason of misrepresentation, 
improper economic pressure or mistake is governed by the proper law of the contract 
under Article 10(1). However, in England, a stringent public policy under Article 21 will 
usually displace foreign rules that deny relief against fraud or non-economic pressure.     
Article 10(2) of the Regulation provides an exception to the general rule specified by 
Article 10(1) in relation to formation. The exception applies when it appears from the 
circumstances that it would not be reasonable to determine the effect of a party’s conduct 
in accordance with the proper law. In such an instance, he may rely on the law of his 
habitual residence to establish that he did not consent. This could be applied in a case in 
which an offer received from a foreign country was ignored by an English resident, but 
silence was regarded as consent under the law that governed the offer. For this purpose, a 
person’s habitual residence will be determined in accordance with Article 19 of the 
Regulation. 
English case law has shown reluctance to apply Article 10(2). In Egon Oldendorff v 
Libera Corp,13 the Court refused to apply Japanese law under Article 10(2) to deprive a 
London arbitration clause of effect, since doing so would disregard commercial 
expectations, and such a clause would be expected in an international contract. Similarly, 
in Horn Linie v Panamericana Formas E Impresos,14 the Court adopted the same 
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 See Albeko v Kamborian Shoe Machine Co (1961) 111 LJ 519. 
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 See The Ythan [2006] 1 All ER 367 (Aikens J). 
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 [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep 64.  
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  [2006] EWHC 373 (Comm). 
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approach with regard to the parties’ consent to a choice of law clause and accordingly 
gave effect to a choice of English law despite an argument that the clause infringed 
Colombian public policy.  
The English Court also narrowed the application of Article 10(2) in Lupofresh v Sapporo 
Breweries,
15
 where it restricted Article 10(2) to the existence of consent as distinct from 
its validity. On this basis, the provision would apply where consent was inferred from 
silence under the proper law of the contract. However, it would not apply to vitiate 
consent by mistake, misrepresentation, non-disclosure, undue influence or duress. These 
factors would simply be subject to the proper law of the contract under Article 10(1). It is 
difficult to see the merit of this narrow interpretation of Article 10(2).
16
  
There is no provision in the CTC corresponding to Article 10(2) of the Regulation. 
The consequence of nullity 
The consequences of nullifying a contract are subjected to the proper law of the contract 
by Article 12(1)(e) of the Rome I Regulation. This provision is derived from the idea that 
the proper law of the contract, which governs validity, should also govern its 
consequences.  
Article 12(1)(e) of the Regulation corresponds to Article 10(1)(e) of the Rome 
Convention 1980. However, reservations excluding Article 10(1)(e) were permitted by 
the Convention, which excludes the application of Article 10(1)(e).
17
 No such 
reservations are possible under the Regulation.  
Some confusion arises from Article 1(2)(i) of the Regulation, which excludes from the 
scope of the Regulation obligations arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion of the 
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  See Stone, 3rd edition, p. 322. 
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  Such a reservation is made by the United Kingdom and by Italy. 
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contract, and from Recital 10, which explains that Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation 
applies to such obligations.
18
 Therefore, it is unclear whether tort or restitution claims that 
arise from the invalidity of a contract by reason of dealings prior to its conclusion will be 
subject to Article 12 of the Rome II Regulation or to Article 12 (1)(e) of the Rome I 
Regulation.  
Public Policy 
Public policy under the Rome I Regulation 
By Article 21 of the Regulation, the application of a rule of the law of any country 
specified by the Regulation may be refused, if such application is manifestly contrary to 
the public policy (ordre public) of the forum. 
This provision is similar to the public policy proviso under traditional English law. The 
Regulation uses a formula that refers to manifest incompatibility derived from the Hague 
Conventions, but in substance the test is the same as under the traditional English rule, 
which (as formulated by some commentators) referred to the forum’s stringent public 
policy. The application of Article 21 of the Regulation can have two results. First and 
most frequently, it may lead the court to consider a contract invalid that would otherwise 
be valid under its governing law. Secondly and conversely, it may lead the court to 
uphold and enforce the contract, contrary to the law that governs it. In both cases, the 
relevant foreign rule is excluded, and the issue is determined in accordance with the 
internal lex fori. The most common application of the public policy proviso is to 
disregard a foreign rule, because its content is regarded as totally unacceptable in terms of 
the forum’s fundamental values. Thus, on this basis English courts have invoked the 
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proviso in order to invalidate contracts entered into as a result of illegitimate non-
economic pressure.
19
 
A further probable effect of Article 21 of the Regulation is to enable the continued 
operation of the traditional English rules, which aim to prevent the English courts from 
requiring or encouraging parties to perform a contract in a country in which such 
performance would infringe the criminal law of that country. Although this result may 
now be achieved by reference to Article 9(3) of the Regulation, it seems probable that 
Article 21 also remains available for this purpose, since these rules aim to avoid giving 
judgments by the English courts which could be the subject of legitimate diplomatic 
complaint by foreign governments, and thus to facilitate the conduct of the United 
Kingdom’s foreign policy. 
The first of these English rules applies when the parties’ main intention at the time of 
contracting was that the performance of the contract should be carried out by means of 
acts done in disobedience of a known criminal prohibition under the law of a country 
where the performance of the act would take place. In this case, the rule will have the 
effect of rendering the whole contract invalid in England. 
The second rule regarding criminal prohibitions applies when there was no actual 
intention of the parties to defy a known prohibition, but unknown to them there existed at 
the time of contracting, or there came into effect between the time of contacting and the 
time when the contract was to be performed, in a country where an act was required by 
the contract to be performed, a criminal prohibition of such an act. In such cases, the 
English courts will treat at least the obligation to perform the prohibited act as discharged 
by reason of the prohibition.  
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This rule was applied by the Court of Appeal in Ralli v Naviera,20 which involved a 
charterparty for the carriage of goods from India to Spain, which was governed by 
English law. The freight was payable in Spain on arrival. During the voyage, a new 
Spanish rule was brought into effect which prohibited payment of freight at a rate beyond 
a legal limit. The court ruled that the new Spanish rule had the effect of discharging the 
obligation to pay the freight to the extent that it exceeded the legal limit. Although the 
decision can be regarded as an application of the English doctrine of frustration to a 
contract governed by English law, it seems clear that an English court would have 
disregarded under the public policy proviso a rule of a foreign proper law that in such 
circumstances insisted on upholding the obligation to pay the agreed freight in Spain in 
defiance of the Spanish prohibition. Today, the same results could also be reached by 
reference to Article 9(3) of the Regulation, which specifically permits a court to respect 
overriding mandatory rules of a country in which an obligation should be performed but 
which prohibits such performance.   
Public policy under the CTC 
Article 27 of the CTC specifies that "It shall not be permissible to apply the provisions of 
a law specified by the preceding Articles if such provisions are contrary to Islamic 
Shari'a, public order, or morals in the State of the United Arab Emirates."  
Thus, Article 27 excludes the application of foreign law if such application would conflict 
with the public policy of the UAE as embodied in its law. It is apparent that, in this 
context, the UAE legislator has placed strong emphasis on the Islamic Shari'a as an 
element of UAE law and policy. It is important to point out that, while there are some 
Islamic Shari'a provisions that apply only to Muslims, there are also some rules of the 
Islamic Shari'a that are part of UAE public policy and that apply equally to Muslims and 
                                                          
20
  [1920] 2 KB 287. 
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non-Muslims. These include, for example, the prohibition of marriage between close 
relatives (such as between a brother and his sister). Such a marriage is prohibited under 
the Islamic Shari'a, and this prohibition is considered as constituting a public policy that 
applies equally to Muslims and non-Muslims. Another example (more relevant to the 
contractual sphere) is the prohibition of dealings with illicit drugs. This too is considered 
a matter of public policy and is based on Islamic Shari'a rules that apply to both Muslims 
and non-Muslims.    
The application of the public policy proviso leads to positive and negative results. First, it 
has a negative result in that the rules that contradict public policy will be set aside. 
Secondly, it has a positive result, as internal law of the forum becomes applicable to fill 
the gap arising from the exclusion of the normally applicable law. 
The court, in considering what counts as public policy under Article 27, should take a 
broadminded view and accept that the scope of public policy in the context of 
transnational relationships should be narrower than in the context of internal 
relationships. Thus, not all internal mandatory rules give rise to an internationally 
applicable public policy. 
Overriding mandatory rules 
Overriding mandatory rules under the Rome I Regulation 
The provisions concerning the overriding of mandatory rules under the Rome I 
Regulation can be found in Article 9(1)-(3).   
Overriding mandatory rules of the forum country under Article 9(2) 
Article 9(2) of the Rome I Regulation provides that nothing in the Regulation is to restrict 
the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum. The 
definition of overriding mandatory rules can be found in Article 9(1), which specifies that 
overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the respect for which is regarded as 
98 
 
crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, social or 
economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling 
within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under the 
Regulation. 
Recital 37 explains that the application of Article 9(2) is narrow, as it applies in 
exceptional circumstances, and that the concept of overriding mandatory provisions has a 
narrower scope than that of provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement, for 
which provision is made by Article 3(3)-(4).  
The relevant substantive rules must be regarded by the forum country as so important in 
relation to its public interests that in appropriate cases they must be given overriding 
effect, so as to displace the normally applicable foreign law. But, despite the reference to 
the country's public interests in Article 9(1), Article 9(2) can be applied to mandatory 
rules of the lex fori, the aim of which is to protect weaker parties, such as a small 
business dealing with a large business. This was confirmed by the European Court of 
Justice in Unamar v Navigation Maritime Bulgare,21 in which it recognised that 
mandatory provisions of the lex fori for the protection of commercial agents could be 
applied under Article 9(2), even in a case where the proper law of the contract is that of 
another Member State, and that law includes provisions that are compatible with a 
European Union measure that has the same aim. In such a case, it is permissible for the 
forum to invoke Article 9(2) to provide the weaker party with the protection of its own 
mandatory rules, which are more demanding or have a wider scope than those of the law 
that governs the contract and complies with the EU harmonising measure. Thus, in the 
definition supplied by Article 9(1), it is the crucial or important, rather than the public, 
character of the forum’s substantive rule that is significant.  
                                                          
21
  Case C-184/12, [2014] 1 All ER (Comm) 625. 
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Overriding mandatory rules of a third country under Article 9(3) 
Under Article 9(3) of the Rome I Regulation, effect may be given to the overriding 
mandatory provisions of the law of the country in which the obligations arising out of the 
contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory 
provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. Moreover, the Article 
specifies that, in considering whether to give effect to those provisions, regard shall be 
had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-
application. 
This provision addresses cases in which the law applicable to a contract is a law of a 
country other than the forum country, and the contract imposes obligations that are valid 
under the normally applicable law, but the contractually agreed performance is prohibited 
by the law of the country of performance. Before the Rome I Regulation, the problem 
was dealt with in England under the public policy proviso specified by Article 16 of the 
Rome Convention 1980. It seems probable that the English courts remain free under the 
Regulation to follow their traditional approach and that this freedom may now be derived 
from both Article 9(3) and Article 21 in favour of the public policy of the forum country. 
Overriding mandatory rules under the CTC 
The UAE legislator has not included in the CTC any special provision dealing with 
overriding mandatory rules in relation to private international law even with regard to 
contracts involving weaker parties.  
However, some other UAE enactments contain mandatory rules that cannot be derogated 
from by agreement. Such provisions can be found in legislation on employment or 
consumer contracts. Thus, Article 20 of Employment Law no. 8 concerning youth labour 
provides that young persons of either gender younger than fifteen years of age should not 
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be employed. Similarly, Article 16 of Consumer Law no. 24 regarding consumer rights 
provides that a consumer is entitled to compensation for personal or material damages in 
accordance with the general rules in force and that any agreement to the contrary is null 
and void.  
Since there are no separate provisions concerning mandatory rules in the context of 
private international law, it seems clear that a UAE court may properly invoke the public 
policy proviso contained in Article 27 of the CTC to enable it to apply UAE mandatory 
rules, such as those designed to protect weaker parties (such as employees or consumers) 
when the situation has a suitable connection with UAE territory. Such rules may, for 
example, favour an employee who works within the UAE or a consumer who is resident 
in and negotiates the contract in or from the UAE. 
Summary  
The provisions concerning capacity under the Rome I Regulation differ from those 
adopted in the CTC. The capacity of an individual under the Rome I Regulation is 
governed by the conflict rules of the forum country, whereas under the CTC the capacity 
of the individual is subject to the law of his nationality. 
Another matter in which the Rome I Regulation differs from the CTC is in the rules 
concerning formalities. Under the Rome I Regulation, it is sufficient, with regard to 
formalities, to comply with the law of a place where a party or agent was present at the 
time of the negotiations by which the contract was concluded. In contrast, under the CTC, 
there are no special rules with regard to formalities, and they are subject to the general 
rules on choice of law for contracts.  
Both the Rome I Regulation and the CTC have special provisions concerning public 
policy, by which the parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law can be overridden in 
order to give effect to other important values.  
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With regard to overriding mandatory rules, the Rome I Regulation provides for special 
rules designed to enable the forum country to insist on its own solutions when it claims to 
have a strong interest in doing so. In contrast, the CTC contains no such provisions in 
relation to overriding mandatory rules. However, UAE substantive law contains some 
mandatory rules which the parties cannot contravene by agreement. Therefore, it seems 
legitimate for a UAE court to apply such mandatory rules in cases appropriately 
connected to the UAE territory by utilising the public policy proviso. 
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Chapter 5 - Protection of Weaker Parties 
Inequality of bargaining power is a controversial issue. Many problems are caused by the 
inequality of bargaining power in commercial contracts, despite the guidelines that were 
agreed to by the contractual parties in a commercial contract. 
There has been little academic discussion about the importance of bargaining power in 
commercial transactions.
1
 In this academic discussion, there are three main views. The 
first and most common view consists of those arguing that, because transactions between 
powerful and weak parties are naturally difficult, courts should adopt particular doctrinal 
remedies to help them identify and invalidate unfair contracts.
2
 A second view includes 
proposals that courts should take inequality of bargaining power into account in 
circumstances other than contract invalidation and non-enforcement. The third view 
criticises the judiciary’s analysis of bargaining power and attempts to address the 
theoretical questions that have been raised, but not answered, by the case law. 
The Rome I Regulation provides special rules for certain types of contract with a view to 
protecting the weaker party. The relevant types are certain consumer contracts, contracts 
for the carriage of passengers, insurance contracts, and individual employment 
contracts.This chapter will deal in turn with each of these types of contract. Each type 
will be examined in relation both to the Rome I Regulation and the CTC.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Helveston, M.H., Jacobs, M.J., 2014. The Incoherent Role of Bargaining Power in Contracts Law, Wake 
Forest Law Review, Vol.49,Apr 3, pp.1017-1058. 
2
 Ibid 
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Consumer Contracts 
Why is protecting consumer contracts important? 
The parties’ freedom to choose the law applicable to their contracts should be based on 
equality between the parties, so that it enables each to take care of his own interests and 
to make a conscious choice of the risks involved.
3
 But since the beginning of the second 
half of the last century, the development of industrialization and capitalist economic 
processes has undermined such equality, so that there is often evident inequality in the 
economic, technical and legal capacities of the parties to a contract. This is especially the 
case with regard to transactions between a trader (a person carrying on a business or 
profession) and a consumer (a person not carrying on a business or profession). Traders 
commonly use for their contracts standard forms that are drafted to maximize their own 
advantages at the expense of consumers and that make the contracts unbalanced. This 
places the consumer in a weaker position economically and technically and requires some 
legal regulation to protect the consumer and to rebalance the relationship between the 
parties.  
Accordingly, consumer protection has become an important issue, especially in the 
present day, in the context of both state-controlled and market economies. The need is for 
an appropriate means of protecting the consumer from unfair conditions that are 
commonly included (or incorporated by reference) in consumer contracts, sometimes 
without the consumer’s knowledge or understanding.4 
 
 
                                                          
3 Dr Khaild Kalel, )  صاخلا يلودلا نوناقلا يف كلهتسملا ةيامح ) The protection of the consumer in private international 
law (dar alnahtha al arabeia, Cairo, 2002), p. 198 (in Arabic). 
4
  See above note 3, at pg 199. 
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The Rome I Regulation 
Conflict rules concerning certain consumer contracts are specified by Article 6 of the 
Rome I Regulation. The relevant contracts are defined by reference both to substantive 
and territorial requirements. The definition used by the Rome I Regulation is similar to 
that used by Article 17 (ex Article 15) of the Brussels I Regulation.    
Substantive Scope 
Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation defines a consumer contract as "a contract 
concluded by a natural person for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his 
trade or profession (the consumer) with another person acting in the exercise of his trade 
or profession (the professional)". 
This definition differs from that used by Article 5(1) of the Rome Convention 1980, 
which referred to "a contract the object of which is the supply of goods or services to a 
person ('the consumer`) for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or 
profession, or a contract for the provision of credit for that object."
5
 Under the new 
definition in the Rome I Regulation, it is explicitly required that the consumer must be an 
individual rather than a company.     
Article 6(4)(c) of the Regulation provides an exclusion from Article 6. Article 6(4)(c) 
refers to "a contract relating to a right in rem in immovable property or a tenancy of 
immovable property other than a contract relating to the right to use immovable 
properties on a timeshare basis within the meaning of Directive 94/47/EC." Thus, 
contracts for the sale or letting of land do not count as protected consumer contracts.  
                                                          
5
 This definition accorded with that in the parallel Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
and Recognition of Judgements, [1972] OJ L 299/32, Articles 13-15. 
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Other exclusions are made by Article 6(4)(a), which refers to "a contract for the supply of 
services where the services are to be supplied to the consumer exclusively in a country 
other than that in which he has his habitual residence”, and by Article 6(4)(b), which 
refers to "a contract of carriage other than a contract relating to package travel within the 
meaning of Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel, package 
holidays and package tours."
6
 These exceptions are similar to those made under Article 
5(4) and (5) of the Rome Convention 1980.  
Insurance contracts concerning mass risks situated within the European Union are also 
excluded from Article 6, as the initial words of Article 6(1) ensure that Article 7 will be 
applied instead. This is confirmed under Recital 32, which explains that the rules 
provided by Article 7 should be sufficient to provide the necessary protection for policy-
holders. But it is unclear whether insurance contracts concerning mass risks situated 
outside of the European Union may fall within Article 6.
7
   
The Territorial Requirement  
The Rome I Regulation insists on imposing a territorial requirement restricting the 
application of the rules that protect the consumer by applying the law of his habitual 
residence to cases in which the contract or the supplier has a sufficient link with that 
country. However, the territorial requirement was redefined in the Rome I Regulation to 
correspond largely with the one used under the Brussels I Regulation. The territorial 
requirement under the Rome Convention 1980 resembled the one adopted under the 
Brussels I Convention.
8
 
                                                          
6
 On such packages, see Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09: Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter and Hotel 
Alpenhof v Heller [2010] ECR I-12527. 
7
 See Stone, P., EU Private International Law, 3rd edn, 2014. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, p. 364. 
8
 Article 5(2) of the Rome Convention 1980 provides that one of three alternative requirements had to be 
met: that in the country of the consumer’s habitual residence the conclusion of the contract was preceded by 
a specific invitation addressed to him or by advertising, and he had taken in that country all of the steps 
necessary on his part for the conclusion of the contract; or that the other party or his agent received the 
consumer's order in that country, or that the contract was for the sale of goods and the consumer had 
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The territorial requirement is defined by Article 6(1) of the Rome I Regulation, which 
requires that a professional must: "(a) [pursue] his commercial or professional activities 
in the country where the consumer has his habitual residence; or (b) by any means, 
[direct] such activities to that country or to several countries including that country; and 
the contract [must fall] within the scope of such activities." 
The European Court examined the concept of directing activities to the consumer's 
country under 17(1)(c) of the Brussels I Regulation in Hotel Alpenhof v Heller and 
Pammer v Reederei Karl Schluter,9 in the context of activities on the Internet. It is clear, 
in view especially of Recital 7 to the Rome I Regulation,
10
 that the ruling must also apply 
for the purpose of Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation. Therefore, to decide whether a 
trader whose activity is advertised on a website can be regarded as directing its activity to 
the Member State of the consumer’s habitual residence, it should be determined whether 
it is apparent from the trader’s overall activity via the website and elsewhere that he 
envisaged doing business with consumers habitually resident in one or more countries, 
including the habitual residence of the consumer being considered, in the sense that he 
intended to conclude contracts with them. But there is no need for a contract between a 
consumer and trader to be concluded at a distance, as was confirmed by the European 
Court in Muhlleitner v Yusufi under Article 17(1)(c) of the Brussels I Regulation.11  
According to Stone, the Regulation has failed to offer any protection for the mobile 
consumer, who contracts abroad in situations where it would be unreasonable to subject 
the supplier to the law of the consumer's residence.
12
        
                                                                                                                                                                             
travelled from that country to another country and there given his order, provided that the consumer's 
journey was arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to buy.   
9
  Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09, [2010] ECR I-12527. 
10
 Recital 7 declares: “The substantive scope and the provisions of this Regulation should be consistent with 
[the Brussels I Regulation] and [the Rome II Regulation].  
11
  Case C-190/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:542. 
12
  See note 7 above, at p. 347. 
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The Protective Regime 
Under Article 6(1) of the Regulation, the law of the consumer's habitual residence serves 
as the applicable law, if the parties have not expressly or impliedly chosen the applicable 
law under Article 3. The default rules concerning the closest connection and the 
characteristic performer's residence under Article 4 are not applicable in the case of a 
protected consumer contract.   
Under Article 6(2) of the Regulation, if the parties have chosen the applicable law 
expressly or impliedly under Article 3, the choice of law will in general be effective. 
However, the application of the law chosen by the parties will operate subject to any 
mandatory rules of the consumer's habitual residence that are designed to protect the 
consumer as the weaker party. The effect is to provide protection for the consumer as a 
weaker party by giving him the benefit both of the protective rules of the chosen law and 
of those of the law of his habitual residence. Therefore, the protective provisions which 
offer the consumer greater protection will prevail.  
There is some controversy as to whether consumer protection provisions can be applied 
as overriding mandatory rules under Article 9 of the Regulation. One view is that Article 
6 deals exhaustively with consumer protection, and any inadequacy of Article 6 cannot be 
cured by reference to Article 9.
13
 A contrary view accepts the application of Article 9 in 
cases in which Article 6 is not applicable.
14
 The importance of the issue is diminished, 
but not eliminated, by the fact that the scope of Article 6 is broader than the scope of 
Article 5 of the Rome Convention, and therefore the number of the consumer contracts 
                                                          
13
 See note 7 above, at p. 349. 
14
 Plender and Wilderspin, European Private International Law of Obligation, (Sweet & Maxwell, Limited, 
4th edn, 2014), at para. 12-040.  
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which fall outside of its scope is smaller.
15
 The issue is confined to protective provisions 
of the lex fori, since this is not a situation in which the law of the place of performance 
renders performance unlawful, so as to satisfy the requirements of Article 9(3). On the 
second view, Article 9 might apply in a case where an English visitor to France, who 
buys from a French trader there, seeks to rely on Article 9 in a French court to get the 
benefit of French protective provisions, the contract having expressly chosen the law of 
Iran. 
As another example, let us suppose that an English consumer travels to Italy and there 
contracts to buy goods. If under the contract the goods have to be delivered to the 
consumer’s residence in England, the consumer can bring a claim for breach of contract 
in England against the Italian seller.
16
 But, in the absence of a contrary choice by the 
parties, the claim will be governed by Italian law in accordance with Article 4 of the 
Regulation, and the English buyer will not be able to rely on the protection offered by 
Chapter 1 of Part I of the (UK) Consumer Rights Act 2015. If, however, the contract 
contains a choice of the law of Iran, Section 32(1) of the 2015 Act seems to enable the 
buyer to invoke the protection of that Act, since in the circumstances the contract appears 
to have a close connection with the United Kingdom.  
Section 31(1) specifies that:  
If –  
(a) the law of a country or territory other than an EEA State is chosen by the parties 
to be applicable to a sales contract, but  
(b) the sales contract has a close connection with the United Kingdom,  
this Chapter, except the provisions in subsection (2), applies despite that choice.  
                                                          
15
 Devenney. J and Kenny. M, European consumer protection, (Cambridge University Press, 2012),  pg 
246. 
16
 Article 5(1)(a) of Brussels I Regulation will be applied; and Article 6 will not be applicable, since the 
territorial requirement is not met. 
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This provision is evidently designed to reflect Article 6(2) of EEC Directive 93/13 on 
unfair terms in consumer contracts,
17
 but it is not limited to the provisions of the 2015 
Act, which are designed to transpose the substantive rules harmonized by the Directive. 
Insofar as section 32 applies to English protective rules, which are not designed to 
transpose the Directive, it seems to rely on, and thus endorse, the broader view of Article 
9 of the Rome I Regulation, in which a Member State is entitled to use Article 9 in 
consumer cases to provide protection to the consumer in addition to that provided for by 
Article 6 of the Regulation. 
Another situation worthy of consideration concerns a consumer contract for credit in 
connection with a sale of goods. For example, assume that an English consumer takes out 
a loan from a French lender in circumstances that do not fall within Article 6 of the 
Regulation. Since section 173(1) of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 forbids contracting 
out, the provisions of the Act must be regarded as mandatory rules within Article 6(2) of 
the Regulation and therefore applicable in cases where the requirements of Article 6 are 
satisfied. But the difficult question is whether the English court will apply the Consumer 
Credit Act as an overriding mandatory rule under Article 9 of the Regulation in cases 
where the requirements of Article 6 are not satisfied. This matter is not addressed by the 
Act, but the ruling of Lord Mance in Office of Fair Trading v Lloyds Bank TSB18 on the 
international application of the Act indicates the Act is of an overriding mandatory 
nature.
19
     
In addition, by Article 11(4), the law of the consumer's habitual residence will govern the 
formal validity of a protected consumer contract.  
                                                          
17
 [1993] OJ L95/29. 
18
 [2007] UKHL 48. 
19
 See above note 7, pg 248. 
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Consumer contracts under the CTC 
With regard to consumer contracts under the CTC, the UAE legislator has not provided 
any special rules regarding choice of law in such contracts. Therefore, consumer contracts 
are subject to the general rules of choice of law specified in Article 19 of the CTC. As 
explained in Chapter 4 above, Article 19(1) permits an express or implied choice of law 
by the parties; and in the absence of such a choice, Article 19(1) makes applicable the law 
of the residence of both parties, if such a common residence exists, or the law of the place 
of contracting, where no such common residence exists. In addition, Article 19(2) makes 
the law of the location of real property applicable to contracts made with respect thereto. 
Hence, if the parties choose the governing law expressly or impliedly, the chosen law will 
be applied. In the absence of an express or implied choice by the parties, then the default 
rules will apply. If the parties are domiciled in the same country, the law of that country 
will govern the consumer contract. However, if the parties are domiciled in different 
countries, the law of the country in which the consumer contract was concluded will be 
the applicable law. 
The application of the default rules can produce unwelcome results in some cases. For 
example, if the seller met the buyer at an exhibition in a country in which neither was 
resident and they contracted there, the reference by Article 19 to the law of the place of 
contracting could point to the law of a country with which the contract and the parties had 
little connection. Moreover, even the application of the law of the seller’s country 
(perhaps by reference to general principles, available under Article 23) might offer 
inadequate protection to a consumer who resides elsewhere.    
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Thus, despite the importance of consumer contracts, the UAE legislator has failed to 
establish any special choice of law rules concerning such contracts. As a result, no special 
protection is given to the consumer as a weaker party.        
If there are any points relating to consumer contracts that are not covered by Article 19, 
the judge will apply Article 23 of the CTC to supplement or interpret Article 19. Article 
23 specifies that “Principles of the private international law shall be observed where no 
express provision appears to exist in the preceding Articles, regarding cases of conflict of 
laws.” Insofar as Article 23 is available, the judge can refer to the rules concerning  
consumer contracts specified in Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation to resolve any issues 
that are not covered by Article 19.   
Some scholars argue that the default rules are not applicable for reasons discussed earlier 
and that the applicable law should be the law of the country where the contract is 
performed.
20
 This approach would give rise to difficulty, especially where the buyer buys 
goods in the seller’s country but requests delivery of the goods to his own country. In 
such a case, both parties have obligations to perform under the contract, so that the 
suggested approach might lead to the application of both laws. A better solution might be 
to adopt a default rule subjecting consumer contracts to the law of the consumer’s 
habitual residence. This would draw inspiration from the Rome I Regulation but go 
beyond the solution adopted by Article 6 of the Regulation, which would not apply in the 
case last envisaged, since the buyer seems to be a mobile consumer.
21
    
It must also be borne in mind that the UAE consumer legislation includes some 
mandatory substantive rules that are designed to protect the consumer as a weaker party 
and to invalidate any conflicting rules. For example, in Federal Law no. 24 on Consumer 
                                                          
20 See above note 1, at pg 147. 
21
 See Stone, supra fn (10). 
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Protection, Article 13 deals with a supplier’s obligation by providing that "the service 
supplier is required to guarantee the service rendered by him for a period appropriate to 
the nature of this service; otherwise he must return the money paid by the service 
recipient or redo the service in a valid manner. The implementing Regulation to this Law 
shall determine the kinds of services and the terms of guarantee decided for each of 
them." Also, Article 16 of the Consumer Law strengthens consumer rights by providing 
that the consumer is entitled to compensation for personal or material damages pursuant 
to the general rules in force and that any agreement to the contrary is invalid.   
Since there are no specific provisions in the CTC concerning the application of UAE 
mandatory rules for the protection of consumers, the court can invoke the public policy 
proviso under Article 27 of the CTC to apply such mandatory rules in cases where the 
contract has a sufficient connection with the territory of the UAE. To identify such a 
connection, Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation may provide a useful analogy. Thus, the 
UAE mandatory substantive rules for the protection of consumers may be applied where 
the consumer was resident in the UAE, and the supplier was either also resident there or 
had chosen to deal with consumers resident there. 
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Carriage of Passengers 
Contracts for the carriage of passengers fell within the scope of Articles 3 and 4 of the 
Rome Convention 1980, as they were treated as ordinary contracts for the purpose of the 
Convention. However, under the Rome I Regulation, special provisions concerning the 
contracts for the carriage of passengers are specified by Article 5(2) and (3).   
Under Article 5(2) of the Regulation, the parties are allowed to choose the governing law 
for a contract for the carriage of passengers in accordance with Article 3, but the range of 
laws from which such a choice is permitted is restricted. The parties may choose as the 
law applicable to such a contract in accordance with Article 3 only the law of one of the 
following countries: that of the passenger’s habitual residence; that of the carrier’s 
habitual residence; that of the carrier’s place of central administration; that in which the 
place of departure is situated; or that in which the place of destination is situated.  
Article 5(2) of the Regulation also provides default rules, which apply in the absence of a 
valid choice by the parties. In that case, there is a presumption in favour of the law of the 
country of the passenger’s habitual residence, provided that either the place of departure 
or the place of destination is situated in that country; or, where no such concurrence 
exists, in favour of the law of the carrier’s habitual residence. Article 5(3) provides that 
these presumptions are displaced where it is clear from all of the circumstances that the 
contract is manifestly more closely connected to a country other than that indicated by the 
relevant presumption, in which event the law of the country of closest connection applies. 
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Insurance Contracts 
Why protecting the contracts of insurance policy-holders is important 
At least in the case of ordinary day-to-day insurance, insurance companies have strong 
economic power compared to the insured, who is in a weaker position. This power 
enables the insurance companies to impose standard terms that have been drafted on the 
advice of their lawyers. Such contracts are not negotiated and are not subject to any kind 
of modification or amendment by the insured, whose only option is to accept the contract 
as a whole and sign it or to reject it as a whole.
22
  
It is not easy for the insurance companies to give up their standard form contracts, as 
these enable speedy contracting and define the obligations of the insurance company in 
detail. The insured usually focuses on the insurance premium and the general risk covered 
rather than the detailed obligations under the contract. The insured often tends to trust the 
insurance company and signs the insurance contract without even reading its full content. 
In any case, the insurance documents are drafted by the insurance companies in 
complicated language that is difficult for the insured to understand and that enables the 
insurance companies to insert conditions favorable to their interests at the expense of the 
policy-holders. Thus, the policy-holders are not in a position of equality, and they do not 
have the same freedom of choice. 
To protect the insured from unfair practices and terms adopted by insurance companies, a 
separate legal regime context is required.
23
 
                                                          
22 Dr Hasham Abdulall,  (صاخلا يلودلا نوناقلا يف نيماتلا دوقع) Insurance contracts in private international law, 
(dar alnahtha al arabeia, Cairo, 2000), in Arabic. 
23
 Suad Nawery, Compartive study in the protection of weaker party in insurance contract, p. 3 (in Arabic), 
available online at slconf.uaeu.ac.ae/SLConf22/Part-
1/%D8%B3%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%20%D9%86%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A.pdf. 
[Accessed: September 15, 2015]. 
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European Law 
It should first be noted that reinsurance contracts are not regarded as insurance contracts 
for the purpose of EU legislation. A reinsurance contract is treated as an ordinary non-
insurance contract, and the reinsured does not receive any special protection.  
Insurance contracts under the Rome Convention and the Insurance Directives 
Prior to the entry into operation of the Rome I Regulation, many insurance contracts were 
excluded from the application of the Rome Convention 1980. Insurance contracts that 
covered risks situated within the European Community were excluded from the Rome 
Convention under Article 1(3). Instead, such contracts were subject, in the case of non-
life insurance, to the choice of law rules specified by Article 7 of EC Directive 88/357 (as 
amended by EC Directive 92/49),
24
 and, in the case of life insurance, to those specified by 
Article 32 of EC Directive 2002/83.
25
 The Directives also defined the location of risks for 
this purpose. 
But the rules concerning choice of law specified in the Rome Convention 1980 applied 
when the risk was not situated within the European Community. These enabled the 
parties to choose the governing law expressly or impliedly in accordance with Article 3, 
and in the absence of such choice, Article 4 would operate, and the governing law would 
usually be the law of the country in which the insurer was established. In addition, the 
usual savings for overriding mandatory rules and public policy, specified by Articles 3(3), 
7 and 17, could operate in cases where an insurance contract fell within the scope of the 
Convention. 
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 [1988] OJ L172 and [1992] OJ L228. 
25
 [2002] OJ L345. 
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It is also important to point out that, in some situations in which the risk was situated 
outside of the European Community, an insurance contract could be regarded as a 
protected consumer contract within Article 5 of the Convention. In such a case, the law of 
the policy-holder's habitual residence was the applicable law under Article 5. Finally, 
mandatory rules concerning the protection of the weaker parties contained in the law of 
the policy-holder's habitual residence operated if the parties chose another law as the 
governing law.   
Insurance Contracts under the Rome I Regulation 
Almost all insurance contracts now fall within the scope of the Rome I Regulation. There 
is a minor exception, specified in Article 1(2)(j), which refers to "insurance contracts 
arising out of operations carried out by organisations other than undertakings referred to 
in Article 2 of [EC Directive 2002/83] concerning life assurance[,] the object of which is 
to provide benefits for employed or self-employed persons belonging to an undertaking or 
group of undertakings, or to a trade or group of trades, in the event of death or survival or 
of discontinuance or curtailment of activity, or of sickness related to work or accidents at 
work." 
Otherwise, the Rome I Regulation applies to all insurance contracts. Both non-life and 
life insurance contracts fall within the scope of the Regulation. The Regulation covers 
insurance of both large risks and mass risks. The Regulation applies regardless of whether 
the risk is situated with the European Union and whether the policy-holder is resident 
therein. But different provisions of the Regulation apply in the case of the insurance of 
large risks from those applicable to mass risks. The distinction is defined by EC Directive 
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72/239 as amended by Directives 88/357 and 90/618.
26
 Any risk that is not a large risk 
counts as a mass risk. 
Large Risks and Mass Risks 
Under the Directives, in general a business risk is regarded as large, unless the policy-
holder is a small business. Thus, many types of risk are regarded as large risks, if the 
policy-holder is involved in and the risks relate to a large or medium-sized business. With 
regard to size, two of the following three conditions must be satisfied with respect to 
policy-holder (or the corporate group to which it belongs): that the balance-sheet total 
exceeds EUR 6.2 million; that the net turnover exceeds EUR 12.8 million; or that the 
average number of employees during the financial year exceeds 250.         
Many transport risks are regarded as large risks regardless of the policy-holder’s business 
size or character. These include damage to or loss of aircraft or ships; damage to or loss 
of goods in transit or baggage, irrespective of the form of the transport; and liabil ity 
arising out of the use of the ships or aircraft, including carrier's liability. 
The law governing large risks 
The determination of the law applicable to an insurance contract covering large risks is 
governed by Article 7(2) of the Rome I Regulation. This provision applies regardless of 
whether the risk is situated within the European Union. The proper law of an insurance 
contract covering large risks under Article 7(2) is the law that is expressly or impliedly 
chosen by the parties in accordance with Article 3.   
                                                          
26
 [1973] OJ L 228, [1988] OJ L172, and [1990] OJ L330. A slightly amended version of the 
distinction will be introduced by Directive 2009/138, [2009] OJ L335/1, when it enters into 
operation. 
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In the absence of an express or implied choice by the parties, under Article 7(2) the law 
of the country in which the insurer has his habitual residence will serve as the applicable 
law for an insurance contract covering large risks, unless it is clear from all of the 
circumstances that the contract is manifestly more closely connected with another 
country, in which event the law of that other country will apply.  
The rules specified in Article 7(2) of the Regulation are similar to those that formerly 
applied under Article 4 of the Rome Convention 1980 with regard to risks situated 
outside of the European Community. 
When a Member State imposes an obligation to take out insurance with respect to a large 
risk, additional rules specified in Article 7(4) of the Regulation will apply. 
The law governing mass risks 
The determination of the law applicable to an insurance contract covering mass risks is 
addressed in Article 7(3) of the Rome I Regulation. This provision is restricted by Article 
7(1) to cases in which the risk covered is situated within the European Union. When the 
mass risk is situated outside of the European Union, the insurance contract will be subject 
to the same rules as apply to ordinary non-insurance contracts or in some cases to those 
applicable to consumer contracts.  
Under Article 7(6) of the Regulation, along with Article 2(d) of Directive 88/357 and 
Article 1(1)(g) of Directive 2002/83,
27
 the main rule as to the location of a risk is that a 
risk is located in the country in which the policy-holder has his habitual residence, if the 
policy-holder is an individual. If the policy-holder is a legal person, the risk is located in 
the country in which its establishment to which the contracts relates is situated.  
                                                          
27 These will be replaced by Article 13(13) and (14) of Directive 2009/138, when it enters into 
operation. 
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Under Article 7(3) of the Rome I Regulation, when an insurance contract covers mass 
risks located within the European Union, the parties are free to choose the applicable law 
expressly or impliedly in accordance with Article 3, but this freedom is restricted to a 
range of laws that have certain specified connections with the contract. The choice is 
limited by Article 7(3)(i) to the following laws: (a) the law of a Member State where the 
risk is situated at the time of the conclusion of the contract; (b) the law of the country 
where the policy-holder has his habitual residence; (c) in the case of life assurance, the 
law of the Member State of which the policy-holder is a national; (d) for insurance 
contracts covering risks limited to events occurring in a single Member State other than 
the Member State where the risk is situated, the law of the Member State in which the 
events covered are to occur; (e) when the policy-holder pursues a commercial or 
industrial activity or a liberal profession and the insurance contract covers two or more 
risks that relate to those activities and are situated in different Member States, the law of 
any of the Member States concerned or the law of the country of the habitual residence of 
the policy-holder. 
Article 7(3)(ii) of the Regulation expands the permissible choices of law in limited cases 
by referring to the conflict rules of a Member State the internal law of which may be 
chosen under Article 7(3)(i). Under these rules, the parties are allowed to choose another 
law that is permissible under the conflict rules of the Member State where the risk is 
located, or the policy-holder has his habitual residence, or in which is located one of the 
risks relating to a business activity of the policy-holder.
28
    
In the absence of an express or implied choice of law by the parties to an insurance 
contract that covers mass risks within the European Union, the default rule specified in 
                                                          
28
 This expansion of the permissible range of choice of law constitutes an exception to the elimination of 
renvoi by Article 20 of the Regulation. 
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Article 7(3)(iii) will apply. The applicable law will be that of the Member State in which 
the risk is located at the time the contract is concluded. There is no exception in favour of 
a manifestly closer connection. For this purpose, when an insurance contract covers risks 
located in several Member States, the contract must be treated as comprising several 
contracts, each relating to a single Member State.
29
   
In cases in which a Member State imposes an obligation to take out insurance covering a 
risk, the additional rules specified in Article 7(4) will be applicable. 
Insurance contracts covering mass risks located outside of the European Union are 
excluded from the application of Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation.
30
 Therefore, unless 
the contract is a protected consumer contract within Article 6, the contract will be treated 
as an ordinary non-insurance contract and will be subject to the general rules concerning 
choice of law specified by Articles 3 and 4. Thus, effect will be given to an express or an 
implied choice of law by the parties. In the absence of such a choice, the default rules 
under Article 4 refer to the closest connection, with a rebuttable presumption in favour of 
the law of the insurer’s habitual residence. Consequently, if the risk is situated outside of 
the European Union, a policy-holder who is a small business will not be protected.            
Compulsory Insurance 
Article 7(4)(a) of the Regulation provides that an insurance contract will not satisfy the 
obligation to take out insurance unless it complies with the specific provisions relating to 
that insurance laid down by the Member State that imposes the obligation.
31
 The second 
sentence of Article 7(4)(a) adds that, when the law of the Member State in which the risk 
                                                          
29
  See Article 7(5) of the Rome I Regulation. 
30
  See Article 7(1) of the Rome I Regulation. 
31
  The same rule was laid down by Article 8(2) of Directive 88/357. 
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is situated and the law of the Member State imposing the obligation to take out insurance 
contradict each other, the latter shall prevail.   
Article 7(4)(b) provides that, by way of derogation from Article 7(2) and (3), a Member 
State may lay down that the insurance contract shall be governed by the law of the 
Member State that imposes the obligation to take out insurance. By Article 7(5), in 
relation to compulsory insurance, when the contract covers risks situated in more than 
one Member State, the contract must be treated as constituting several contracts, each 
relating to a single Member State. 
Insurance Contracts under the CTC 
The UAE legislator has not set out any special rules in the CTC regarding choice of law 
for insurance contracts. Therefore, insurance contracts are subject to the general conflict 
rules for contracts specified in Article 19 of the CTA. Hence, if the parties choose 
governing law expressly or impliedly, the chosen law will be applied. In the absence of 
an express or implied choice by the parties, then the default rules will apply, so that, if the 
parties are domiciled in the same country, the law of that country will govern the 
insurance contract; or if they are domiciled in different countries, the law of the country 
where the insurance contract was concluded will be the applicable law. These rules do not 
provide any special protection to the weaker party.        
If there are any points relating to insurance contracts that are not covered by Article 19, 
the judge will apply Article 23 of the CTA to provide clarification or supplementation. 
Article 23 of the CTA specifies that “Principles of the private international law shall be 
observed where no express provision appears to exist in the preceding Articles, regarding 
cases of conflict of laws.” By referring to Article 23, the judge can take into account the 
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rules concerning insurance contracts specified by Article 7 of the Rome I Regulation to 
resolve issues that are not addressed by Article 19. 
It is important to point out that, in UAE insurance law, there are some mandatory 
substantive rules that are designed to protect the insured as a weaker party and that 
invalidate any terms or conditions that affect the insured’s rights. Article 1028 of the 
CTC provides that the following conditions in a policy of insurance are void: conditions 
providing for the forfeiture of the right to insurance on account of a breach of the laws, 
unless such breach constitutes a deliberate felony or misdemeanor; condition providing 
for the forfeiture of the insured’s right due to his delay in notifying the relevant 
authorities or in producing documents, if it appears that the delay was for an acceptable 
excuse; any printed condition relating to cases involving nullity of the contract or 
forfeiture of the insured’s right that is not shown in a clear manner; an arbitration 
condition included in the printed general conditions of the policy and not as a special 
agreement distinct therefrom; and any arbitrary condition, the breach of which appears to 
have no bearing on the occurrence of the event insured against.  
Since there are no specific provisions in the CTC concerning the application of UAE 
mandatory rules for the protection of insured persons, the court can invoke the public 
policy proviso under Article 27 of the CTC to apply such mandatory rules in cases in 
which the contract has a sufficient connection to the territory of the UAE. 
 
 
 
123 
 
Employment Contracts 
Why is protecting employment contracts important? 
In the 19th century, the relationship between employees and employers was governed by 
the general law of contract.
32
 The parties to this relationship were seen as equals before 
the law, freely exercising their will over the letting and hiring of the worker’s services. 
Wages given in exchange depended on the law of supply and demand. This liberal model 
of regulating employment, however, never brought about genuine equality. Instead, it 
exposed the difference in socio-economic power between employers and workers that 
enabled the former to impose their terms on the latter. It became acknowledged that the 
typical features of employment contracts were not freedom and equality, but submission, 
subordination and inequality of bargaining power. This change in perception led to the 
formation of an autonomous notion of employment contracts and to the development and 
extension of collective bargaining and protective legislation.
33
 An aim of regulating 
employment has thereafter been to compensate employees as they are in weaker position. 
Apart from pursuing the goal of distributive justice, modern legal regulation of 
employment is also motivated by the objectives of social inclusion, protection of human 
rights in the workplace, and greater economic efficiency and competitiveness of 
businesses.
34
 Achieving parallelism with the substantive law of employment requires 
commensurate efforts in private international law.  
Employers usually have more resources than employees. Therefore, employees generally 
cannot afford legal advice in a matter concerning their employment contract by referring 
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 B. Veneziani, The Evolution of the Contract of Employment, in B. Hepple (ed), The Making of Labour 
Law in Europe: A Comparative Study of Nine Countries up to 1945 (London, 1986), at 31.   
33
 Grušić .U, The International Employment Contract: Ideal, Reality and Regulatory Function of European 
Private International Law of Employment, (PhD thesis,  The London School of Economics and Political 
Science, 2010), p. 19. 
34
 Ibid, p. 20. 
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to employment lawyers or specialists from various jurisdictions. Additionally, an 
employee will not usually bring a claim in relation to his employment contract unless the 
claim outweighs the cost of legal advice, or the outcome of such claim is clear and has 
been recognised in case-law. Employment contracts are usually regarded as advantageous 
to employers, since they are the parties who benefit from the economies of scale: the 
larger the number of employees, the lower the cost of legal advice per employee. In 
comparison the employee, in acceding to an employment contract, does not have the 
same weight as the employer in comparable transactions. The variation in practical 
accessibility of legal opinion and experience leads to information asymmetry. 
Moreover, because of the length and complexity of formal employment contracts, which 
include choice of law and choice of court clauses, the employees might overlook these 
provisions. The employee might not realise the effect of choice of law and choice of court 
clauses and might underestimate the consequences of the contractual terms and 
conditions, because there are many in the contract.
35
 Even when the employee realises the 
risks or may be aware of other choices, he might not object to the choice of law or court 
proposed by the employer, because he is afraid of losing the job. 
Private international law rules should ensure the operation of the law and jurisdiction of 
the courts with which employees are sufficiently closely connected and whose application 
and jurisdiction the parties rationally expect.  
A negative effect might occur by applying the lax employment laws of the country in 
which the employee carries out his work for the employer. In some countries, employees 
may be dismissed without explanation or notice, or the provision of redundancy payment 
by the employers. In England, for instance, an employee must have worked for the 
                                                          
35
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employer for more than two years continuously to meet the criteria for the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed and to claim a redundancy payment.
36
 In some countries, employers 
can require their employees to work for long hours for low wages in unhealthy 
environments and without job security. The protective provisions will not operate, if 
employers are permitted to force their employees to accept the application of the law and 
jurisdiction of the courts of such countries. Such a choice may be efficient for the 
business involved. However, such choice may not be efficient generally, if consideration 
is given to the broader social costs, such as, for example, the costs of injured workers and 
their dependants.
37
 In order to compel employers to shoulder such social costs, legal 
regulation is required. To accomplish this aim, party autonomy should be restricted. 
Respect for terms of international contracts leads to legal certainty. However, because of 
the significance of their fundamental values and policies, states are usually reluctant to 
respect choice of law and choice of court clauses included in international employment 
contracts. Thus, substantial uncertainty may arise when the particular employment 
contract is not most closely connected with the country whose law or courts are chosen in 
the clauses. Uncertainty may arise with regard to whether the chosen court will accept 
jurisdiction and whether the courts whose jurisdiction was rejected will accept this 
outcome. The operation of choice of law clauses depends on the forum’s private 
international law rules. Such a clause may operate fully, partly, or not at all. Even if the 
chosen court accepts jurisdiction and applies the choice of law clause, the resulting 
judgment may not be recognised and enforced abroad. By considering the states’ 
legitimate interests in applying their laws to issues relating to employment contracts with 
which they are sufficiently closely connected, a high level of legal certainty in this field 
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 Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA 1996’), ss.108, 155.   
37
 H. Collins, Justifications and Techniques of Legal Regulation of the Employment Relation, at pp. 15-16.   
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of private international can be achieved. Limiting the parties’ freedom to choose the 
applicable law in an employment contract can be justified to accomplish this aim.  
European Law 
The Rome I Regulation 
Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation contains provisions concerning choice of law for an 
"individual employment contract", which are designed to protect the employee as a 
weaker party. No explicit definition of an employment contract is specified in the Rome 
Convention 1980 or the Rome I Regulation. Some assistance may be drawn from the 
recent opinion of Cruz Villalón AG in Holterman Ferho v Spies38 in relation to the 
Brussels I Regulation. He defined a contract of employment as one whereby a person 
subjects himself to the directions and instructions of another person, in the performance 
of a particular activity, in return for remuneration. 
In the case of an employment contract, if the parties have not chosen the applicable law 
expressly or impliedly under Article 3, Article 8(2)-(4) of the Regulation will be applied. 
They are designed to protect the employee as a weaker party with regard to such 
contracts. Under Article 8(2), the applicable law, in the absence of the choice by the 
parties, is the law of that country in which or, failing that, from which the employee 
habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract; and the country in which 
the work is habitually carried out remains unchanged if he is temporarily employed in 
another country.  
However, if the place of habitual work cannot be identified, the applicable law will be 
determined in accordance with Article 8(3), which refers to the law of the country in 
which the place of business through which the employee was engaged is situated. Under 
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   Pending Case C-47/14; opinion of 7 May 2015. 
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Article 8(4), the rules specified by Article 8(2) and (3) will be displaced if it appears from 
the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another 
country than that indicated by Article 8(2) and (3); and in that case the law of that other 
country will apply.     
It is well established that the reference in Article 8(2) to the country in or from which the 
employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract has the same 
meaning as in the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation, and that the 
relevant case law of the European Court is equally applicable to jurisdiction and to choice 
of law. As the European Court explained in Mulox v Geels39 and Rutten v Cross 
Medical,40 where the employee does not carry out his work in a single country, one must 
refer to the place where the employee conducted his effective working activities, at which 
crucial duties were performed.  
Where the centre of the effective working activities is difficult to identify, because the 
employee has worked in several places for different periods, the relevant place will be the 
place where the employee worked the longest. This was confirmed by the European Court 
in Weber v Universal Ogden Services,41 where the Court ruled that, where there is no 
effective centre of activities, the whole duration of the employment relationship must be 
considered. But the latest period of work will be decisive when the employee, after 
having worked for a period in a single place, has then moved his activities to another 
place on a permanent basis. 
The European Court further clarified the place of habitual work in Koelzsch v 
Luxembourg42 and Voogsgeerd v Navimer,43 both of which involved employment in 
international transport (as a member of a ship’s crew and as a lorry driver). The Court 
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  Case C-125/92, [1993] ECR I-4075. 
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  Case C-383/95, [1997] ECR I-57. 
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  Case C-37/00, [2002] ECR I-2013. 
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explained that a broad interpretation should be given to the place of habitual work as 
referring to the place in which or from which the employee actually carries out his 
working activities, and reference must be made to the place where he carries out the 
majority of his activities in cases where a centre of activities cannot be identified. 
Furthermore, with regard to employment in international transport, the Court explained 
that, when the place where the employee receives instructions regarding his transport 
tasks and commences the carrying out of his transport tasks is always the same, that place 
will count as the place where the employee habitually carries out his work in view of the 
nature of work in the sphere of international transport.    
Moreover, the European Court emphasised that Article 8(3), which refers to the place of 
business at or through which the employee was engaged, applies only in cases when the 
country of habitual work cannot be identified by the court seised. It also explained that 
the way in which the employee’s actual employment is carried out is not relevant under 
Article 8(3), which focuses instead on the conclusion of the employment contract.  
Article 8(4) of the Regulation provides for displacement of the presumptions in favour of 
the law of the country of habitual work or of the engaging establishment, so as to make 
applicable instead the law most closely connected to the contract. The application of this 
provision was clarified by the European Court in Schlecker v Boedeker,44 which involved 
an employment contract between a German company and a German resident who worked 
in the Netherlands for more than eleven years as a manager. The Court held that, even 
though the employee worked for a long period of time in the country where the work was 
carried out, displacement is still possible in favour of a more closely connected law under 
Article 8(4).  
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Under Article 8(1) of the Regulation, if the parties have chosen the applicable law 
expressly or impliedly under Article 3, the choice of law will in general be effective. 
However, the application of the law chosen by the parties will operate subject to the 
mandatory rules of the law that would be applicable in the absence of choice under 
Article 8(2)-(4), the sections of which are designed to protect the employee as a weaker 
party. Thus, both the protective provisions of the chosen law and those of the law 
specified by the default rules are available, and the employee will benefit from the more 
protective of these laws.   
The Directive on the posting of workers  
The Directive applies in certain cases in which a worker is posted temporarily to another 
Member State in the context of the transnational provision of services. Its main 
significance may be in relation to the posting of construction workers to Germany. The 
Member States are required by the Directive to ensure that workers posted to their 
territory receive the minimum protection of certain mandatory rules (such as on minimum 
rates of pay) of the Member State where the work is carried out. Therefore, where the 
Directive applies, it makes available to the worker the protection imposed by the law of 
the country where he temporarily, but not habitually, works. 
Employment contracts under the CTC 
Despite the importance of employment, the UAE legislator has not established any 
special choice of law rules concerning employment contracts. As a result, there is no 
specific provision designed to offer special protection for the employee as a weaker party. 
Therefore, employment contracts are subject to the general choice of law rules specified 
by Article 19 of the CTA. Hence, if the parties choose the governing law expressly or 
impliedly, the chosen law will be applied. In the absence of an express or implied choice 
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by the parties, then the default rules will apply, under which, if the parties are domiciled 
in the same country, the law of that country will govern the employment contract; but if 
the parties are domiciled in different countries, the law of the country in which the 
employment contract was concluded will be the applicable law.  
It seems that the application of the default rule in the favour of the law of the place of 
contracting can lead to unwanted results, since it could point to a law which has little 
connection to the employment contract. For example, if an employer based in the UAE 
came to England searching for employees to work in the UAE, and he found some who 
signed the contact in England, it seems unreasonable to subject the employment contract 
to English law, since the employee agreed to perform and is performing his work in the 
UAE and residing there while doing so.  
If there are any points relating to employment contracts that are not covered by Article 
19, the judge may apply Article 23 of the CTC to provide clarification or 
supplementation. Article 23 specifies that “Principles of the private international law shall 
be observed where no express provision appears to exist in the preceding Articles, 
regarding cases of conflict of laws.” Some argue that the best rule to be adopted for the 
employment contracts in the absence of a law chosen by the parties is the law of the place 
where the employing company has its central administration. However, this solution 
could be unattractive in some situations. For example, if an airline had its central 
administration in France and it employed a few ground staff at its branch at a Spanish 
airport, it would be difficult to accept the application of the French law to the matter in 
question based on the rule in favour of the employer’s central administration, since the 
matter will be mostly connected to Spanish law. The best solution to adopt is to utilise 
Article 23 to resolve any issues that are not addressed by Article 19 and to follow the 
rules concerning employment contracts specified in Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation, 
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which subjects an employment contract to the law of the place where the employee 
habitually carries out his work for the employer.  
Another issue on which the UAE legislature has been silent concerns cases in which the 
location of the employee’s working activities is not wholly clear. Such problems can be 
addressed by applying Article 23 of the CTC and adopting solutions drawn from the 
rulings of the European Court under the Brussels I Regulation and the Rome I 
Regulation.
45
 Thus, where the employee divides his working activities for the employer 
between different places, as where he works at an office in Brussels for three days each 
week and at an office in Amsterdam for two days each week, reference can be made to 
the place where the employee works the longest. Another case is when the employee 
moves his working activity permanently from one place to another, such as when he is 
transferred from the employer’s Paris office to its London office. Reference can then be 
made to the place to which he has moved. More generally, one may refer to the place 
where the employee has established the effective centre of his working activities, at or 
from which he performs the essential part of his duties towards his employer or, in the 
absence of such a centre, to the place where he carries out the majority of his activities.   
It is important to point out that, in UAE employment law, there are some mandatory 
substantive rules that are designed to protect the employee as a weaker party and that 
invalidate any agreement between the parties to the contrary. Thus, some of the 
provisions of Federal Law no. 8 on the Regulation of labour relations are considered 
mandatory rules. For instance, Article 25, which deals with young workers, provides that 
the maximum effective working hours for young workers shall be six hours per day, with 
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one or more intervals for rest, meals or prayer, the total of which must be at least one 
hour. Such interval(s) must be set in such a manner that the young person does not work 
more than four consecutive hours, and he may not be kept at the work location for more 
than seven consecutive hours.  
Similarly, Article 31, regarding women workers, specifies that, during a period of 
eighteen months after giving birth, a nursing mother must be entitled, in addition to the 
normal rest period, to an two additional periods per day for this purpose, the duration of 
each of which is not to exceed half an hour. Such additional periods must be treated as 
part of the working hours and shall not entail any deduction from wages.  
Since these UAE substantive rules are mandatory in character, the court can rely on the 
public policy proviso under Article 27 of the CTC to apply them in cases that it considers 
sufficiently connected to UAE territory, such as, for example, where the employee 
performs his work wholly or mainly within the UAE.      
Summary 
Having examined different types of contracts under the Rome I Regulation and the CTC, 
the Rome I Regulation has special provisions that are designed to protect the weaker 
party in relation to consumer contracts, employment contracts and insurance contracts. 
Under the CTC, there are no special provisions concerning consumer contracts, 
employment contracts or insurance contracts, and all such contracts will be subject to the 
general rules of choice of law under Article 19. Even though there are no provisions 
concerning the choice of law in those contracts, there are some provisions under the 
substantive law of consumer, employment and insurance laws that are designed to protect 
the weaker party and cannot be derogated by agreement of the parties. The Rome I 
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Regulation offers more protection for the weaker party than the CTC, as the Rome I 
Regulation has special provisions regarding choice of law. 
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Chapter 6 - Private International Law in the DIFC 
INTRODUCTION 
The DIFC (Dubai International Financial Centre) was established with the intent of 
providing a secure and efficient environment from which business and financial 
institutions could reach into and out of the emerging markets of the region. Another 
potential benefit of the DIFC is that it could increase Dubai's economic development by 
encouraging the banking and financial sectors while reducing the reliance on oil income.
1
 
The DIFC is a territorial enclave that has its own law and courts. Its laws are distinct from 
the federal laws that are applied in all other UAE courts. The development of the DIFC 
courts has succeeded in making the DIFC an attractive centre of interests for many 
international businesses. As a result, an increasing number of cases have been determined 
by the DIFC courts, especially after the recent expansion of DIFC jurisdiction.
2
 The 
quality and range of DIFC’s independent regulation, common law framework and 
supportive infrastructure and its tax-friendly regime make it the perfect base from which 
to take advantage of the region’s rapidly growing demand for financial and business 
services.
3
 Another reason for applying the common law rules is that foreign companies 
widely accept such rules because they are written in English, so they can easily 
understand them and do not have to translate their contracts. Second and most 
importantly, the parties trust the common law rules more than the CTC rules as they have 
                                                          
1 Campbell.F, The Dubai International Financial Centre: Legislative changes Regarding the DIFC, 
available at www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-7/may-6/the-dubai-international-financial-
centre-legislative-changes-regarding-the-difc.html [Accessed: January 17, 2016]. 
2 On the recent expansion of the bases of jurisdiction of the DIFC courts, see Dubai Law No 16 of 2011, 
available on: http://www.difc.ae/sites/default/files/Translation- 
Law%20No%2016%20of%202011%20Amending%20DIFC%20Courts%20Law%20%28040212%29FIN
ALsigned%20%28external%20doc%29123_0.pdf. [Accessed: October 4, 2014]. This matter is discussed in 
the second part of the present chapter. 
3
 Discover the DIFC, available on: www.difc.ae/discover-difc [Accessed: January 17, 2016]. 
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seen and experienced the application of these rules in countries in which it is based on the 
application of the common law rules. 
The chapter will deal with the DIFC in relation to private international law. It is divided 
into two parts. The first part will deal with choice of law. The relevant enactments 
dealing with choice of law will be introduced. Then, the proper law of a contract will be 
discussed with regard in turn to cases in which there is an express choice of law by the 
contracting parties, and to cases in which there is no such choice of law. Finally, choice 
of law in relation to non-contractual issues will be considered. 
The second part of this chapter will address other aspects of private international law with 
regard to the DIFC. It will deal in turn with the jurisdiction of the DIFC courts; 
arbitration in the DIFC; the recognition and enforcement in the DIFC of judgments and 
awards from elsewhere; and the recognition and enforcement elsewhere of judgments and 
awards from the DIFC. It must be admitted that, in this respect, the thesis will go beyond 
its normal scope of addressing questions relating directly to the determination of the 
substantive law that is applicable to contractual issues. The rationale for this extension is 
that examination of the additional issues may enable a greater understanding of the 
practical significance of the DIFC as a host for international businesses and of the context 
in which its choice of law rules are to be applied. Moreover, the recent creation of the 
DIFC means that its legal order is at an early stage of its development, and many 
interesting issues with respect to its private international law rules have not yet been 
definitively resolved.  
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PART 1 - CHOICE OF LAW IN THE DIFC COURTS 
Choice of law enactments 
Various DIFC enactments lay down rules concerning choice of law. In view of the 
complex network of such enactments, it is convenient to set out their provisions in (more 
or less) chronological order first and then to discuss their combined effects. 
At the Dubai level, Article 6 of Dubai Law 12/2004 (as amended) with respect to the 
Judicial Authority at Dubai International Financial Centre, which may conveniently be 
referred to as the Judicial Authority Law, provides: 
 
The [DIFC] Courts shall apply the Centre’s Laws and Regulations, except where 
parties to the dispute have explicitly agreed that another law shall govern such 
dispute, provided that such law does not conflict with the public policy and public 
morals. 
 
The earliest and most fundamental enactment at the DIFC level is DIFC Law 3/2004 on 
the Application of Civil and Commercial Laws in the DIFC, which may conveniently be 
referred to as the First Application Law. It regulates the ascertainment of the law to be 
applied by the DIFC courts, in terms both of ascertaining the content of DIFC internal 
law and of enabling the application of foreign law by virtue of conflict rules. Its Article 8 
provides: 
(1) Since by virtue of Article 3 of Federal Law No.8 of 2004, DIFC Law is able to 
apply in the DIFC notwithstanding any Federal Law on civil or commercial matters, 
the rights and liabilities between persons in any civil or commercial matter are to be 
determined according to the laws for the time being in force in the Jurisdiction 
chosen in accordance with paragraph (2).  
 
(2) The relevant jurisdiction is to be the one first ascertained under the following 
paragraphs:  
 
(a) so far as there is a regulatory content, the DIFC Law or any other law in force in 
the DIFC; failing which,  
 
(b) the law of any Jurisdiction other than that of the DIFC expressly chosen by any 
DIFC Law; failing which,  
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(c) the laws of a Jurisdiction as agreed between all the relevant persons concerned in 
the matter; failing which,  
 
(d) the laws of any Jurisdiction which appears to the Court or Arbitrator to be the one 
most closely related to the facts of and the persons concerned in the matter; failing 
which,  
 
(e) the laws of England and Wales. 
 
Provisions which focus more specifically on private international law are laid down by 
DIFC Law 10/2005 (replacing DIFC Law 4/2004) Relating to the Application of DIFC 
Laws, which may conveniently be referred as the Second Application Law. 
 
Its Article 7(2) provides: 
 
In relation to any matter which under this Law is governed by the law of another 
jurisdiction, any rule of the law of that jurisdiction applying the law of another 
jurisdiction in relation to that matter shall be disregarded. 
 
Its Article 8 provides:  
 
The existence, validity, effect, interpretation and performance of a contract, or any 
term thereof, including any requirements as to formality, shall be determined by the 
law which governs it.  
 
Its Article 9 provides: 
 
An express choice of a governing law in a contract shall be effective against all 
persons affected thereby.  
 
Its Article 10 provides: 
 
If the parties do not specify the governing law of a contract, the contract shall be 
governed by the law of the DIFC. 
 
The DIFC’s internal substantive law of contract is defined by DIFC Law 6/2004, the 
Contract Law, which consists of 184 articles and a schedule on interpretation. The rules 
adopted are derived from English contract law and the Vienna Convention of 11 April 
1980 on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Its Article 7 provides: 
The law relating to the Application of DIFC laws makes provision with respect to the 
choice by parties of governing law and jurisdictions in a contract. 
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This appears to refer to the Second Application Law. 
The Contract Law is supplemented by DIFC Law 6/ 2005, the Implied Terms in 
Contracts and Unfair Terms Law, which also lays down substantive rules which regulate 
certain contractual issues. Part 2 defines the terms that are implied in various types of 
contract. Part 3 invalidates certain contractual or similar terms that exclude liability. The 
substantive provisions appear to be modelled on English legislation, such as the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Its Article 7 provides: 
(1) [Part 2] applies to any contract governed by the law of the DIFC, subject to 
Articles7(2) and 7(3). 
(2) [Part 2] does not apply to: 
(a) any contract so far as it relates to real estate; 
(b) any contract so far as it relates: 
(i) to the formation or dissolution of a body corporate or unincorporated 
association; or 
(ii) to its constitution or the rights or obligations of its members or partners; or 
(c) any contract so far as it relates to the creation or transfer of securities or of any 
right or interest in securities. 
Its Article 35 provides:  
 
(1) Insofar as it relates to liability in contract, [Part 3] applies to any contract 
governed by the law of the DIFC. 
(2) Insofar as it relates to any other liability, [Part 3] applies to any liability arising 
from, or in relation to, an act or omission in the DIFC. 
 
Also relevant to choice of law is Article 30 of DIFC Law 10/2004, the Court Law, which 
provides: 
 
(1) In exercising its powers and functions, the DIFC Court shall apply:  
 
(a) the Judicial Authority Law;  
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(b) DIFC Law or any legislation made under it;  
 
(c) the Rules of Court; or  
 
(d) such law as is agreed by the parties.  
 
(2) The DIFC Court may, in determining a matter or proceeding, consider decisions 
made in other jurisdictions for the purpose of making its decision.  
 
 
From this maze of potentially applicable provisions, some general conclusions may be 
drawn as to the resulting rules on choice of law with respect to transnational contracts. It 
seems proper to interpret the various provisions together to produce harmonious solutions 
that avoid conflict between them and to give the greatest weight to the most specific of 
the provisions. On this basis, the most important enactment is the Second Application 
Law, and the principal choice of law rules are that a contract is governed by the internal 
law expressly chosen by the parties, if such a choice has been made; but, in the absence 
of such a choice, the contract will be governed by DIFC internal law, the lex fori.   
 
Express choice of law 
 
An express choice of law by the parties will be respected under the DIFC enactments. 
The First Application Law ensures the parties’ right to choose the governing law, as 
Article 8(2)(b) directs the DIFC courts to apply any law expressly chosen by a DIFC law, 
thus referring (inter alia) to the Second Application Law, and Article 8(2)(c) directs the 
courts to apply the laws agreed to by the relevant parties. The Second Application Law 
Act deals with the choice of the governing law by Articles 8 and 9, which enable 
contracting parties to choose the governing law expressly with effect against all persons 
concerned. This solution is confirmed by Article 30(1)(d) of the Court Law, which 
obliges the court to apply the law agreed to by the parties; and by Article 6 of the Judicial 
Authority Law, which permits the parties to choose the law that governs their contract.  
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Some doubt as to whether it is possible for the parties to choose ordinary UAE law (that 
is, the law of the rest of the UAE, apart from the DIFC) may have been created by the 
decision of Yaakob J in the DIFC first-instance court in Rasmala Investments v Banat.4 In 
dealing with a claim for unfair dismissal, the judge disregarded an agreement between the 
parties to an employment contract which chose the UAE labour law as the applicable law 
for issues not covered by DIFC regulations and laws. The judge dismissed the claim in 
accordance with the DIFC internal rule that an employee has no cause of action for unfair 
dismissal. It is difficult to see any sound basis for this ruling. One possible basis for the 
ruling might be that a choice of ordinary UAE law cannot be effective in a DIFC court 
because of Article 3(2) of Federal Law 8/2004 concerning financial free zones, which 
states that “financial Free Zones and the Financial Activities shall be also be subject to all 
federal laws, with the exception of the civil and commercial federal laws.” The argument 
would be that, since the UAE labour law is a part of a civil law, the DIFC judge cannot 
apply it. Another possible basis for the decision in Rasmala would be that the DIFC 
legislation on employment was chosen deliberately, albeit by omission, to deny an 
employee any rights with respect to unfair (as distinct from wrongful) dismissal, and that 
this denial amounted to an overriding mandatory rule or a stringent public policy. But 
even this explanation is unconvincing, and it is submitted that the case was wrongly 
decided. 
There is no doubt that the UAE legislator, in adopting Article 3(2) of Federal Law 
8/2004, was aiming to ensure that a financial free zone is a separate entity and to establish 
its own laws concerning any civil or commercial matters. This rule empowered the DIFC 
to set up its own legal framework concerning civil and commercial matters. However, 
this consideration does not provide any justification for ignoring an agreement between 
                                                          
4
  [2006-09] DIFC. C.L.R. 7. 
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contracting parties choosing ordinary UAE law as the governing law. Such a restriction 
would be especially undesirable now that the jurisdiction of the DIFC courts has been 
expanded.
5
 It may become very common for two parties resident in the UAE to agree to 
bring a dispute to the DIFC courts but to choose ordinary UAE law as the governing law.  
It is also difficult to accept that a DIFC court is able to apply any foreign law chosen by 
the parties, such as Egyptian or Kuwaiti law, but is unable to respect their choice of 
ordinary UAE law.  
Article 3(2) of Federal Law 8/2004 should have been interpreted differently, as its aim is 
to ensure that the DIFC has a distinct law of its own for civil and commercial matters. 
Therefore, the exclusion specified by Article 3(2) should be interpreted in the light of the 
distinction between internal law and private international law. It ensures that the ordinary 
UAE law is not applicable as part of the internal law of the DIFC. But it does not prevent 
the application in the DIFC courts of ordinary UAE law as a foreign or quasi-foreign law 
in accordance with DIFC conflict rules. 
The question of the meaning of choice of law and jurisdiction clauses was raised in 
National Bonds Corp v Taaleem,6 which involved a clause that referred to Dubai law and 
courts. In the instant case, the DIFC Court of Appeal interpreted the clause as referring to 
DIFC law and courts, because the contractual arrangements were designed to use trusts, 
which are a feature of common law but not of civilian law. However, in most instances, a 
reference to Dubai law and Dubai courts should mean non-DIFC law and courts, because 
parties using such a clause most often do so in continuance of practices established before 
the creation of the DIFC, at a time when the clause could only refer to the ordinary Dubai 
                                                          
5
  On this expansion, see note 2 above. 
6
 CA 001\2011. 
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law and courts.
7
 The creation of the DIFC as a distinct territory has given rise to a new 
situation. Thus, good practice now requires that clauses choosing a jurisdiction or law 
should indicate explicitly whether they are referring to ordinary Dubai/UAE courts or 
laws or to DIFC courts or laws.  
Shrayh has stated: 
[I]n order to eliminate any remaining risk of being involuntarily drawn into the net of 
the DIFC Courts, a jurisdiction clause should still make it clear that a reference to the 
“Dubai Courts” is to the local (non-DIFC) Dubai Courts and not to the DIFC Courts. 
Therefore, where a party or transaction with any link to the DIFC intends to contract 
out of the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction and refer disputes to the local (non-DIFC) 
Dubai Courts, the jurisdiction clause should make it clear that all disputes are to be 
referred to the Dubai Courts as established under Dubai Law No. 3 of 1992.
8
 
By way of exception, an express choice by the parties will be disregarded in favour of 
DIFC public policy or DIFC overriding mandatory rules. This exception is clearly stated 
in several enactments. Thus, Article 8(2)(a) of the First Application law gives priority to a 
DIFC law that has regulatory content, and Article 6 of the Judicial Authority Law allows 
the parties to choose the law that governs their contract, so long as the chosen law does 
not conflict with public policy or public morals.  
Under Article 7(2) of the Second Application Act, when an express choice operates, the 
internal law of the relevant country, rather than its choice of law rules, is applied. 
The DIFC legislator failed to consider some essential points regarding the choice of law 
under its enactments. First of all, the enactments do not specify clearly whether the 
parties’ freedom to choose the applicable law extends to allowing them to alter their 
chosen law at any time after contracting, though Article 9 of the Second Application Law 
appears to envisage an express choice contained in the contract. A second point is that the 
                                                          
7
 See also Shrayh, T.S., 2012. Opting Out Of The Exclusive Jurisdiction Of The DIFC Courts. Available at: 
<www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-6/november-3/opting-out-of-the-exclusive-
jurisdiction-of-the-difc-courts.html> [Accessed: October 15, 2014]. 
8
 Ibid. 
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enactments do not clarify whether parties are permitted to choose different laws for 
different parts of their contract. Finally, the enactments do not clearly indicate whether 
the parties are able to choose a religious law to govern the contract, or whether they are 
obliged to choose the law of a country, though Article 8(2) of the First Application Act 
suggests that the choice must be of a territorial law. 
The impact of overriding DIFC legislation is well illustrated by the decision of Chadwick 
DCJ (in the DIFC Court of First Instance) in Al Khorafi v Bank Sarasin-Alpen (ME) Ltd 
and Bank Sarasin & Co Ltd,9 which involved claims by Kuwaiti investors against a Swiss 
bank and its DIFC subsidiary arising from an investment in derivatives. The Court upheld 
the claims against both defendants based on the DIFC legislation on the provision of 
financial services.
10
 The subsidiary had breached the DIFC regulatory provisions by 
accepting inappropriate clients and by recommending unsuitable investments, and the 
parent by providing financial services in or from the DIFC without a licence to do so. In 
contrast, it was accepted that a contractual claim against the parent for giving poor 
investment advice was governed by the expressly chosen Swiss law. 
The default rule in the absence of an express choice of law 
In the absence of an express choice of law by the parties, DIFC internal law will apply. 
The default rule in favour of DIFC internal law arises from various enactments. The 
clearest indication is by the Second Application Law, Article 9 of which gives effect to an 
express choice, and Article 10 provides that if a choice is not specified, DIFC law 
becomes applicable. Similarly, Article 6 of the Judicial Authority Law specifies that the 
court should apply the DIFC internal law, unless the parties have explicitly agreed that 
another law should govern the disputes. It seems clear that the references to a law agreed 
                                                          
9
 CFI 026/2009, 21 August 2014.  
10
 DIFC Law 1/2004 and the DFSA Rules made thereunder.  
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to by the parties, contained in Article 8(1)(c) of the First Application Law and Article 30 
of the Court Law, must be restricted to explicit agreements so as to accord with the other 
enactments. The Contract Law and the Implied Terms in Contracts and Unfair Terms 
Law serve to specify the relevant internal law of the DIFC. 
In cases in which the internal law of the DIFC applies, but there is no DIFC enactment or 
judicial decision establishing the content of the relevant rules, the corresponding rule of 
English law will usually be imported, sometimes with modifications considered necessary 
in the light of local conditions. Such importation is authorised by Article 8(2)(e), which 
allows the judge to refer to English law. In Dutch Equity Partners v Daman Real Estate,11 
which involved company law, the judge utilised Article 8(2)(e) and applied English law 
to supplement the DIFC enactments on companies with respect to points that were not 
explicitly dealt with in these enactments. This application of English law was justified by 
the fact that the companies’ law in the DIFC was based on the common law, and the 
application of English rules would support the provisions of the DIFC enactments.  
In Forsyth Partners Global Distributors,
12
 which involved preferential debts in 
insolvency proceedings, the DIFC insolvency law did not contain any explicit provision 
concerning preferential debts at the time of hearing. Hwang J therefore referred to Article 
8(2) of the First Application Law. But he ultimately refused to import any rules creating 
preferential rights. He declined to introduce the preferences recognised by UAE law 
under Article 8(2)(d), since the UAE insolvency law might be influenced by priorities and 
social conditions in the UAE. He also declined to import the preferences recognised by 
English law under Article 8(2)(e), as the English rules were not necessarily appropriate in 
the circumstances existing in the DIFC. He left the possible introduction of preferential 
                                                          
11
 [2006-09] DIFC. C.C.L.R.1. The companies law in DIFC 2004 and 2006.  
12
 [2006-09] DIFC.C.C.L.R.3. 
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rights to future DIFC legislation and adhered to the basic rule in insolvency law, that of 
equality between creditors. Preferential debts are exceptional and reflect a legislative 
choice involving policy considerations and possibly somewhat arbitrary solutions. 
Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the judge to rule that, until further legislation is 
adopted in the DIFC, no preference was available there. 
Other laws, especially ones resembling English law (such as Australian law), may also 
considered models that may be imported. Authority for this can be found in Article 30(2) 
of the Court Act, which permits the judge to consider decisions made in other 
jurisdictions to assist in making his decision. This was confirmed in Raul Silva v United 
Investment Bank,13 in which the Chief Justice explained (in paragraph 77) that the trial 
judge had been wrong in referring to some cases under the English law concerning unfair 
dismissal to support his decision on a claim for wrongful dismissal, since such cases were 
irrelevant in view of the absence of any right with respect to unfair dismissal under DIFC 
law. Therefore, it must be recognised that the importation of English law under Article 8 
is restricted, as it must not conflict with the DIFC substantive law as enacted.    
A striking feature of the DIFC enactments concerning choice of law is that they do not 
appear to admit an implied choice by the parties or a test of closest connection to be 
ascertained by the court. Such references might at first sight seem to be authorised by 
Article 8(2)(c) and (d) of the First Application Law. However, they now appear to be 
blocked by the combined effect of Article 8(2)(a) and (b) of that Law, Articles 8 and 10 
of the Second Application Law, Article 30 of the Court Law, and Article 6 of the Judicial 
Authority Law.  
 
                                                          
13
 CA 004\2014. 
146 
 
Other choice of law rules 
The Second Application Law also provides specific choice of law rules for subrogation, 
agency and property. However, torts remain governed by Article 8(2) of the First 
Application Law, so that a test of closest connection is available for torts under Article 
8(2)(d). It should be noted that some guidance concerning torts might be drawn from the 
Rome II Regulation. That regulation, for instance, favours the law of the place of injury 
in the absence of a common habitual residence. 
In Al Khorafi v Bank Sarasin-Alpen (ME) Ltd and Bank Sarasin & Co Ltd,14 which 
involved claims by Kuwaiti investors against a Swiss bank and its DIFC subsidiary 
arising from an investment in derivatives, Chadwick DCJ (in the DIFC Court of First 
Instance), in reliance on Article 8(2)(d) of the First Application Law, applied Kuwaiti law 
to tort claims against the DIFC subsidiary for negligence in advising and for 
misrepresentation. These tort claims were most closely connected with Kuwait, where the 
claimants resided and where they received and acted on the advice. Thus, these claims 
were rejected, since Kuwaiti law did not admit concurrent claims in contract and tort and 
did not impose liability for non-fraudulent misrepresentation. A claim for 
misrepresentation against the parent company was also rejected on the basis that it was 
governed by the expressly chosen Swiss law and that, in the absence of proof to the 
contrary, Swiss law was presumed to be the same as DIFC law. Under DIFC Law, the 
claim failed, because the relevant statements were of opinion rather than fact. 
Agency 
Article 11 of the Second Application Law determines the law applicable to agency. Under 
Article 11(1), the capacity and authority of the agent must be determined by reference to  
                                                          
14
 CFI 026/2009, 21 August 2014.  
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the law that governs the contract under which the agent was appointed. Therefore, an 
express choice of law between the principal and the agent will govern such a matter. In 
the absence of an express choice of law between the principal and the agent, the default 
rules will be applied. This approach is also adopted by the Rome I Regulation. 
Nonetheless, the Rome I Regulation excludes the question of capacity from its scope; in 
other words, it does not insist that the law of the agent’s habitual residence will govern 
the question of his capacity. The DIFC provision contrasts with the English approach to 
capacity, which subjects the agent’s capacity either to the proper law of a contract or to 
his personal law, whichever is more favourable to capacity.
15
   
Agency agreements can be very complicated, as many countries have legislation in place 
that protects commercial agents and that are regarded as overriding mandatory rules. 
Within the EU, an agency contract will be governed by the law chosen by the parties in 
the contract, unless there are mandatory rules that override the law selected by the parties. 
For example, in Ingmar GB Ltd v Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc,16 a contract between 
a Californian principal and an English agent contained a clause choosing California law. 
The European Court ruled that the protective provisions of a European directive
17
 
operated as overriding mandatory rules and applied, despite a choice of an external law, 
whenever the agent was established and carried on his activities within the European 
Union.  
However, by Article 11(2), the rights and liabilities of the principal with regard to third 
parties, in cases where an agent contracts on behalf of a principal, must be determined by 
reference to the law that governs the main contract concluded by the agent on behalf of 
the principal with the third party. This provision corresponds with the approach adopted 
                                                          
15
 See Dicey, Rule 228; and Stone, 3rd edition, pp. 324-26. 
16
 Case C -381/98, [2000] ECR I-9305. See also Lucy Pringle and Peter Snaith, of Bond Dickinson LLP, 
Which law governs agency agreements?, published in Lexology, 19 February  2014.  
17
 EEC Directive 86/653, on self-employed commercial agents, [1986] OJ L382/17. 
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by English law.
18
 Such a matter is excluded from the scope of the Rome I Regulation by 
Article 1(2)(g). In contrast, the Hague Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law 
Applicable to Agency, in Article 11(1), usually subjects this matter to the law of the 
country in which the agent has his business establishment.
19
    
Rights of subrogation 
The law that governs the right of subrogation is dealt with in Article 12 of the Second 
Application Law, which provides:  
Where a person (the "creditor") has a contractual claim upon another (the "debtor"), 
and a third party has a duty to satisfy the creditor, or has in fact satisfied the creditor 
in discharge of that duty, the law which governs the contractual claim shall 
determine the extent to which the third person is entitled to exercise against the 
debtor the rights which the creditor had against the debtor under the law governing 
the contractual claim. 
  
This contrasts with Article 15 of the Rome I Regulation, which instead subjects the right 
of legal subrogation to the law that governs the third person's duty to satisfy the creditor, 
though it limits the debtor’s liability to that existing under the law governing the 
relationship between the creditor and the debtor.  
Property  
Articles 14 and 15 of the Second Application Law provide that the law that governs 
proprietary rights is the law of the country in which the property is situated. Article 14 
provides that the lex situs governs the classification of property and the validity and 
extent of interests in property, and Article 15 subjects to the lex situs the validity and 
proprietary effects of a transfer of property. There is an exception in favour of the law 
governing the transfer, when the property is in transit or its location is not known.  
 
                                                          
18
 See Dicey at p. 2,125. See also Stone at p. 327. 
19
 The convention is enforced in three of the EU Member States, namely France, the Netherlands and 
Portugal. Rules based on the Convention were proposed by the Commission in its initial proposal for the 
Rome I Regulation, but they were rejected by the Council and the Parliaments and were not included in the 
Regulation as adopted. 
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Some related questions 
Another question that could arise is how the courts within the other UAE territories 
should treat DIFC law if it is the governing law as agreed by the parties. On the one hand, 
it could be argued that the judge will treat the DIFC law as a foreign law, as the majority 
of the DIFC legislation is formulated in the English language and needs to be translated. 
On the other hand, some may argue that the judge should treat the DIFC law as a local 
law rather than a foreign law, because this law was established by Dubai legislation and 
in the name of the ruler of Dubai. However, any judge within the UAE courts (outside of 
the DIFC) should treat the DIFC law as foreign law for the purposes of private 
international law, as this law applies only in the DIFC territory. The situation is 
analogous to the treatment within one part of the United Kingdom of the law of another 
part of the United Kingdom. For example, the Scottish court applies Scottish law, but if 
the parties choose English law to govern their contract, the Scottish court will apply 
English law in accordance with the Scottish conflict ruling requiring the choice to be 
respected, and will treat English law as a foreign law despite the fact that England and 
Scotland are both parts of the United Kingdom.       
Another question is whether in such cases the parties are obliged to prove the content of 
the DIFC law in proceedings in other courts within the UAE. Even though the DIFC 
courts are among the Dubai courts, the DIFC has its own legal system, and its laws are 
completely different from the civil or commercial laws that apply elsewhere in the UAE, 
as the DIFC laws are based on the common law and are formulated in English. Therefore, 
it seems necessary that the parties should be obliged to prove the DIFC laws in any other 
UAE courts and that they should have to produce translations of them into Arabic.  
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PART 2 - OTHER PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES  
RELATING TO THE DIFC 
As explained above, this part of this chapter will address other aspects of private 
international law in relation to the DIFC. It will deal in turn with the jurisdiction of the 
DIFC courts; arbitration in the DIFC; the recognition and enforcement in the DIFC of 
judgments and awards from elsewhere; and the recognition and enforcement elsewhere of 
judgments and awards from the DIFC. 
Before addressing these issues, it is necessary to provide some clarification about 
territories and some corresponding definitions. 
Although the UAE (apart from the DIFC) has a single substantive law, it has various 
courts for different emirates. Dubai , Ras Al Khaimah and Abu Dhabi each has its own 
courts, while in all of the other emirates there is a unified federal court structure, in which 
the federal Supreme Court is the court of final appeal. That Court also deals with conflicts 
between judgments of different UAE courts, even when one of them is a Dubai court. 
In these circumstances, it is convenient to use the following terminology: "main Dubai" 
refers to Dubai except for the DIFC enclave, and "main Dubai courts" has a 
corresponding meaning; "main UAE" means the UAE except for Dubai; and "external 
country" refers to a country outside of the UAE (such as England or France). 
Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction of the DIFC courts 
The DIFC courts' jurisdiction was initially established in Article 5(A)(1) of Dubai Law 
12/2004 (as amended), which states that the Court of First Instance shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear and determine the following civil or commercial claims:  
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(a) claims and actions to which the DIFC or any DIFC Body, DIFC Establishment or 
Licensed DIFC Establishment is a party;  
(b) claims and actions arising out of or relating to a contract or promised contract, 
whether partly or wholly concluded, finalised or performed within the DIFC or that will 
be performed or is supposed to be performed within the DIFC pursuant to express or 
implied terms stipulated in the contract;  
(c) claims and actions arising out of or relating to any incident or transaction that has 
been wholly or partly performed within the DIFC and is related to DIFC activities; and  
(d) any claim or action over which the Courts have jurisdiction in accordance with DIFC 
Laws and DIFC Regulations. 
Article 5(A)(1) remains in force, but it has now been supplemented by Article 5(A)(2)-
(4). These further provisions were added by the amendment of Dubai Law 16/2011, 
which broadened the Courts’ jurisdiction.   
Article 5(A)(2) provides that the Court of First Instance may hear and determine any civil 
or commercial claims or actions, if the parties agree in writing to file such claim or action 
with it whether before or after the dispute arises, provided that such agreement is made 
pursuant to specific, clear and express provisions.    
Article 5(A)(3) provides that the Court of First Instance may hear and determine any civil 
or commercial claims or actions falling within its jurisdiction, if the parties agree in 
writing to submit to the jurisdiction of another court over the claim or action, but that 
court dismisses the claim or action for lack of jurisdiction.   
However, Article 5(A)(4) provides that the Court of First Instance may not hear or 
determine any civil or commercial claim or action with respect to which a final judgment 
is rendered by another court.  
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Article 5(B)(1)(a) provides that the DIFC Court of Appeal has exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear and determine appeals filed against judgments and decisions made by the Court of 
First Instance. 
The relation between the DIFC courts and laws and those of the other emirates in the 
UAE may be affected by the Supreme Court’s ruling No 192/1320 on the relations 
between the Dubai courts and the UAE Federal courts. The Court held that, since Dubai 
has elected to have its own judicial system, and accordingly its courts have jurisdiction 
over matters within its territory, the distribution of jurisdiction between the Dubai courts 
and the Federal courts is a matter of public policy, so that it is not open to parties to make 
agreements that conflict with these jurisdictional principles. Both the Federal and the 
Dubai courts should abide by the limits of their jurisdiction positively and negatively and 
should neither waive their jurisdiction nor assume the jurisdiction of another court. In 
light of this ruling, an agreement to give jurisdiction to the DIFC courts or to the main  
Dubai courts may be challenged as violating public policy, if, for example, an Abu Dhabi 
party asserts that Abu Dhabi courts have jurisdiction over the matter.   
In this context, it must be understood that conflicts of jurisdiction can arise in situations 
in which two courts within the UAE territories have jurisdiction over the same matter, 
and they issue incompatible judgments on the merits of the dispute. In order to tackle this 
problem, the UAE legislator has given the Federal Supreme Court the authority to select 
the court that has jurisdiction over the matter. But the Supreme Court cannot exercise 
such authority unless the judgments are final. In another words, the parties cannot raise 
this point before the Supreme Court until the judgments have been affirmed by the Court 
of Appeal or the Court of Cassation.  
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The role of the Federal Supreme Court applies to conflicts between a DIFC judgment and 
an Abu Dhabi judgment. However, the role of the Federal Supreme Court does not apply 
to conflicts between a DIFC judgment and a main Dubai judgment, since both courts 
belong to the same emirate. In this situation, although there is no explicit legislative 
authority, a similar role seems naturally to belong to the Dubai Court of Cassation. 
In Rodever Lechet v Baker Hughes EHO Ltd. (Dubai Branch) and International 
Professional Resources Ltd. and Oilfields Supply Center Ltd,21 the main Dubai courts 
asserted that the DIFC has no jurisdiction to rule on labour disputes. It reasoned that 
labour disputes do not count as civil and commercial disputes for the purpose of Article 5 
of DIFC Law 12/2004. The main Dubai court also confirmed its exclusive jurisdiction to 
resolve labour disputes by referring to Article 25 of the Federal Civil Procedures Law 
11/1992, as amended by Federal Law 30/2005, and Federal Law 10/2014, which states 
that "first instance courts shall have the competence to review civil, commercial, 
administrative, labour and personal status disputes except for the disputes to which the 
federation is a party, as they are adjudged by the Federal Courts."  
It is strange that the main Dubai courts have distinguished between labour law and civil 
law, as labour law counts as one element of the civil laws as normally understood under 
UAE law. Moreover, the contrast made by the main Dubai court between the explicit 
inclusion of labour disputes in the Federal Civil Procedures Law 11/1992 with the 
omission specifically to refer to labour disputes in the DIFC legislation is misconceived, 
since the DIFC legislation is drafted against the background of English law, under which 
labour matters are regarded as civil matters without a need for a specific mention.     
This ruling may lead to many problems. First, it can lead to a conflict of judgments 
between the DIFC courts and the main Dubai courts, since the DIFC courts have ruled 
                                                          
21 Case No. 133/ 2014, Labor Appeal [2015]. 
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that their jurisdiction does extend to labour matters,
22
 and the employment provisions 
under the DIFC laws differ from those adopted under the CTC.
23
 Moreover, since the 
DIFC provisions are in some respects less favourable to employees than the main Dubai 
provisions, employees may have an incentive to sue in main Dubai courts, while 
conversely employers may have an incentive to sue in DIFC courts.  
For example, there are differences in the provisions concerning maximum working hours. 
Under the UAE labour law, Article 65 provides: 
The maximum normal hours of work of adult workers shall be eight a day or 48 a 
week. The hours of work may be increased to nine hours a day in commercial 
establishments, hotels and cafes and of guard duties and any other operations where 
such increase is authorized by order of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs. 
The daily hours of work may be reduced in the case of arduous or unhealthy 
operations by order of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs. The normal hours 
of work shall be reduced by two during the month of Ramadan. The periods spent by 
a worker in traveling between his home and place of work shall not be included in 
his hours of work.  
In contrast, Article 21 of the DIFC employment law provides that an employee's working 
time shall not exceed an average of 48 hours for each 7 day period unless the employer 
has first obtained the employee's consent in writing. Both laws have the same rule 
concerning the normal weekly maximum hours of work. However, the UAE labour law 
offers more protection for the employee who might be in weaker position by prohibiting 
any agreement on a longer working week, whereas the DIFC employment law allows 
such an agreement and thus puts the employer in a better bargaining position.    
If the two parties bring the dispute to both the DIFC courts and the main Dubai courts, 
one of the parties can request the judge to stay proceedings until it has been decided by 
the first court to which the dispute is brought. If the two courts give inconsistent rulings, 
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 See the Rasmala Investments v Banat decision.  
23
 This is particularly true in relation to the Lechet case itself, which involved unfair dismissal, since there 
are no provisions concerning unfair dismissal under the DIFC law, as was confirmed by the DIFC ruling in 
Rasmala Investments v Banat.   
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then the Dubai Court of Cassation must select which ruling should be enforced and which 
court had jurisdiction.
24
 The Dubai Court of Cassation has this role, since Dubai has its 
own courts and is not subject to the federal legal system in the same way as the Emirates 
of Ajman or Sharjah, the courts of which fall under the federal umbrella and for which 
the Federal Supreme Court is the final court of appeal. 
It is important to emphasise that any issues relating to the establishment of the DIFC will 
be decided by the Dubai Court of Cassation, since the establishment of the DIFC is 
subject to Dubai law. However, if the issue relates to the establishment of free zones, the 
Federal Supreme Court will have jurisdiction, since the free zones are established by the 
federal law.   
Recently, the Supreme Legislation Committee of Dubai (SLC)
25
 issued a marker opinion 
concerning the jurisdiction of the DIFC. The SLC opinion was based on Article 83 of 
Law 6/1997 on Contracts of Government Departments, which states that “the Dubai 
Courts shall have the jurisdiction to hear any dispute that arises between a government 
entity and a customer…” 
The SLC explained that the DIFC court is considered one of the Dubai courts and part of 
its legal system. Therefore, its jurisdiction should include any civil or commercial 
disputes raised between a government entity and a contractor, as long as both parties 
agree to give the jurisdiction to the DIFC courts. 
It seems that there is no obstacle to prevent the Dubai government entity from 
commencing litigation in the DIFC court if both parties agree. However, the other party 
needs to obtain permission from the Government of Dubai Legal Affairs Department to 
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 In a similar situation involving courts of two different emirates, such as, for example, Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi, the Supreme Court would decide which courts had the jurisdiction over the dispute and whose 
judgment should therefore be enforced.   
25
 The SLC was established by Dubai Law no.24 of 2014. 
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register the case two months after the application for such permission.
26
 The period of 
two months is designed to enable the issue to be resolved without litigation.  
This ruling, which allows a government entity to agree on DIFC jurisdiction, can be 
useful in new contracts, because new contracts can include such an agreement. However, 
in the case of old contracts, a new agreement between the parties regarding jurisdiction 
will be necessary, and, in its absence, the dispute will have to be brought before the main 
Dubai court.  
Jurisdiction clauses  
The expansion of the jurisdiction of the DIFC courts by Dubai Law 16/2011 took effect 
in November 2011. This amendment enables any parties who reside outside of the DIFC 
to agree to choose the DIFC courts to hear their disputes. Parties can include a choice of 
the DIFC courts in their contracts at the conclusion stage, and the choice may be 
exclusive or non-exclusive. Alternatively, they can jointly agree in writing to refer a 
dispute to the DIFC courts after the dispute has arisen.  
Practice Direction 2/2012 on the DIFC Courts’ Jurisdiction recommends three types of 
jurisdiction clauses: 
"A) Exclusive Jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts Before a Dispute Arises 
Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract, including any question 
regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Courts of the Dubai International Financial Centre. 
This contract shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of 
[INSERT PLACE]” 
B) Non-Exclusive Jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts Before a Dispute Arises 
Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract, including any question 
regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be subject to the non-exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Courts of the Dubai International Financial Centre. 
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 Law no. 3 of 1996 of Government Claims law. 
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Each party irrevocably submits to the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts and waives 
any objection it may have to disputes arising out of or in connection with this 
contract being heard in the Courts of Dubai International Financial Centre on the 
grounds that it is an inconvenient forum (forum non conveniens). 
This contract shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of 
[INSERT PLACE]” 
C) Exclusive Jurisdiction After a Dispute Arises /Over Existing Disputes 
A dispute having arisen between the parties concerning [DEFINE DISPUTE], the 
parties hereby agree that the dispute shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the DIFC Courts. 
The governing law of this agreement shall be the law of [INSERT PLACE] 
Arbitration  
The Arbitration Law of the DIFC  
In the DIFC, the legal regime relating to arbitration was established in 2008 by DIFC 
Law 1/2008 (the DIFC Arbitration Law), which came into force on 1 September 2008. 
The DIFC Arbitration Law is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, which forms the 
foundation of the arbitration law of many countries and has come to represent the 
accepted international standard for a modern statutory arbitration regime. The DIFC 
Arbitration Law covers all aspects of arbitration from the formal requirements of 
arbitration agreements to the enforcement of awards. In accordance with this Law, there 
is no requirement for parties to have any “nexus” or “connection” with the DIFC in order 
to enable them to provide for arbitration to be seated in the DIFC. Anyone, from any 
country, can opt for the DIFC as an arbitral seat.
27
 Furthermore, the rules that govern the 
arbitration can be chosen by the parties, as they are free to choose the applicable rules. In 
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 John Gaffney and Dalal Al Houti, “Arbitration in the UAE: Aiming for Excellence”, published in the 
Law Update, May 2014; available online at www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-8/may-
7/arbitration-in-the-uae-aiming-for-excellence-1.html [Accessed: June 15, 2015]. 
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the absence of such agreement, the arbitral tribunal will decided on the procedures that 
should be applied.  
It should be noted that, pursuant to Article 7 of the Judicial Authority Law (Dubai Law 
12/2004), DIFC awards, once ratified by the DIFC courts, are enforceable by the main 
Dubai courts, if the ratified award is “final and appropriate for enforcement” and is 
accompanied by an Arabic translation. The main Dubai courts have no jurisdiction to 
review the merits of the DIFC awards before their enforcement in main Dubai.  
Once an execution order is obtained from the main Dubai courts, the DIFC awards are 
automatically enforceable throughout the UAE and can be enforced in the other Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC) states – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait - 
under the GCC Convention for the Execution of Judgments, Delegations and Judicial 
Notifications (1996). In addition, the DIFC is bound by other international conventions 
ratified by the UAE, which means that DIFC awards are also enforceable in all of the 
more than 140 states party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
28
   
The DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre 
The DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre is based in the DIFC and was established on 17 
February 2008 as a joint venture between the DIFC and the well-established London 
Court of International Arbitration (the LCIA). The LCIA is based in the United Kingdom 
and is generally regarded as one of the leading administrative institutions dealing with 
commercial arbitration and mediation in the world, with roots going back more than 100 
years. The launch of the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre was seen by many as an historic 
milestone in the development of the DIFC and the Emirate of Dubai as an international 
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 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Newsletter September 2008, “The New DIFC Arbitration Law”. 
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finance and commercial centre for the region. The announcement of the DIFC-LCIA 
Arbitration Centre was the first step in bringing to the DIFC, as a seat of arbitration, a 
well-established set of administrative and procedural rules for conducting arbitration. 
The DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre is guided by the DIFC-LCIA International Rules of 
Arbitration 2008 (the DIFC-LCIA Rules), which are modelled on the Rules of Arbitration 
of the LCIA with minor amendments. The DIFC-LCIA Rules are compatible with both 
civil and common law systems. They also provide a modern and comprehensive 
framework, which allows the international business community, international lawyers and 
arbitrators to conduct arbitrations under the auspices of the DIFC-LCIA Centre with 
confidence and efficiency. The Centre serves to promote the UAE as an effective dispute-
resolution venue for international commercial disputes.  
The DIFC-LCIA Centre is independent from the DIFC courts, but the DIFC Court Law 
(Law 10/2004) recognises that the DIFC courts will exercise the “curial”, or supervisory, 
role that in all systems of law is exercised by the relevant national court.
29
 Parties who 
choose the DIFC as the seat of arbitration are free to arbitrate under the rules of arbitral 
institutions other than the DIFC-LCIA Centre, including, for example, the Rules of the 
Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC). Further, parties are free to agree on the 
procedure to be followed by the tribunal. When the parties have not agreed on the 
procedure to be followed, then the tribunal has discretion to discharge its duties in order 
to conduct the arbitration in a fair, efficient and expeditious manner. Arbitral awards 
under the DIFC-LCIA Rules are final and binding, and the parties irrevocably waive any 
right to appeal.
30
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 Sir Antony Evans, Chief Justice of the DIFC Courts, “The Future of Arbitration in Dubai’, Judge’s 
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The DIFC-LCIA Centre has jurisdiction to hear disputes when there is an agreement 
among the parties in writing that the arbitration will proceed under its provisions and 
rules. Therefore, the Centre provides dispute-resolution services for parties globally 
rather than only to parties in the DIFC region. The DIFC-LCIA Rules provide an 
expedited procedure for the formation of the arbitral tribunal in matters of exceptional 
urgency. The Rules respect the parties’ freedom to choose the law governing the arbitral 
procedure, as Article 14 specifies that, "unless agreed otherwise by the parties, the 
tribunal shall have ‘the widest discretion to discharge its duties allowed under the law(s) 
or rules of law’ as determined by the tribunal."  
The DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre recommends that parties who wish to have the Centre 
resolve their disputes insert the following clause into their contract:  
Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract, including any question 
regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to and finally 
resolved by arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration 
Centre, which Rules are deemed to be incorporated by reference into this clause. The 
number of arbitrators shall be [one/three]. The seat, or legal place, of arbitration shall 
be [city and/or country]. The language to be used in the arbitration shall be 
[language]. The governing law of the contract shall be the substantive law of 
[governing law].  
 
Respect in the DIFC for foreign arbitration clauses 
In International Electromechanical Services Co. LLC v Al Fattan Engineering LLC,31 one 
of the questions addressed by the Court was whether the DIFC courts have the power to 
grant a stay of their proceedings when there is an arbitration clause, and the seat of 
arbitration is outside the UAE. David Williams J ruled that the DIFC court has an 
inherent power to grant a stay of proceedings in such cases. In arriving at this ruling, the 
Court refused to follow the earlier decision in Injazat Capital Limited and Injazat 
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Technology Fund B.S.C. v Denton Wilde Sapte & Co,32 in which Sir David Steel ruled 
that the Court could not stay its proceedings in favour of a foreign-seated arbitration. Sir 
David Steel based his ruling in Injazat on Article 7 of Law 1/2008 concerning the 
recognition of arbitral agreements, which restricted Article 13 thereof to cases in which 
the seat of arbitration is the DIFC. In contrast, David Williams J found the power to stay 
on the basis of other provisions and principles and thus was able to avoid a situation in 
which the DIFC courts would be unable to comply with the obligations of the UAE as a 
party to the New York Convention. 
The recognition and enforcement of non-DIFC awards in the DIFC 
Recent cases before DIFC courts have considered the jurisdiction of the DIFC courts to 
make orders for the recognition and enforcement in the DIFC of arbitral awards made 
outside of the DIFC. The cases have involved, in particular, situations in which the award 
was made against a defendant who resided in main Dubai and had no assets within the 
DIFC. The essential background to these disputes is the greater efficiency of the DIFC 
courts, as compared with the main Dubai courts, in dealing with applications for 
enforcement of an arbitral award. In these cases, the jurisdiction of the DIFC courts has 
been upheld. 
In Banyan Tree v Meydan Group LLC,33 the appellant challenged the first instance 
judgment issued by H.E. Al Muhairi.
34
 The appeal concerned the recognition and 
enforcement by the DIFC Court of a domestic arbitration award issued in main Dubai in 
favour of a company incorporated in Singapore. In the Court of First Instance H.E. Judge 
Al Muhairi ruled that the DIFC courts have jurisdiction to ratify a domestic arbitration 
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award issued outside of the DIFC. The Court adopted the same approach as in the earlier 
decision in X1 and X2 v Y1 and Y2,35 in which the claimants were award creditors located 
outside of Dubai, who applied for an order recognising and granting leave to enforce a 
foreign arbitral award gained in their favour in opposition to award debtors located in 
main Dubai but outside of the DIFC. 
The Court of Appeal, per Sir David Steel, affirmed the decision at the first instance and 
explained that Article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law gives the DIFC the jurisdiction to 
recognise and to enforce an arbitral award, irrespective of the state or jurisdiction in 
which it was made.
36
 In the case of an award issued in Dubai, the New York Convention 
is not applicable. However, Article 42 does not distinguish between a domestic and a 
foreign award. 
Moreover, the Court approved the ruling at first instance that Article 5(A)(1)(E) of the 
Judicial Authority Law serves as the gateway by which Article 42 of the Arbitration Law 
confers jurisdiction on the DIFC Courts to recognise the award as binding within the 
DIFC.37 This jurisdiction is not restricted by any requirements that the subject matter or 
the defendant or its assets should have any connection with the DIFC. Moreover the court 
below was correct to follow the approach adopted in X1 and X2 v Y1 and Y2. Thus, the 
Court of Appeal has firmly established that the enforcement of awards within the DIFC 
does not require personal jurisdiction over the award debtor, by way of factors such as his 
residence or possession of assets within the DIFC territory. An objection based on forum 
non conveniens was also rejected, since the DIFC Courts have exclusive jurisdiction for 
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 Article 42 proivdes: "An arbitral award, irrespective of the State or jurisdiction in which it was made, 
shall be recognised as binding within the DIFC and, upon application in writing to the DIFC Court, shall be 
enforced subject to the provisions of this Article and of Articles 43 and 44." 
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 Article 5(A)(1)(E) states that the DIFC Courts "have jurisdiction over any claim in accordance with DIFC 
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the determination of the question whether an award should be recognised and enforced in 
the DIFC.  
It is also clear that the effect in main Dubai of an order by the DIFC Court in favour of 
the enforcement of an award within the DIFC is a matter that must be resolved by the 
main Dubai courts. In particular, the DIFC Court of Appeal noted that:  
If in due course the matter is left to be raised before the courts of Dubai (which are 
the courts of the seat) the question whether the bar on considering the merits of the 
DIFC order before the execution judge would also inhibit the Dubai courts from 
ruling on a challenge to the validity of the underlying award is a matter for the 
Dubai courts and is a matter on which we have heard no argument. 
It is clear that a DIFC order in favour of a main Dubai award should not prevent the main 
Dubai courts from exercising their supervisory jurisdiction over an arbitration seated in 
main Dubai. On the other hand, if the award is from an arbitration seated in a country 
outside of the UAE but which is a party to the New York Convention, there is much to be 
said for the argument that a DIFC order in favour of the award should preclude objections 
to enforcement from being raised in main Dubai courts, since such objections would 
necessarily be based on provisions of the Convention and would have been available in 
the DIFC proceedings. 
Enforcement of External Judgments 
External judgments are judgments given by a court of a country outside of the UAE. In 
speaking of the main UAE, we refer to the territory of all the emirates except Dubai. 
Enforcement of external judgments in the main UAE and main Dubai  
A party seeking to enforce a foreign judgment in the UAE can do so through the main 
UAE courts, the main Dubai courts, or the DIFC courts, although in practice it is difficult 
to achieve enforcement in the main UAE or main Dubai courts, and this is relatively 
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untested in the DIFC courts. The main UAE courts and the main Dubai courts apply 
different considerations from those applied by the DIFC courts in determining whether to 
recognise and enforce foreign judgments from countries with which the UAE has no 
treaty.
38
 Under the relevant local legislation, the main UAE courts and the main Dubai 
courts will not enforce a foreign judgment if they had or would have had jurisdiction 
themselves over the matters in dispute. As the main UAE courts and the main Dubai 
courts have broad jurisdiction over matters concerning citizens and foreigners who 
maintain residence in the country, it has historically been difficult to meet this test. To 
date, it does not appear that any English judgments have been successfully enforced in 
the main UAE or main Dubai.  
Enforcement of external judgments in the DIFC  
Foreign judgments can be enforced by the DIFC Courts in accordance with the Rules of 
the DIFC Courts (DIFC Court Rules). In accordance with Article 7(6) of the Judicial 
Authority Law and Article 24(1)(a) of the DIFC Court Law (Law 10/2004), the DIFC 
courts have jurisdiction to ratify any judgment of a recognized foreign court for the 
purposes of any subsequent application for enforcement in the courts of main Dubai.  
The enforcement of a recognized foreign money judgment within the DIFC against a 
defendant with assets located in the DIFC should be relatively straightforward. This is 
especially so for such judgments from England, because in January 2013 a non-legally 
binding Memorandum of Guidance as to Enforcement was signed between the DIFC 
Courts and the English Commercial Court to facilitate mutual enforcement, taking into 
account certain conditions, of money judgments issued in the two jurisdictions. It is also 
possible to enforce foreign judgments of a more complex nature, such as injunctions and 
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freezing orders, in the DIFC courts, again subject to certain conditions. The enforcement 
of a foreign judgment in the DIFC courts can be procured by filing a claim for a judgment 
debt or a declaration. The claim can be filed either under Part 7 of the DIFC Court Rules, 
which is the more common procedure for commencing claims, or alternatively by way of 
a Part 8 claim, if the claim is unlikely to involve a substantial dispute of fact. Any 
resulting judgment issued by the DIFC Courts is effective and binding on any parties with 
a presence in the DIFC.
39
 
In DNB Bank ASA v Gulf Eyadah Corporation,40 Ali Al Madhani J declared that the 
DIFC courts have jurisdiction to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment within the 
DIFC territory. Such jurisdiction exists in all cases, and there need not be any other 
connection with the DIFC territory with respect to the defendant's residence or the subject 
matter involved. But the declaration by the DIFC courts that a foreign judgment is 
recognised or enforceable within the DIFC territory is not designed to have any effects 
outside of that territory. It does not count as a DIFC judgment for the purpose of 
recognition or enforcement in main Dubai.  
Enforcement of DIFC judgments  
Enforcement of DIFC judgments can be examined under the following headings:  
(a) enforcement of DIFC judgments in main Dubai;  
(b) enforcement of DIFC judgments in main UAE; and  
(c) enforcement of DIFC judgments in an external country. 
Enforcement of DIFC judgment in main Dubai 
Judgments and orders made by the DIFC courts can be converted into a main Dubai court 
judgment through a fairly straightforward and routine procedure that was initially set out 
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in a non-binding protocol.
41
 In accordance with Article 7(2) of Dubai Law 12/2004 (the 
Judicial Authority Law), DIFC court judgments, decisions and orders may be enforced 
through the main Dubai courts if three conditions are satisfied:  
(a) they must be final and executory; 
(b) they must be legally translated into Arabic and  
(c) they must be certified by the DIFC courts for execution and have a formula of 
execution affixed by the courts.   
It is also required that the final judgment must be translated into Arabic and that the 
enforcing party must obtain an execution letter from the DIFC courts addressed to the 
execution judge in the main Dubai courts. The procedure makes it clear that the execution 
judge in the main Dubai courts has no jurisdiction to review the merits of the judgment. 
DIFC judgments should be enforced in the Dubai Courts in the same way as judgments 
delivered by the main Dubai courts.   
The procedure now in effect is that the DIFC court judgment, order or decision is 
“converted” into a judgment of the main Dubai courts, which can then subsequently be 
enforced under any enforcement treaties to which the UAE is a party. There are numerous 
examples of judgments and orders having been enforced between the DIFC and the main 
Dubai courts. DIFC court orders that have been so enforced include interim orders, such 
as freezing orders (Mareva injunctions).42 
 
 
                                                          
41 Under the terms of a 2009 Protocol of Enforcement between the main Dubai courts and the DIFC courts 
and confirmed in Dubai Law 16/2011, Article 7(3)(c).  
42 In Mohammed Usman Saleem v Oasis Crescent Capital (DIFC) Ltd and HSBC Bank Middle East Ltd 
(CFI – enforcement no. 002/2008), a branch of HSBC Bank located outside of the DIFC and in main Dubai 
was ordered to freeze the amount of AED 70,809 in the account of the judgment debtor. In this case, a letter 
of execution was issued by the DIFC courts to the main Dubai courts. 
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Enforcement of a DIFC judgment in main UAE 
It may be noted that, to enforce a DIFC judgment within the UAE, but outside of Dubai, 
the enforcement has to go through a process called "referral", as stipulated by Article 221 
of the Federal Civil Procedures Law, which provides as follows:  
a. The competent execution judge shall refer the judgment or order to the execution 
judge for the area in which the judgment or order is sought to be enforced, and 
provide the latter with all the legal papers required for execution. 
b. The execution judge to whom the referral is made shall take all the decisions 
necessary to execute the referral and shall rule on procedural objections relating to 
the execution raised before him, and his appealable decisions shall be subject to 
appeal before the court of appeal in his area. 
c. The execution judge who has carried out the execution shall inform the competent 
execution judge who made the referral of what has happened, and shall transfer to 
him any items or other property received by him as a result of the sale of things 
attached. 
d. If the execution judge to whom the matter has been referred finds that there are 
legal reasons precluding the execution, or if it is impossible for him to execute for 
any other reason, he must notify the competent execution court thereof.  
 
It is generally supposed that, for this purpose, the main Dubai execution judge counts as 
the “competent execution judge” with regards to DIFC judgments. However, Article 7(2) 
of Dubai Law 12/2004, as amended by Law 16/2011, now provides that, “where the 
subject matter of execution is situated outside the DIFC, the judgments, decisions and 
orders rendered by the Courts and the Arbitral Awards ratified by the Courts shall be 
executed by the competent entity having jurisdiction outside the DIFC in accordance with 
the procedure and rules adopted by such entities in this regard …”. According to some 
legal scholars, following the coming into force of this amendment, DIFC court 
judgments, decisions and orders can be sent directly from the DIFC Courts for execution 
by the local “competent entity” within the UAE, without having to go through the main 
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Dubai execution judge as part of the process of “referral” established by Article 221 of 
the Federal Civil Procedures Law. However, so far, this possibility of enforcing a DIFC 
court judgment outside of Dubai and within the UAE is untried and untested. In any 
event, the DIFC courts have concluded Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with the 
courts in the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah and the UAE Federal Ministry of Justice, which 
are expected to assist in the enforcement of DIFC judgments, decisions and orders within 
the main UAE.  
Enforcement of DIFC judgments in external countries  
Constitutionally, the DIFC courts form part of the Dubai court system, and DIFC court 
judgments, either themselves or once converted into Dubai court judgments, are 
enforceable in each of the seven Emirates that make up the UAE and in any country with 
which the UAE has a reciprocal enforcement treaty in place. These include the countries 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia); the 
Riyadh Convention states (the GCC states plus Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen); and Tunisia, 
France, India and China under bilateral treaties.
43
 Further, DIFC judgments can be 
enforced internationally through reciprocal arrangements with many common law courts 
overseas, including the English Commercial Court, the Federal Court of Australia, the 
New South Wales Supreme Court, the High Court of Kenya (Commercial and Admiralty 
Division), and the Supreme Court of Singapore.
44
  
Where a relevant treaty is in place between the UAE and the target jurisdiction,  
enforcement will be governed by the terms of that treaty. In contrast, if there is no 
                                                          
43
 See Patrick Bourke and Dominic Hennessy, Could the recent guidance agreed between courts in England 
and the Dubai International Financial Centre provide a gateway to reciprocal enforcement of court 
judgments in the Gulf?, available online at http://www.theoath-me.com/s/deconstructing-the-new-mog 
[Accessed: June 17, 2015].  
44
 DIFC Court press release dated 15 February 2015, available online at difccourts.ae/new-innovation-difc-
courts-enhances-dubais-position-world-leader-dispute-resolution/ [Accessed: June 17, 2015]. 
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relevant treaty, enforcement will depend on the laws of the state in which the judgment 
creditor is seeking enforcement.
45
 However, to enforce a DIFC judgment in any member 
state of the GCC, at present it is generally assumed that the judgment must first 
recognised by the main Dubai court before attempting enforcement outside of the UAE, 
since the establishment of the DIFC is comparatively new, and an external court may be 
unfamiliar with its courts and their judgments. The practice may change in the future after 
many external courts have recognised the DIFC courts and their role in the Dubai legal 
system.
46
 
On the other hand, the DIFC courts have already respected a judgment issued in a GCC 
member state seeking enforcement in the DIFC. Thus, in Farroq Al Alwia v Lloyds TSB 
Bank PLC and Credit Suisse AG47, the DIFC court ordered the respondents to comply 
with a judgment issued by the Bahraini family court.      
A new mechanism for enforcement  
The DIFC Courts adopted a new mechanism on 16 February 2015 concerning the 
enforcement of DIFC judgements by issuing Practice Direction No. 2 of 2015 on the 
Referral of Judgment Payment Disputes to Arbitration.
48
 The Practice Direction is now 
fully in force. 
The new mechanism is designed to allow the parties to enforce their judgment by 
obtaining through the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre an arbitral award declaring its 
enforceability and then seeking to enforce the award abroad under the New York 
Convention. The Practice Direction essentially seeks to allow creditors to enforce through 
arbitration payment judgments issued by the DIFC courts against non-compliant debtors 
                                                          
45
 See Article 7 of Law 12/2004. 
46
 See the DIFC Courts Enforcement guide, p.14; available online on: difccourts.ae/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/ENFORCEMENT-GUIDE-2015.pdf. [Accessed: June 10, 2015].     
47
 Execution order No: 02 /12 of 19 January 2011.  
48
 Available online on the official website of the DIFC Courts at difccourts.ae/difc-courts-practice-
direction-no-2-2015-referral-judgment-payment-disputes-arbitration [Accessed: June 15, 2015]. 
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that have failed to comply with the terms of the judgments voluntarily. The main benefit 
envisaged will be the enhanced enforceability of “judgment-converted-awards” under 
international enforcement instruments typically applicable to international arbitration 
awards, such as the 1958 New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. A secondary objective of the Practice Direction is to encourage 
settlement of payment disputes prior to escalation to arbitration in view of the deterrent 
effect of the enhanced global enforceability of a DIFC judgment converted award.
49
 
Generally, in international disputes, the party who obtains a successful judgment seeks 
enforcement of the judgment or award and needs to have confidence that the judgment or 
award obtained will be enforceable. The new mechanism introduced by the DIFC Court is 
designed to enable the parties to enforce their judgement or award globally. The new 
mechanism is based on the idea that the parties who choose DIFC jurisdiction or fall 
under its jurisdiction should include a clause in their contract concerning enforcement. 
The clause should expressly indicate the parties’ intention that, in the case of a dispute 
concerning enforcement, the parties will refer such disputes to the DIFC-LCIA 
Arbitration Centre. For example, parties based in the UK and Australia can agree in 
writing to submit disputes concerning their contract to the jurisdiction of the DIFC courts 
and add a further clause that, upon obtaining a successful judgment, the successful party 
can approach the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre seeking an award from the Centre that 
confirms the enforceability of the DIFC court judgment. After obtaining such an award, 
the winning party can seek its enforcement through the Australian court under the New 
York Convention, to which Australia is a party.  
It may be noted that, if parties who agreed in writing to bring their disputes to the DIFC 
courts failed to include a clause to resolve disputes concerning enforcement through the 
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 Gordon Blanke, “DIFC Courts Practice Direction No. 2 of 2015: Adopted at Last!”, published in Kluwer 
Law on 31 March 2015. 
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DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre, then they have the option to make use of the new 
mechanism by subsequently agreeing in writing to resolve the enforcement dispute 
through the Centre, even after the judgment on the merits has been issued. But it seems to 
the present writer that this option will rarely be useful, since the losing party is unlikely to 
make a subsequent agreement to resolve the issue through the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration 
Centre, when a judgment against him on the merits has already been issued. Thus, it 
seems desirable that the clause recommended by the court choosing DIFC jurisdiction 
should contain an additional section on the resolution of disputes concerning enforcement 
through the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre. It could also be suggested that the DIFC 
legislator should amend its law and establish a new provision concerning enforcement by 
which the parties who agree on DIFC court jurisdiction should be taken to have also 
agreed that any issue concerning enforcement should be resolved through a DIFC-LCIA 
Arbitration, unless they specifically excluded such a further agreement.  
It is worthy of emphasis that, if the winning party seeks enforcement through the DIFC-
LCIA Arbitration Centre, the panel will resolve only the enforcement dispute without 
considering the merits of the case, as the merits have already been decided by the court. It 
seems that the main objective of the new mechanism concerning the enforcement of 
DIFC judgements is to improve the enforcement of judgments worldwide, and the 
Practice Direction will not contribute anything in relation to the enforcement within the 
UAE, as the DIFC judgment will be enforced within the UAE without any difficulties.  
Despite the enthusiasm with which the Practice Direction has been met in certain 
quarters, it seems to the present writer that the new mechanism will not succeed in 
enabling DIFC judgments to be enforced in external countries under the New York 
Convention, for the following reasons. 
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(1) The system of international arbitration, including the New York Convention (NYC) 
1958, rests on a premise that arbitration resolves “disputes” arising out of a defined legal 
relationship between the parties, such as substantive claims with respect to a particular 
contract or tort.
50
 A confirmatory award, which is effectively what Direction No 2 will 
ultimately achieve, does not raise a real issue for the arbitrator to determine, because the 
merits of the dispute have already been dealt with in the court judgment. Therefore, DIFC 
court judgments confirmed in accordance with Direction No. 2 are unlikely to be 
considered as awards that fall within the meaning of the New York Convention 1958.   
(2) Moreover, a court invited to enforce such an award might well refuse to do so on the 
basis of a general principle of private international law relevant to the interpretation of the 
NYC that there cannot be an exequatur on an exequatur (an enforcement order on an 
enforcement order).
51
  
(3) Another potential objection is that either the confirmatory award purports merely to 
declare the judgment enforceable within the DIFC, in which case it has no impact on the 
enforceability of the judgment abroad, or it purports to declare the judgment enforceable 
everywhere, in which case it conflicts with the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of a 
country to control enforcement within their territory, and this conflict renders the subject-
matter of the award non-arbitral, or its recognition and enforcement contrary to public 
policy, within the meaning of Article V(2) of the NYC. 
(4) If the UAE could succeed in this manoeuvre, other states would also do so, and the 
NYC would produce effects that no-one envisaged and few want. The result would be 
that numerous countries would consider withdrawing from the NYC until it is amended to 
prevent such manoeuvres. 
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 See articles I and II of the NYC 1958.  
51
 See Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws, 15th edition, para 14-205.  
173 
 
 A more promising method of improving the enforcement of DIFC judgments globally is 
for the UAE, through its federal government, to accede to the Hague Convention 2005 on 
Choice of Court Agreements.
52
 It could do so either after becoming a member of the 
Hague Conference or without joining the Conference, since Article 27 of the Convention 
permits accession by non-member counties. Moreover, in view of Article 28, such 
accession could either be with respect to the UAE territory as a whole or be confined to 
the DIFC alone. The Convention entered into force between the European Union (except 
for Denmark) and Mexico on 1 October 2015. It has also been signed by the United 
States and by Singapore, and thus there is some reason to hope that they will eventually 
ratify and then apply the Convention. 
The Convention regulates the direct jurisdiction of the courts of the contracting states in 
the context of exclusive jurisdiction clauses and provides for the recognition and 
enforcement between the contracting states of judgments given in accordance with such 
clauses.
53
 By Article 1(1), the Convention applies in international cases to exclusive 
choice of court agreements concluded in civil or commercial matters. Article 1(2) states 
that, in relation to direct jurisdiction, a case is international, unless the parties are resident 
in the same Contracting State, and the relationship of the parties and all other elements 
relevant to the dispute, apart from the location of the chosen court, are connected only 
with that State. By Article 1(3), a case is international where recognition or enforcement 
of a foreign judgment is sought. Article 19 permits a State to declare that its courts may 
refuse to determine disputes to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies if, 
                                                          
52
 For a brief analysis of the Convention, see Peter Stone, EU Private International Law (Second Edition, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), pp. 181-86 and 252-54. This analysis is omitted from the Third Edition 
(2014).   
53
 For exclusions with respect to recognition and enforcement between different EU Member States and 
savings in relation to other treaties, see Article 26.   
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except for the location of the chosen court, there is no connection between that State and 
the parties or the dispute. 
The meaning of "exclusive choice of court agreement" is addressed by Article 3(a), which 
defines such a clause as an agreement concluded by two or more parties that designates, 
for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a 
particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific 
courts of one Contracting State, to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. 
Article 3(b) adds that a choice of court agreement that designates the courts of one 
Contracting State, or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State, must be 
regarded as exclusive, unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise. Article 3(c) 
insists that an exclusive choice of court agreement must be concluded or documented 
either in writing or by some other means of communication that renders information 
accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference. Article 3(d) adds that an exclusive 
choice of court agreement that forms part of a contract must be treated as an agreement 
independent of the other terms of the contract and that the validity of the exclusive choice 
of court agreement cannot be contested solely on the ground that the substantive contract 
is not valid. 
Several matters are excluded from the scope of the Hague Convention 2005 by Article 2. 
These include consumer contracts; contracts of employment; family matters; wills and 
succession; insolvency; proprietary rights in and tenancies of land; the validity, nullity, or 
dissolution of legal persons, and the validity of decisions of their organs; the validity or 
infringement of intellectual property rights other than copyright and related rights; the 
validity of entries in public registers; the carriage of passengers and goods; marine 
pollution, limitation of liability for maritime claims, general average, and emergency 
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towage and salvage; anti-trust (competition) matters; liability for nuclear damage; claims 
for personal injury brought by or on behalf of natural persons; and tort claims for damage 
to tangible property that do not arise from a contractual relationship. But under Article 
2(3), proceedings are not excluded from the Convention application where these matters 
arise merely as a preliminary question and not as an object of the proceedings. Under 
Article 2(4), arbitration and related proceedings are excluded from the scope of the 
Convention. Under Article 2(5)-(6), proceedings are not excluded from the scope of this 
Convention by the mere fact that a State, including a government, a governmental agency 
or any person acting for a State, is a party thereto; however, the Convention does not 
affect privileges and immunities of States or of international organisations with respect to 
themselves and their property.  
Under Article 21, a State that has a strong interest in not applying the Convention to a 
specific matter may declare that it will not apply the Convention to that matter. The State 
making such a declaration must ensure that the declaration is no broader than necessary 
and that the specific matter excluded is clearly and precisely defined. On approving the 
Convention, the European Union made a declaration under Article 21 excluding its 
application of the Convention to insurance contracts, subject to exceptions similar to 
those specified by Articles 15 and 16 of the Brussels I Regulation,
54
 but no such 
reservation has been made by Mexico. 
Although (as explained) a wide range of matters are excluded from the scope of the 
Convention, the exclusions do not seem to have much significance in relation to the 
DIFC, since the Convention is applicable to transnational contracts that involve trade or 
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 See Annex I to EU Council Decision 2014/887. 
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financial services, and it is these which are important in relation to the operation of the 
DIFC as a global centre of business activity. 
With regard to direct jurisdiction, Article 5(1) ensures that the court or courts of a 
Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement have jurisdiction 
to decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless the agreement is null and void 
under the law of that State; and, by Article 5(2), such a court cannot decline to exercise 
jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be decided in a court of another State.
55
 
Conversely, Article 6 requires a court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen 
court to suspend or dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement 
applies. This negative obligation is subject to five exceptions: when the agreement is null 
and void under the law of the State of the chosen court; when a party lacked the capacity 
to conclude the agreement under the law of the State of the court seised; when giving 
effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary 
to the public policy of the State of the court seised; when, for exceptional reasons beyond 
the control of the parties, the agreement cannot reasonably be performed; and when the 
chosen court has decided not to hear the case.
56
 
By Article 8(1) of the Convection, a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State 
designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement must be recognised and enforced in 
other Contracting States in accordance with the Convention, and recognition or 
enforcement may be refused only on the grounds specified in the Convention. By Article 
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8(3), a judgment must be recognised only if it has effect in the State of origin and must be 
enforced only if it is enforceable in the State of origin. By Article 8(4), recognition or 
enforcement may be postponed or refused if the judgment is the subject of review in the 
State of origin or if the time limit for seeking ordinary review has not expired; but such a 
refusal does not prevent a subsequent application for recognition or enforcement of the 
judgment. By Article 8(2), except as regards such review as is necessary for the 
application of the provisions of the Convention, there must be no review of the merits of 
the judgment given by the court of origin. Moreover, the court addressed will be bound 
by the findings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction, unless the 
judgment was given by default. 
The grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement are dealt with in Articles 9-11 of the 
Convention. Thus, under Article 9(a), a judgment may be rejected if the agreement on 
jurisdiction was null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court, unless the 
chosen court had determined that the agreement was valid. By Article 9(b), a judgment 
may be rejected if a party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement on jurisdiction 
under the law of the requested State.
57
 Other grounds for rejection relate to inadequate 
notification of the defendant; fraud in connection with a matter of procedure; 
incompatibility with the forum’s public policy; non-compensatory damages; conflicting 
judgments; and incidental rulings on excluded matters.  
The procedure for obtaining recognition or enforcement is addressed by Article 13-15 of 
the Convention. In general this is remitted to the law of the requested State. 
 
                                                          
57 For other cases in which recognition and enforcement may be refused, see the Hague Convection under 
Article 9-11. Available online: www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98( accessed on 
12th September, 2015). 
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Summary  
The DIFC enactments respect the freedom of contracting parties to choose the law 
governing their contracts subject only to a saving in favour of the forum’s public policy. 
However, some confusion may have arisen from an unfortunate decision, which may be 
interpreted as indicating that a choice of UAE law to govern the contract cannot be 
effective in the DIFC. In the absence of an express choice, the court will apply directly 
the default rule, which subjects the contract to DIFC internal law, since no place is made 
in the DIFC legislation for a governing law ascertained by reference to an implied choice 
or a closest connection.  
The recent expansion of the jurisdiction of the DIFC courts will increase the number of 
cases that will be decided there. As a result, conflicting claims to jurisdiction between the 
DIFC courts and the main Dubai courts are emerging especially with regard to 
employment law. Such conflicts give rise to undesirable uncertainty for litigants.  
The effectiveness of the DIFC legal order as a globally significant provider of dispute-
resolution services is to a large extent dependent on the global enforceability of its 
judgments and awards. While awards in arbitrations seated in the DIFC will obtain 
widespread respect under the New York Convention 1958, the enforceability of 
judgments given by DIFC courts is problematic in relation to the many countries that 
have no relevant treaty with the UAE. Moreover, the recent attempt to enhance the 
enforceability of judgments by converting them into arbitral awards declaring their 
enforceability seems doomed to failure. A more promising manner of addressing this 
problem might be for the UAE to become party (on behalf of the DIFC at least) to the 
Hague Convention 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements.  
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Chapter 7 - Conclusions 
 
This thesis has analysed the rules on choice of law with respect to contract rules under 
European Union legislation and under the UAE Civil Code. The main aim was to 
consider how the UAE rules might usefully be reformed by interpretation or amendment, 
especially with regard to points on which the UAE law is unclear, and for this purpose to 
make use of the Rome I Regulation as an example of modern and widely accepted 
solutions. In addition, because of the importance of the DIFC as a developing centre of 
international commerce, the thesis examines the choice of law rules that have been 
adopted in the DIFC. In addition, the thesis has also considered other related aspects of 
private international law in the DIFC, such as judicial jurisdiction, arbitration, and 
enforcement of judgments and awards.   
The current chapter is divided into three parts. The first part presents some of the main 
findings of this research. The second part suggests a proposed draft of choice of law 
rules, designed for adoption by way of amendment to the CTC, in the light of the 
examination of the rules contained in the Rome I Regulation. The final part will be 
divided into two sections: the first relating to choice of law rules under DIFC law and the 
second focusing on other aspects of the private international law rules under DIFC law.    
  
Part 1 – Some Main Findings 
 
In chapter 3, the main rules on choice of law with respect to contracts specified by the 
Rome I Regulation and the CTC were examined. In both cases, the choice of law 
provisions allow the parties to choose the governing law expressly. However, the rules 
adopted under the CTC are silent on a few matters, such as whether the parties’ freedom 
to choose the governing law extends to allowing them to change the governing law at any 
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time; the permissibility of splitting the law that governs the contract; the permissibility of 
choosing an otherwise unconnected law; and the permissibility of choosing a non-
territorial law. These doubtful points under the CTC have been dealt with under the Rome 
I Regulation. To resolve these matters under the CTC, the judge can refer to its Article 
23, which allows him to refer to general principles of private international law to resolve 
matters not specifically addressed by the CTC.  
With regard to implied choice, both enactments recognise the parties’ freedom to choose 
the governing law impliedly. However, the Rome I Regulation restricts this freedom, as it 
requires that such choice must be clearly demonstrated, while under the CTC, there is no 
such explicit restriction on the discovery of an implied choose of law. Thus, the Emirati 
judge can take advantage of this flexibility and take a broader view of implied choice of 
law in order to escape from the default rules and introduce a closest connection rule. 
Factors that can be used as an indication of an implied choice can be identified in the 
Rome I Regulation and the case law thereon. However, under the CTC, there are no 
examples of these factors. Therefore, the UAE judge can rely on Article 23 of CTC as 
enabling him to refer to the Rome I Regulation to identify factors that may indicate an 
implied choice of law.           
The default rules in the absence of an express or an implied choice under the Rome I 
Regulation seem to operate better than the default rules under the CTC. This is especially 
the case with respect to the second UAE default rule, which refers to the law of the 
country of contracting as applying where the parties have different domiciles. The 
application of this rule can lead in some situations to results unexpected by the parties. 
Therefore, it would be more sensible to interpret this rule in a narrow sense, so as to 
confine it to situations in which the place of contracting is unambiguous and thus more 
likely to have a substantial connection with the contract.     
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Chapter 4 focused on exceptions to the operation of the proper law of a contract. One of 
these exceptions under both the Rome I Regulation and the CTC relates to personal 
capacity. The capacity of an individual under the Rome I Regulation is largely remitted to 
the conflict rules of the forum country. However, the capacity of the individual under the 
CTC is governed by the law of his nationality. 
Another exception relates to the capacity of companies. Under the Rome I Regulation, 
this matter is again remitted to the forum’s conflict rules. In contrast, the CTC subjects 
the capacity of companies to the law of the country in which the company has its actual 
main administrative centre, but it makes an exception if the company carries out an 
activity in the UAE and then subjects its capacity to the UAE internal law.      
Another matter in which the Rome I Regulation differs from the CTC is in the rules 
concerning formalities. Under the Rome I Regulation, it is sufficient, with regard to 
formalities, to comply with the law of the place in which a party or agent was present at 
the time of the negotiations through which the contract was concluded. In contrast, under 
the CTC, there are no special rules in relation to formalities, and they are subject to the 
general rules on choice of law for contracts. It has also been found that there are no 
explicit rules concerning the application of overriding mandatory rules in the CTC. 
Therefore, to apply such rules of the lex fori, the UAE court can adopt a wide 
interpretation of the public policy proviso specified by Article 27. In contrast, the Rome I 
Regulation makes specific provision for the application of overriding mandatory rules.    
 
In chapter 5, the choice of law rules in relation to certain types of contract (consumer, 
insurance, and employment contracts), in which one party is in a weaker position, were 
examined. It has been found that there are no special rules in the CTC concerning choice 
of law in relation to such contracts. The general rule of choice of law in contracts under 
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Article 19 will be applied. Thus, a consumer contract will be governed by the law chosen 
by the parties, and, in the absence of such choice, the normal default rules will be applied. 
Similarly, employment and insurance contracts will be subject to the general choice of 
law rules under Article 19 of the CTC, since no special provisions dealing with such 
contracts are included therein.  
In contrast, the Rome I Regulation explicitly subjects certain consumer contracts to the 
law of the consumer's habitual residence or at least gives overriding effect to protective 
provisions contained in that law. The Rome I Regulation also subjects some insurance 
contracts to the law of the country in which the risk is located and in general subjects 
employment contracts to the law of the country in which the employee carries out his 
work for the employer or at least gives overriding effect to protective provisions of that 
law.   
Despite the fact that, in the UAE, there are no special provisions concerning choice of 
law for these contracts, the UAE legislator has included some provisions in the 
substantive law of consumer contracts to offer protection to the weaker party in certain 
situations. Similarly, the UAE legislator has included some provisions in the substantive 
law of employment and insurance to protect the weaker party in particular circumstances. 
To make these mandatory provisions effective in appropriate transnational cases, there is 
a need to adopt special choice of law rules for such contracts and to ensure that the 
protective provisions are regarded as overriding mandatory provisions and given priority 
as such or under the public policy proviso.  
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Part 2 – A Suggested Amendment to the CTC 
In light of the findings in this thesis, it is useful to offer a draft of an amending enactment 
designed for adoption by the UAE legislator so as to make appropriate amendments to the 
CTC. This thesis proposes the following draft enactment. 
We Khalifa Bin Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, 
President of the United Arab Emirates State, 
Pursuant to the perusal of the provisional 2 Constitution and Federal Act no. 1 of 
1972, concerning the Jurisdictions of the Ministers and the Powers of the Ministers 
and the amending Acts thereof, and Federal Act no. 5 of 1985, concerning the Civil 
Transactions Code and the amending Acts thereof, and  
Acting upon the proposal of the Minister of Justice and the approval of the 
Council of Ministers and the ratification of the Federal Supreme Council, 
Have promulgated the following Act 
Article 1  
The Civil Transactions Act shall be amended by substituting a new version of 
Article 19 and adding an Article 27(2) so as to make better provision as to the law 
applicable to contractual obligations, as follows: 
"Article 19 
 
(1) The rights and obligations of the parties under a contract shall be determined in 
accordance with the proper law of the contract, ascertained as follows. 
 
(2)(a) The proper law shall be the law of the country which the parties have chosen 
as the law governing the contract by means of an express agreement, or of an 
agreement which is clearly implied from the terms of the contract and the other 
circumstances of the case.  
 
(b) The said choice may be made at any time; but a choice made after the conclusion 
of the contract shall not adversely affect the existing rights of third parties under the 
law previously applicable.  
 
(c) The choice must be of the law of a single country and must be designed to apply 
to the whole of the contract. It shall not be possible to choose different laws to 
govern different parts of the same contract. 
 
(d) A party may rely on the law of his residence at the time of contracting to show 
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that he did not agree to a choice of law proposed by the other party, where in the 
circumstances it would clearly be unreasonable to determine his consent to the 
alleged choice in accordance with the law allegedly chosen. 
 
(3)(a) When there is no effective choice in accordance with paragraph 2 above, the 
proper law shall be that of the country to which the contract has its closest 
connection determined by reference to all of the circumstances that existed and were 
known to the parties at the time of contracting..  
 
(b) For this purpose, unless the contrary is clearly demonstrated, the following 
presumptions as to closest connection shall be applied: 
(i) where the contract is a consumer contract, that the contract is most closely 
connected to the country in which the consumer was resident at the time of 
contracting; otherwise, 
(ii) where the contract is a contract of employment, that the contract is most closely 
connected to the country in or from which the employee was expected to carry out 
all or most of his work for the employer under the contract; otherwise, 
(iii) where the contract is a contract of insurance, that the contract is most closely 
connected to the country in which the risk was located; otherwise, 
(iv) where the parties were resident in the same country at the time of contracting, 
that the contract is most closely connected to that country; otherwise, 
(v) where the contract is for the transfer or creation of proprietary rights in 
immovable property, that the contract is most closely connected to the country in 
which that property is located; otherwise, 
(vi) that the contract is most closely connected to the country in which the party who 
is bound to carry out the performance which is characteristic of the type of contract 
in question was resident at the time of contracting. 
 
(4) With regard to formalities, a contract shall be regarded as valid if it complies in 
form with the requirements of its proper law, or with those of a country in which a 
party, or an agent of a party, was present at the time of the negotiations that led to the 
conclusion of the contract, and in or from which he was acting in those negotiations. 
 
Article 27 
 
(2) Where a matter is subject to foreign law under the provisions of this Chapter, 
effect shall nonetheless be given to overriding mandatory rules of UAE internal law 
in cases in which the situation is connected to the UAE territory in such a manner as 
to give rise to a strong interest of the UAE in the application of the relevant 
mandatory rule in the circumstances of the case. This applies, in particular, to 
mandatory rules that are designed to protect a party to a contract, who is regarded as 
having weaker bargaining power than the other party, such as a consumer, an 
employee, or in certain cases, an insurance policy-holder.   
 
The draft Article 19 is concerned with choice of law with respect to contracts. It allows 
the parties to choose the governing law for their contract expressly. In the absence of an 
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express choice, the court may determine an implied choice of law from the terms and 
circumstances of the case.  
Moreover, the draft Article permits a subsequent choice of law after the contract was 
concluded, but such agreement does not adversely affect third party rights. The draft also 
insists that the governing law must be the law of a single country, which will govern the 
contract as a whole. The parties are not allowed to split the law that governs the contract.  
The draft permits a party to invoke the law of his residence to show that he did not agree 
to a choice of law suggested by the other party, in circumstances in which it would 
clearly be unreasonable to determine his consent to the supposed choice in accordance 
with the law supposedly chosen. 
The draft ensures that, in the absence of an express or implied choice of law by the 
parties, the applicable law should be the law of the country that is most closely connected 
to the contract. The determination of such choice must be made based on the all of the 
circumstances relating to the contract of which the parties had knowledge at the time of 
contracting. Further, to increase certainty and predictability, it provides various rebuttable 
presumptions as to closest connection and places them in order of priority.  
Thus, the draft will usually subject an employment contract, in the absence of an express 
or an implied choice, to the law of the country in which the employee was expected to 
carry out all or most of his work for the employer under the contract. This presumption is 
also designed to offer the employee protection, since he is regarded as a weaker party in 
such a contract. Similar policies underlie presumptions for consumer contracts in favour 
of the law of the consumer’s residence and for insurance contracts in favour of the 
location of the risk. 
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More generally, in cases in which the parties have a common residence at the time of 
contracting, there will be a presumption in favour of the law of the country of the 
common residence. Otherwise, there is a presumption in favour of the law of a country in 
which immovable property is located in the case of a contract involving the transfer or 
creation of proprietary rights in such property. The final presumption refers to the law of 
the residence of the party whose performance is characteristic of the type of contract 
involved such as the seller in the case of a sale of goods.  
The last provision of the draft Article 19 is concerned with formalities, as the CTC has no 
existing provision concerning formalities. The draft aims to adopt a relaxed approach to 
formalities leaning towards validity. Thus, it upholds the validity of a contract that shall 
be considered valid if it complies with the formal requirements of its proper law or with 
those of a country in which a party, or an agent of a party, was present at the time of the 
negotiations that led to the conclusion of the contract and in or from which he was acting 
in those negotiations.  
The draft addition to Article 27 is concerned with the application of overriding mandatory 
rules of the lex fori. Since no provision specifically deals with this matter in the existing 
CTC, the draft provides a separate basis for the application of such rules independent of 
the public policy proviso. It will apply in the cases in which the situation is connected to 
the UAE territory in such a way as to give the UAE a strong interest in the application of 
its mandatory rules in the circumstances of the case. It is explicitly provided that this may 
apply to mandatory rules that are intended to protect a party to a contract, who is regarded 
as having weaker bargaining power than the other party; such as a consumer, an 
employee, or in certain cases an insurance policyholder.   
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Part 3 – The DIFC 
Choice of law in contract in the DIFC 
DIFC law respects the parties’ freedom to choose the law governing their contract. This 
right is ensured by several DIFC enactments subject to a proviso in favour of DIFC 
public policy.  
However, there is some case law which suggests that the DIFC law prohibited the parties 
from choosing the law of the main UAE to govern their contract in view of on an article 
in the legislation that establishes the DIFC. The DIFC should reconsider the interpretation 
of this article and recognise that its aim is to prevent the DIFC judge from applying the 
UAE law by default and to empower the DIFC to establish its own commercial and civil 
laws. 
There is no provision for an implied choice of law under the DIFC provisions. Therefore, 
in the absence of an express choice of law, the default rules will be applied. These simply 
subject the contract to DIFC internal law, which includes an enactment containing rules 
derived partly from the Vienna Convention on the international sale of goods. Where no 
other solution is available, as a last resort, the DIFC judge can use English law to fill any 
gap found or to answer any question that has not been covered by the DIFC Laws. Thus, 
English law has a supplementary role in relation to DIFC law.    
Other aspects of private international law in the DIFC 
Initially, the jurisdiction of the DIFC courts was limited to certain cases specified by the 
DIFC law which involved various connections with the DIFC territory. However, 
recently the jurisdiction of the DIFC courts has been expanded so as to allow any parties 
who wish to litigate in the DIFC to create jurisdiction by agreement.  
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With regard to arbitration in the DIFC, the Arbitration Law is based on the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, which is the accepted international standard for a modern statutory 
arbitration system. Moreover, the DIFC has established the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration 
Centre, which will have a great positive impact for the UAE and for Dubai in particular to 
make it an attractive international financial and commercial centre.  
The DIFC courts have recently accepted jurisdiction to ratify any arbitral award, even if 
the parties, their assets, and the subject of the dispute have no connection to the DIFC 
territory. This feature is attractive for parties who succeed in arbitral proceedings, since 
ratification in the DIFC will be shorter and faster than elsewhere in the UAE.   
The DIFC courts have only the power to enforce judgments within the DIFC territory. 
Thus, enforcement of a DIFC judgment elsewhere in the UAE is subject to the general 
rules of enforcement under UAE law. However, such enforcement should not involve any 
serious difficulty.  
In the case of a conflict of judgments between DIFC courts and main Dubai courts, the 
legislator has been silent on this issue. It is suggested that the matter should fall under the 
jurisdiction of the court of cassation and that the jurisdiction of the court of cassation 
should be extended in this respect by amendment. It seems difficult to subject the issue to 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court, as the conflict is between judgements 
between two courts of the same emirate.  
In contrast to enforcement elsewhere within the UAE, the enforcement of a DIFC 
judgment outside of the UAE will be subject to all relevant treaties and to the law of the 
country addressed. The new mechanism designed to improve the enforcement abroad of 
DIFC judgments by way of converting the judgment into an arbitral award seems likely to 
be beset with difficulties for the various reasons that have been explained in chapter 6. 
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Since the UAE and particularly the DIFC are seeking to offer an attractive environment 
for investors, it is suggested that the UAE should accede to the Hague Convention 2005 
on Choice of Court Agreements, which would have a significant impact in improving the 
enforceability of DIFC judgments in countries outside of the UAE.    
The problems that are raised and discussed herein concerning the choice of law may be 
resolved in light of suggested amendments to the CTC rules. Regarding the DIFC, 
various areas of private international have been examined, and the DIFC may examine 
the discussed issues and consider the solution suggested. Issues such as the jurisdiction 
between the main Dubai courts and the DIFC courts need to remain under review until a 
law is established by the legislator to eliminate this issue by establishing the jurisdiction 
of each court and the solution to jurisdiction conflicts. Future research could examine 
areas such as the application of Islamic rules to Islamic business and its relationship with 
the DIFC legal system.  
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